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# **REVIEW GROUP ON THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON UNIFICATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES**

REPORT 31 AUGUST 1980










31 August, 1980

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The Minister

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW GROUP ON THE REPORT  
OF THE TASK FORCE ON UNIFICATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

1. In accordance with your direction of 7 May, 1980, I forward the report of the Review Group on their appreciation of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces. I am confident that this material will serve you well in making decisions on disposition of the several recommendations of the Task Force.
2. At the same time, I commend to you the professional and timely work of the Review Group.



*R.M. Withers*  
R.M. Withers  
General










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
31 August 1980

TO: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF


Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Minister of National Defence is the report of findings and recommendations of the Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces.



J.E. Vance  
Major General  
Chairman



W.B. Hotsenpiller  
Commodore  
Member



J. Veronneau  
Brigadier General  
Member





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION	SUBJECT	PAGE
I	INTRODUCTION	1
II	BASIC CONSIDERATIONS	
	General	2
	Problem Definition	2
	Operational Effectiveness	3
	Unification	4
III	ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS	
	Part 1 – General	6
	Part 2 – Command and Control	8
	Part 3 – <u>Civilianization</u>	14
	Part 4 – Mobilization	22
	Part 5 – Support Services	24
	Part 6 – Base Concept	28
	Part 7 – Personnel	32
	Part 8 – Training	37
	Part 9 – Identity	42
IV	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	
	General	48
	Disposal of Task Force Recommendations	48
	Operational Effectiveness	48
	Resources	49
	People	49
	Unification	50
	Value of the Task Force's Work	50
	Final Conclusion	51

## ANNEXES

- A. NDHQ Action Directive D2/80
- B. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 1
- C. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 2
- D. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 3
- E. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 14
- F. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 15
- G. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 16
- H. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 17
- J. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 4
- K. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 5
- L. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 6
- M. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 7
- N. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 8
- P. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 9
- Q. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 10
- R. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No's 11 and 12
- S. Appreciation of Task Force Recommendation No. 13
- T. Staff Paper on Task Force Recommendation No's 22 to 30
- U. Summary of Recommended Disposal of Task Force Recommendations



## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

#### BACKGROUND

101. On 6 September 1979 the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces was given a mandate to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification and, at the same time, to provide comments on the Unified Command System. The Task Force met its mandate by identifying in its Report, entitled "Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report, 15 March 1980," a series of perceived problems on which it made 30 recommendations.

102. In order to give due regard to the Task Force's recommendations, on 7 May 1980 the Minister of National Defence directed the Chief of the Defence Staff to form a Review Group which was formally established under authority of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) Action Directive D2/80 of 27 May 1980. A copy of this directive is attached as Annex A.

#### TASK

103. The task assigned to the Review Group was to examine and prepare an appreciation of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces so that appropriate disposition of its recommendations could be achieved.

104. The scope of this task was to include, but not be limited to, an analysis of the findings and conclusions of the Task Force and the preparation of an action plan; including the broad policy, military and cost implications, and alternatives for the disposition of their recommendations.

105. The Minister charged the Review Group to report to him by 31 August 1980.

#### APPROACH

106. Initial assessment of the task by the Review Group underlined a requirement to view the undertaking as a staff endeavour rather than a study. Although explicitly stated within the scope of the mandate, it is emphasized that the mission of the Review Group was to review the Task Force Report and not to conduct a full review of unification. The approach adopted was to address the 30 recommendations individually by applying the military appreciation process to each. Considering the time factor it was found necessary to obtain problem related and impact analysis information from appropriate NDHQ and Command sources. Interviews were conducted with the environmental Commanders and comments and advice on certain recommendations were solicited from NDHQ Group Principals and their staff. The views of NDHQ Branch Advisors were obtained for those problems related to identity. Other specific problem areas were discussed with the NDHQ environmental Branch Chiefs, Chief of Reserves and the Chairman of the Mobilization Planning Task Force.

107. The Review Group is most appreciative of the excellent cooperation of NDHQ and Field staff in assisting the Group to meet its mandate.





## SECTION II

### BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

#### GENERAL

101. There are a number of important, and general, features of the Task Force Report which should be emphasized from the outset:

- a. In its approach the Task Force undertook to conduct an audit using individual and collective opinions gathered over as wide a base as time permitted. The findings of the Report, therefore, were based in large part on perceptions of problems presented to the Task Force. Its conclusions and recommendations took the form of the Task Force's best collective judgement based on the information received and in the context of several general governing principles.
- b. The Task Force established operational effectiveness as its governing criterion in drawing conclusions and making recommendations.
- c. While it made a number of specific and important recommendations, the Task Force did not include in its Report a general recommendation on unification itself.

102. Each of these general features is discussed in turn below.

#### PROBLEM DEFINITION

103. The Task Force's approach of canvassing as broadly as possible for opinions produced a wide ranging set of findings not normally available to the military staff system. One result of this approach, however, was that opinions expressed were not always supported in the Report by defined problems. Therefore, the Review Group, in treating the Report's findings, has devoted much of its work to problem definition, doing so in the conviction that the applicability of a related conclusion and recommendation was directly dependent on the accuracy on which the finding was based. In some cases the process of defining the problem has led the Review Group to somewhat different conclusions and to a broader number of options in disposing of the Task Force's recommendation.

104. It was the decision to concentrate initially on analyzing the Report's findings through problem definition which led the Review Group to apply the military appreciation format to most of the Report's recommendations.

105. One other related feature of the Report merits general comment and underlines the value of the work undertaken by the Task Force: the Report demonstrates the variety of perceptions with which the Canadian Forces are viewed. At the least this indicates that within the Forces themselves a common perspective, coming from a mutual understanding of goals, resources and constraints, is not shared

throughout the Forces. One must, therefore, deduce that the Canadian Forces have a problem of communications which needs to be set right as a matter of priority.

## OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

106. The use of operational effectiveness by the Task Force as its governing criterion is strongly supported. The Task Force defined operational effectiveness as meaning "to cover the quality and efficiency of the Canadian Forces with regard to the fulfilment and achievement of the tasks that they have undertaken." The Task Force concluded that the Canadian Forces perform extremely well, indicating "..... a disciplined, well administered force, capable of fielding excellent operational units and formations."

107. In interpreting operational effectiveness in a broader context, however, the Task Force cited important shortcomings in the areas of equipment, personnel and materiel deficiencies.

108. Investigation by the Review Group supports both these conclusions, noting that the deficiencies in the broader context are directly related to the allocation of resources to the Department of National Defence (DND).

109. There are two other aspects of operational effectiveness to be inferred from the Report. The first is the need to keep squarely in front of us the widely accepted principle that the needs of the Service must come ahead of the aspirations of the individual. This principle is inherent in many of the Task Force recommendations on personnel matters. The other is the requirement to continually measure DND policies, plans and procedures with the template, "Will it work in conflict?" Underlying many of the problems cited by the Task Force is the concern that, in certain areas, the Canadian Forces would have difficulty in moving into operations, including moving to a war footing. Examples in the Report include:

- a. Command and control, particularly the regional command system.
- b. Central support systems, such as the capacity to extend the Canadian Forces Supply System into field operations or the applicability of the personnel system in the areas of recruiting and training.
- c. Continued concern that the Canadian Forces do not yet have a mobilization plan and, from that, the rationale on which to task, structure and equip the Reserves.

110. The Review Group notes the introduction into the Forces of the revised Performance Measurement System as the surest method of assessing operational effectiveness on a routine and continuing basis. To further emphasize its importance, the Review Group recommends that:

- a. operational effectiveness be identified as the governing criterion in monitoring progress and in identifying improvement in all areas of CF endeavour;



- b. the simple yardstick, "will it work in conflict?" be applied in all issues requiring decision; and,
- c. the principle that the needs of the Service come ahead of the aspirations of the individual be re-enunciated.

## UNIFICATION

111. While it made a number of specific and important recommendations, the Task Force did not include in its Report a general recommendation on unification itself. The Task Force analysis of the policy of unification did not lead it to recommend the repeal of Bill C243, the central legal instrument by which a single unified force was created. Further, among the Report's recommendations most directly affecting the policy of unification, those on command and control and on retention of central support systems are predicated on continued refinement of existing central institutions. Therefore, one must infer from the Report the conclusion that the policy of unification should remain in effect, tempered by the adoption of the Task Force's recommendations which pertain to the policy of unification. Section III of this report is devoted to an analysis of those recommendations.

112. It is submitted that this conclusion should be further qualified by the following considerations:

- a. Changes which occurred independently but concurrently during the process of unification have made subsequent audit of its success or failure virtually impossible. The most significant of these changes were in the area of resource allocation. Indeed, many of the problems cited by the Task Force can be set straight only by the allocation of further additional resources or the reallocation of current resources.
- b. The process of unification carried with it two unhealthy side effects. One was that unification for a time was enshrined as an article of faith: it took a number of years before essential environmental differences could once again be recognized and respected. The other effect was characterized by the attitude that any function that could be unified, should be, and, if it was applied at the national headquarters level it ought to be applied at the field level as well. The end result of this thrust for uniformity was that some policies were introduced more, it seemed, for the sake of unification than for operational effectiveness. The Task Force manifested the same concern in its treatment of such areas as the base concept, training and identity.
- c. The marked turbulence of the unification era, engendered by a process of continual change, left the Canadian Forces with a strong disposition to retrench. Nevertheless, after a short respite, the Forces returned to their natural aptitude for change, exemplified in the reversion of arms training to environmental Commands, the reintroduction of navy rank nomenclature, and the establishment of Air Command. In this aptitude for change, however, there remains a strong desire for evolutionary development rather than revolutionary upheaval.

- d. The Canadian Forces to this day continue to manifest collectively an abiding sense of professionalism, disposing members to the frame of mind that there will always be problems and that their peacetime job in good part is to strive to solve them and thereby better the Forces.

## SECTION III

### ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

#### PART 1 — GENERAL

101. This section is given to a detailed analysis of each of the Task Force recommendations and to the Review Group's proposals to the Minister of National Defence for their disposal.

102. In approaching its work, the Review Group has been guided by the basic considerations developed in Section II above. These are summarized for ease of reference:

- a. the perceptual nature of the problems cited by the Task Force and the attendant problem of communications within the Canadian Forces;
- b. the use of operational effectiveness as the governing criterion, including the application of the simple yardstick, "will it work in conflict?" and of the principle that the needs of the Service must come ahead of the aspirations of the individual;
- c. acceptance of the retention of the basic policy of unification, conditioned by the need to recognize environmental differences and measured by the criterion of operational effectiveness;
- d. recognition that the Forces have faced, and will continue to face, serious resource constraints; and,
- e. acceptance of problems as a principal challenge of the peacetime professional service member. In this context the Task Force Report serves the important purpose of identifying a wide variety of current problems in the Canadian Forces.

103. In its analysis of Task Force recommendations, the Review Group has used the same functional categories or problem areas defined by the Task Force in their Report. These functional categories are presented in an order that permits early identification of keystone recommendations, notably those covering Command and Control, Mobilization and Support Services. This Section thus contains the following:

- Part 2 — Command and Control
- Part 3 — Civilianization
- Part 4 — Mobilization
- Part 5 — Support Services
- Part 6 — Base Concept
- Part 7 — Personnel
- Part 8 — Training
- Part 9 — Identity



104. In each Part the Task Force recommendation is identified by the original numbering assigned in the Task Force Report and is quoted in full in the introductory material.

105. A full appreciation has been prepared on most of the recommendations. Because of their length and detail, their content has been summarized in the main text. Where appropriate to a more complete understanding of the Review Group analysis, actual appreciations have been attached as annexes to this Report.

## **SECTION III**

### **PART 2 — COMMAND AND CONTROL**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

201. The Unification Task Force made two recommendations on Command and Control:

a. **Recommendation 20**

"The Task Force recommends as an urgent priority that the Commanders of Commands be made members of the Defence Council and the Defence Management Committee and that measures be taken to ensure their influence is fully recognized in matters pertaining to operations, training, personnel administration and support to the operational forces."

b. **Recommendation 21**

"If this measure proves insufficient to solve the problems identified by the Task Force, it is further recommended that three environmental Heads of Service be established at National Defence Headquarters to be responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff for the command of the navy, army and air force."

202. Because of their interrelationship these two recommendations have been dealt with together by the Review Group. Moreover, since the Minister of National Defence had already accepted and has put into effect the first recommendation, it was not considered necessary to develop problem definition and full argumentation. Thus, the subject of Command and Control has not been subjected to the appreciation format.

#### **BACKGROUND**

203. The Task Force placed marked emphasis on Command and Control, making it the central issue of their Report. The Review Group has found that similar importance is attached by most of the senior NDHQ staff and all three of the principal Commanders. The fact that the Minister of National Defence had chosen to direct, and the Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff have acted expeditiously on the first of the two Command and Control recommendations further underlines this importance.

204. In demonstrating its emphasis, the Task Force decided to consider a wide variety of subjects under the heading of Command and Control, the net effect being to present an omnibus, almost miscellaneous, section on the subject. In identifying concerns the Task Force findings enumerated the following related issues:

- a. role of environmental Commanders;
- b. civilianization;
- c. need for a scientific advisor;

- d. regional command system;
- e. base concept;
- f. authority of Commanding Officers (COs);
- g. helicopter air detachments (helairdets); and
- h. mobilization.

205. By and large, only the role of environmental Commanders is addressed directly in the Command and Control recommendations. Issues of base concept, authority of Commanding Officers and mobilization are dealt with in other recommendations. The remaining issues did not lead the Task Force to specific recommendations and, therefore, the Review Group has decided to give separate advisory papers to the Chief of the Defence Staff on them. However, the problem of civilianization, while not leading to Task Force recommendations, was considered by the Review Group critical enough to warrant its own separate treatment in Part 3. This approach has permitted the Review Group to concentrate in this part on the role of environmental Commanders.

## **AIM**

206. The aim of this Part is to review Recommendations 20 and 21 in the light of problems cited by the Task Force and the Minister of National Defence decision to implement Recommendation 20.

## **ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

207. In leading to its recommendations the Task Force concluded that:

- a. there is a lack of environmental input into the decision making process at the senior National Defence Headquarters level;
- b. there are too many sources of direction to the commands, bases and units; and,
- c. there is a lack of environmental direction to the National Defence Headquarters central systems.

208. In making their recommendations the Task Force stressed the wish to retain the integrated systems currently in use in NDHQ, while ensuring these systems respond to the needs of the three environments. Also to be inferred, it is suggested, is the hope that increased involvement of environmental Commanders would place operational matters in sharper focus. Finally, the Task Force further emphasized the need to proceed in an evolutionary manner with any changes or modifications.

209. The Review Group finds considerable consistency between this Task Force position and many of the main points developed in Section II (Basic Considerations) of this report. There is a strong emphasis on operational matters and on the need to recognize environmental differences. At the same time there is a clear statement on the retention of central institutions. In short, the import of the Task Force recommendations is to make specific, but important, adjustments to the present command and control system and to do so gradually in an evolutionary manner.



210. There is one other key feature to be noted from the Report: it concerns the perceived lack of communications between the field and senior management. Action taken to involve environmental Commanders in the senior decision making process will go a long way in allaying this perceptual problem. Even more important, such a step will serve the critical purpose of improving communications throughout the Canadian Forces by assuring a better understanding by the Commanders of the situation facing the Canadian Forces as a whole for transmission down the chain of command. In this regard, Commanders can fill a vital role in communicating a common perspective of Forces' goals, resources and constraints to the troops under their command. Additionally, this step will serve the purpose of obtaining at appropriate times the benefit of the experience of Commanders and their appreciation of the situation or of the implications of policies under consideration.

## **IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS IMPACT**

211. In April 1980, the Minister of National Defence announced that environmental Commanders would henceforth attend Defence Council (DC) and Defence Management Committee (DMC). Subsequently, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff issued instructions that the environmental Branch Chiefs would represent the respective Commanders at these meetings when the latter were unable to attend. Environmental Commanders have attended meetings of DC and DMC twice monthly since the Minister's announcement.

212. Review with environmental Commanders of the implications of this action has produced the following findings:

- a. there is unanimous concurrence in their increased participation through attendance at DC and DMC;
- b. practical problems in terms of demand on time and difficulties of travel are expected;
- c. there is concern for the impact this additional task will have on Commanders' primary job of commanding their Commands;
- d. they anticipate a problem in making an effective contribution in view of irregular attendance, difficulty in maintaining liaison and the need for continuity;
- e. there is some uncertainty as to the appropriate level at which to raise parochial issues;
- f. they are concerned about the impact on the functions of the environmental Branch Chiefs, in terms of both increased workload and relationship with Commanders and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS);
- g. the view is expressed that environmental Branch Chiefs should attend Program Control Board and/or DMC;
- h. the question of whether the inclusion of Commanders at DC and DMC will satisfactorily meet their concerns has led to the suggestion that the implementation of Recommendation 21 will have to be considered eventually; and,

- i. in view of these anticipated problems and the number of attendant matters still to be resolved, the Commanders share the conviction that the implementation of Recommendation 20 should be considered as a trial.

213. The following further points have been presented to the Review Group by members of senior management in NDHQ:

- a. implementation of Recommendation 20, in the aspect of having Commanders attend DC and DMC, is not likely to be adequate by itself;
- b. adjustments in the responsibilities of DCDS may be required. That appointment has included the job of addressing a major challenge of the unified Force, that is, the principal task of matching resources and capabilities for the three separate environmental programs. This responsibility perhaps more properly belongs to the Program Control Board and Defence Management Committee;
- c. there is a requirement for a better mechanism to establish complete and fully coordinated environmental programs. The Land Force Combat Development Committee is considered to be a suitable model, providing as it does a balanced, long range army program of tactical development, doctrine and equipment procurement. Similar processes are now being developed in the other environments;
- d. it is evident that, just as there is a need to sensitize central systems in NDHQ to field needs, so too is there a requirement to improve communications through the downward linkages of the chain of command; and,
- e. any further adjustment, along the lines of Recommendation 21, will need very careful assessment of a number of considerations, not the least of which are:
  - (1) the fact that NDHQ in its present form is an amalgamation of Departmental HQ and CFHQ. Further adjustments must take into consideration both the important gains this amalgamation has produced and the penalties such adjustment might incur in the continued successful operation of the amalgamated headquarters; and,
  - (2) it is debatable whether the presence of heads of service in NDHQ over the last five years would have materially altered decisions taken in areas like resource allocation or equipment procurement.

214. It is clear to the Review Group in analyzing the views outlined in paras 212 and 213 that significant additional work will be needed in the process of disposing of Recommendation 20 and that such work will take considerable time.

215. The remaining point to be considered in this analysis is that only part of Recommendation 20 has been addressed thus far. There remains the Task Force view that "... measures be taken to ensure their (environmental Commanders) influence is fully recognized in matters pertaining to operations, training, personnel administration and support to the operational forces." One can take the view that such influence will be given effect through Commanders' presence at DC and DMC. However, it is submitted that this approach does not fully cater to the Task Force concern for the "lack of environmental direction to the National Defence Headquarters central systems."

216. In assessing this problem the Review Group is satisfied that matters pertaining to operations and training are fully catered for through the existing environmental branches in the DCDS Group, as well as the presence of Commanders at DC and DMC. Assessment of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) Group indicates that a sound staff structure exists in the pertinent functional areas, namely engineering maintenance, procurement and supply. This staff structure, organized as it is along environmental lines, assures the facility for recognizing environmental needs. There is, however, no apparent evidence of a parallel facility in the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) Group. The chief part of the personnel system most frequently perceived as needing environmental influence is in the career management area. The Review Group feels that the need to study this area more closely has merit and should be considered.

217. The perceptual aspect of the problem bears emphasis. The value of having Commanders involved in, and seen to be involved in, the senior decision making process has been accepted. It is submitted that, in fully disposing of Recommendation 20, NDHQ central systems should be sensitized to environmental needs. This would entail three steps:

- a. a conscious review of the NDHQ central systems to confirm the Review Group assessment in paragraph 216 above;
- b. remedial action as deemed appropriate; and,
- c. thorough publication down the chain of command of the results of a and b above.

## CONCLUSIONS

218. Expeditious action has been taken on the critical area of Command and Control in the Minister's direction that Commanders attend DC and DMC. The main part of Recommendation 20 has thus been disposed of.

219. There are a number of attendant concerns arising as this direction is being implemented, including the functions and interrelationships of the environmental Branch Chiefs and the DCDS. This implementation, therefore, needs to be monitored with a view to further refinement or modification and a trial period of two years is suggested. This length of trial is necessary in view of the amount of adjustment which may be needed. It is also important to proceed in an orderly and evolutionary manner.



220. The balance of Recommendation 20 needs to be disposed of, it is suggested, through a study to ensure that central systems are sensitized to environmental needs.

221. In view of the conclusion that more work needs to be undertaken to fully dispose of Recommendation 20 and considering that Recommendation 21 has not yet been disposed of, a trial approach monitored at the highest level would seem to be in order.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

222. It is recommended that:

- a. attendance of Commanders at DC and DMC be viewed as a trial, attendant problems being confirmed and appropriate adjustments being made over a period of two years;
- b. the need to ensure that NDHQ central systems are sensitized to environmental needs be addressed through:
  - (1) a conscious review of the NDHQ central systems to confirm the Review Group assessment;
  - (2) remedial action as deemed appropriate; and,
  - (3) thorough publication down the chain of command of the results of (1) and (2) above.
- c. implementation of the above action and monitoring of its success be undertaken at the highest level so that, at the end of the trial period, decision can be made either to confirm that action or to consider further adjustment, including the disposal of Recommendation 21.

## SECTION III

### PART 3 — CIVILIANIZATION

#### INTRODUCTION

301. The Task Force raised the problem of civilianization of the Canadian Forces as part of its examination of the broader issue of Command and Control. Although civilianization is indirectly addressed in the Task Force recommendations on Command and Control, there are no conclusions or recommendations dealing specifically with this subject. However, concern for civilianization runs as an undercurrent throughout the Report, to the extent that the Review Group felt it advisable to conduct a separate analysis of this subject.

#### AIM

302. The aim of this Part is to analyze the Task Force position on civilianization with a view to making recommendations on its disposal.

#### TASK FORCE FINDINGS/DISCUSSION

303. Opinions expressed to the Task Force regarding a perceived civilianization of NDHQ can be summarized in the following findings:

- a. **Senior Decision Making.** At the senior level, civilians were making decisions of a military nature. In the same context, the co-chairmanship of Defence Management Committee (DMC) was criticized.
- b. **Military/Civilian Ratio.** It was alleged that the proportion of civilians in NDHQ had increased in relation to the proportion of military personnel.
- c. **Day-to-Day Military Decisions.** Some witnesses claimed that too many decisions affecting the daily lives of service personnel were being made by civilians who were not sufficiently familiar with the details of service life.
- d. **Impact on Operational Effectiveness.** It was held that this perceived civilianization had resulted in a loss of focus on the "sharp end".
- e. **Civilianized Approach.** There was a widespread feeling within the CF outside NDHQ that the seemingly large number of civilians involved in the decision making process in NDHQ had civilianized the approach to military problems.

304. It should be noted that the above findings, like all those in Section V of the Task Force Report, were simply reported and do not include discussion by or views of

the Task Force itself. Indeed, the only editorial, and concluding, comment by the Task Force had the effect of stressing the perceptual nature of the problem of civilianization. This is reviewed in the following paragraphs.

## **SENIOR DECISION MAKING**

305. The Task Force discussion, in Section VI of the Report, is worth quoting in full:

"Within the area of command and control, there is a perception that civilians have too much influence in the making of decisions which affect the military. In part, this perception may be based on an incomplete understanding by those in the field about the nature and functioning of NDHQ, and in part, attributable to the composition of DMC which is perceived to be dominated by civilians. The Task Force feels that the relationships between civilian and military personnel are of a high quality. It is also felt that the perception of civilianization would be dissipated with a greater involvement of the military in the decision making process."

306. The key points to note in this Task Force position are:

- a. The problem of perception arising from both appearance, in the sense of the composition of DMC, and misunderstanding, in the sense of comprehension in the field of the workings of NDHQ.
- b. The need for greater military, rather than less civilian, involvement.
- c. The recognition of the high calibre of military/civilian relations within the Department.

307. In analyzing the problem of perception, the Review Group notes that the need for more visible military involvement in the senior decision making process is already being addressed. The step of including environmental Commanders in DC and DMC will go far in strengthening the military presence.

308. There remains an important problem of comprehension, an aspect of the lack of communications cited in Section II (Basic Considerations). It is clear that the following at least are not well understood throughout the Forces at large:

- a. the amalgamation of Departmental HQ and CFHQ which occurred in 1972;
- b. the basic terms of reference of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff as derived from law;
- c. the management system introduced to coordinate and control plans, policies and programs, including the Defence Services Program; and,



- d. the degree to which senior civilian officials of the Department have assumed both more direct authority and greater responsibility for the Forces. The marked increase in their accountability particularly is not widely appreciated.

309. How to correct such misunderstanding is a major challenge which the Review Group feels must be faced. The best hope would appear to lie in a thorough assessment of the training manuals, study material, and curricula used currently in officer and senior non-commissioned officer training. From that assessment it may be wise to consider the issue of a carefully thought-out, simply written manual like the old Canadian Army manual of training entitled "Organization and Administration in Canada, 1960" (CAMT 1-34). In any case, there is an educational task ahead of us if the misperception of the functioning of NDHQ is to be corrected.

310. Finally in this section concerning senior decision making, the Review Group's analysis, discussions and interviews all reaffirm the high regard with which the senior civilian officials of the Department are held by the Forces.

## CIVILIAN/MILITARY COMPONENT

311. In addressing the relative size of components, the Task Force reported that "it was alleged that the proportion of civilians in NDHQ had increased in relation to the proportion of military personnel." Although organizational changes have made valid comparisons virtually impossible, this statement is inaccurate according to the best information available to the Review Group, in that the period from 1964 to 1979 saw a reduction of 178 military positions compared to 169 civilian. Similarly there is no disparity at senior levels, viewing the Department as a whole:

General Officers:	Senior Executives (SX):
Authorized (1967) 113	25
Authorized (1979) 109	23

When examining these statistics one should also bear in mind two other considerations. One is the marked growth elsewhere in the Public Service throughout this era, a growth not reflected in DND. Secondly, there is also the question of how Canada, and its amalgamated departmental and armed forces headquarters, compares in relative terms with the United Kingdom, United States or Federal Republic of Germany, and their headquarters structures.

312. The Review Group therefore concludes that the Task Force finding on the relative size of military and civilian components is not supported.

313. A far more important issue in reviewing the military/civilian components has come to the attention of the Review Group: it relates to the perceived loss in military employment potential at the more senior levels in NDHQ, apparently beginning with the introduction in 1972 of the MIL/CIV concept, by which a number

of senior appointments can be filled alternatively by either military or civilian personnel. This apparent loss seems to stem from the following perceptions:

- a. Implementation of the MIL/CIV concept has placed civilians in positions, from Director to Chief levels, that were either traditionally held by military or whose primary responsibilities relate to a critical military function.
- b. Some senior positions have been reclassified above military equivalents to match comparable levels in other government departments.
- c. Giving due regard to the competence, specialization, and advantages of continuity produced by the senior civilian, his selection to fill a mil/civ position tends to become rather permanent. Once occupied by a civilian, a position which should be filled on a rotating, either/or basis, becomes in reality a civilian position. Thus promotion and employment potential for military officers has been accordingly reduced.
- d. Because civilians are less mobile and because of the civilian classification and competition process, the position they occupy becomes a vital part of their career. Thus the inherent tendency to build and expand the job may be viewed as a legitimate attempt to progress, whereas the military is provided promotion not directly linked to a specific job.

314. Among the important advantages of an integrated military and civilian structure is the combination of the civilian, with his degree of specialization, NDHQ experience and continuity, and the senior military officer, with his leadership, field experience and breadth of expertise. It is suggested that this advantage is not being fully exploited by the current method of sharing individual positions. A better method might be to redesignate some of these positions as either military or civilian. The creation of the position, Director General of Civilian Personnel, is a good example of a fairly recent change which resulted from a realization that the management of civilian personnel had been fragmented. Elements of civilian personnel administration belonged to various military directors general and directors who were not fully equipped to deal with unique civilian personnel problems. These responsibilities are now consolidated under a single director general, whose position necessarily is civilian.

315. The Review Group therefore concludes that the application of the MIL/CIV concept has had a significant impact on the morale of the Forces and that it continues to reinforce the perception of civilianization. The Review Group agrees that many of the senior positions in NDHQ can be effectively filled by either military or civilian. However, job tenure and military content should be carefully considered before a selection is made. Indeed, a re-designation of certain positions as either military or civilian is recommended as the preferred solution.

#### **DAY-TO-DAY MILITARY DECISIONS**

316. While many of the opinions expressed to the Task Force on the question of civilianization appear to have come from senior serving or retired officers, there is one area of expressed concern which has a broader, perhaps all-ranks base. Certainly the most vocal and frequent criticism of civilianization emanating from service personnel at the working level relates to the control which civilians appear to have



over day-to-day issues which affect them personally. Pay structure, allowances, financial entitlements, pensions, promotion quotas, bilingualism, travel claims, dependents education, etc., are "bread and butter" concerns for military personnel. Lacking a full knowledge of the NDHQ structure, they find it difficult to understand why the final authority in so many of these areas is a civilian. The working level perception of "civilian control" is further reinforced by the fact that field briefings on contentious issues are often given by civilians. Unfortunately some of the policies on which these briefings are based are highly complex and made even more so by detailed and, for the average platoon commander or divisional officer, incomprehensible regulations. This situation in turn has promoted a widely held suspicion that such regulations are more attuned to Treasury Board directives than to the needs of the field.

317. The challenge facing the Department is to strike a balance between this perception of field-oriented needs and the fundamental requirement that rules and regulations for the Forces must reflect rules and regulations for government at large. Equally as important is the need to ensure that, at the time they are being formulated, Government-wide rules and regulations are written so that the particular needs of the Canadian Forces can be accommodated.

318. The Review Group has therefore concluded that this problem is serious enough to warrant special consideration. While there does not appear to be any short term solution, the following recommendations are tabled:

- a. in manning those positions dealing with "bread and butter" concerns, particular care must be taken to balance the need for military experience against the need for bureaucratic experience;
- b. the policies governing these key areas, together with the regulations which effect them, should be examined to ensure that they are as fully supportive of field needs and as simply stated as possible. (This recommendation is also included in the Review Group Report's examination of the autonomy of Commanding Officers); and,
- c. Departmental participation must be achieved in the development of Government-wide policies and regulations to ensure that they accommodate particular Canadian Forces needs.

## **CIVILIANIZED APPROACH**

319. The area of civilianization in which the Review Group found greatest cause for concern is that of the increasingly civilianized approach to military problems. The source of concern is not, as was reported by the Task Force, the large number of civilians involved in military business. Rather, it is the gradual imposition, upon the Department as a whole including military members, of civilian standards and values in managing the Forces and in assessing their needs and goals. The dilemma facing the Forces as a profession is that civilian standards and values are displacing their proven military counterparts and, in the process, are eroding the basic fiber of Canadian military society. At the risk of overstating the situation, the Forces are facing a crisis of the military ethos.



320. The dimensions of that crisis can be divined in the following:

- a. the military ethos is now not clearly defined. Seldom is it spoken of;
- b. the Department continues valiantly to fight a series of rearguard actions for such vital causes as military quarters or regimental messes;
- c. it has marked difficulty in reconciling operational effectiveness under war conditions with the demands of socialization in areas like human rights or freedom of information; and,
- d. we increasingly succumb to the principle of civilian comparability in critical areas like military pay and compensation.

321. The issue facing the Forces is simply put: in the absence of clearly defined and defensible military values, the Canadian Forces are steadily turning to civilian values. If this trend persists, the continued weakening of the military profession as it has been known is predictable.

322. The Review Group can suggest no facile answer to this problem. Nonetheless, solution might be indicated in this analogy: just as the environmental Commands within the Forces need special recognition of their unique needs, so the Canadian Forces as a whole (indeed DND in its entirety) must be recognized for their differences from the rest of Government.

323. How to enunciate those differences and to strive for their recognition will require considerable thought. As a start these basic steps ought to be considered:

- a. there is a clear need for a carefully selected officer to be detailed to research and write down the military ethos for the Canadian Forces;
- b. this document should be approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff and, under his direction, put into effect within the military at every opportunity; and,
- c. under the joint supervision of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, an assessment of relations with Treasury Board and other official agencies should be undertaken to determine how best to re-instate military values as the criteria for judging military needs and goals.

## CONCLUSIONS

324. The Review Group draws the following conclusions to the attention of the Minister of National Defence:

- a. problems concerning civilianization in senior level decision making are ones of perception and education. With the inclusion of environmental Commanders in DC and DMC, there remains an educational task to ensure that the organization, division of responsibilities, and management system of NDHQ are clearly and simply understood throughout the Forces;

- b. the high regard with which the senior civilian officials of the Department are held is reaffirmed;
- c. the finding reported to the Task Force on the relative size of military and civilian components in NDHQ is not supported;
- d. the application of the MIL/CIV concept has had a significant impact on the morale of the Forces and continues to reinforce the perception of civilianization. This perception is of sufficient concern to warrant reassessment of certain aspects of the MIL/CIV concept;
- e. there is a need to attune Departmental administration to the daily "bread and butter" needs of servicemen and women. Special consideration should be given to the manning of certain key positions, balancing the need for military and bureaucratic experience, and to the policies and regulations themselves, as regards the degree to which they are supportive of field needs, comprehensible to the field commander and reconcilable with overall Government policies and regulations; and,
- f. there has been a gradual imposition, upon the Department as a whole including military members, of civilian standards and values. Civilian standards are increasingly being used to assess Forces' needs and goals because we no longer have clearly defined and defensible military values. There is an urgent need to address this problem squarely.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

325. It is recommended that:

- a. a thorough assessment be conducted of training manuals, study material and curricula to ensure that the organization, responsibilities and management system of NDHQ are clearly and simply understood throughout the Forces;
- b. the application of the MIL/CIV concept be reviewed, with particular attention being given to those positions which:
  - (1) have a very high military content and day-to-day profile with the field; and,
  - (2) have a very high bureaucratic, regulatory content; and,
- c. to enunciate military values and to strive for their recognition, the following basic steps be considered:
  - (1) the military ethos for the Canadian Forces be written;

- (2) this document be approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff and, under his direction, put into effect within the military at every opportunity; and,
- (3) under the joint supervision of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, an assessment of relations with Treasury Board and other official agencies be undertaken to determine how best to reinstate military values as the criteria for judging military needs and goals.



## SECTION III

### PART 4 - MOBILIZATION

#### INTRODUCTION

401. The findings on mobilization reported by the Task Force can be summarized as follows:

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** Concern was expressed to the Task Force about the low priority given to mobilization planning, the lack of a mobilization plan being taken as an example of the lack of emphasis on operational matters.
- b. **Resources.** The Canadian Forces' inability to mobilize was attributed in part to the shortage of resources.
- c. **Unified Structure.** The degree to which the unified structure would impede mobilization was questioned. Doubt was expressed particularly in the common recruiting and training systems.
- d. **Reserves.** It was reported that the Reserve Force was in a dilemma as its raison d'être depended upon a mobilization plan, without which its role, structure and equipment needs could not be set straight.

402. The Task Force concluded that:

- a. a low priority has been given to augmentation plans;
- b. current defence policy does not include a mobilization plan; and,
- c. there is doubt as to the ability of the training system, the common recruiting system and the unified structure to cope with mobilization.

403. The Task Force made two recommendations on mobilization:

- a. **Recommendation 18**  
"the highest priority be given to the subject of mobilization planning"
- b. **Recommendation 19**  
"the current National Defence Headquarters study on mobilization deal with the associated problems identified by the Task Force including those aspects that go beyond augmentation: the organizational structure of the Reserve Force, the viability of the common training structure, and the ability of a unified structure to respond to mobilization"

404. In making its report, the Task Force acknowledged the work currently underway in the Department of National Defence on mobilization planning.

#### AIM

405. The aim of this Part is to report on the current Department of National Defence study on mobilization in the light of Task Force concerns.

## DISCUSSION

406. The Review Group notes that the concerns expressed by the Task Force have been shared in DND for some time and that a major effort to address mobilization planning was launched within the Department on 1 October 1979. At that time the Chief of the Defence Staff directed the formation of a Mobilization Planning Task Force (MPTF) to establish a realistic conceptual basis upon which mobilization planning can be founded and to develop the necessary supporting plans.

407. The MPTF was assigned a wide ranging mandate, an analysis of which shows that **inter alia** it addresses the concerns of the Unification Task Force. This mandate is designed to confirm the roles of the Canadian Forces on mobilization, to define the personnel and equipment requirements to meet the commitments assigned to the Canadian Forces on mobilization, and to develop supporting contingency plans to move the Forces to a wartime footing. A basic feature of the MPTF mandate is the total force concept and the Reserves thus are being considered in all aspects of the MPTF work, with a view to identifying the Reserves' role, structure and equipment needs as well.

408. The MPTF has completed its preliminary report which will be presented to Defence Management Committee and Defence Council in the early autumn. It is intended that the final Canadian Forces Mobilization Plan be presented for approval in June, 1981.

409. In view of the special nature of the MPTF assignment and the priority given to its work, the Review Group did not consider further investigation appropriate.

## CONCLUSION

410. The Review Group has examined the mandate of the MPTF and the progress made to date and is satisfied that the requirement for mobilization planning has been established, that the scope of the MPTF work adequately addresses the concerns of the Unification Task Force, and that a high priority is being placed on this vital subject. It is appreciated that the concerns of the Unification Task Force will not be effectively met until the recommendations of the MPTF have been implemented.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

411. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence note that the recommendations of the Unification Task Force on the subject of mobilization are being given effect in the work of the MPTF. What remains is that the conclusions of the MPTF be given the most serious consideration towards enhancing our operational effectiveness and meeting the valid concerns of the Unification Task Force.

412. It is further recommended that the work of the MPTF be accepted as the surest method of defining the role, structure and resources needed for the Reserve Force.

## SECTION III

### PART 5 — SUPPORT SERVICES

#### INTRODUCTION

501. This Part is a summary of the four appreciations which deal separately with the recommendations of the Task Force on the subject of Support Services. The four appreciations are attached as annexes to this Report and should be referred to for a full treatment of the subject.

502. The Task Force made the following recommendations on this subject:

a. **Recommendation 1**

"the common central support systems be retained"

b. **Recommendation 2**

"support services personnel rotate between the central systems and their particular environment"

c. **Recommendation 3**

"direction be given to address the recognized inadequacies in the supply system including organization, depot locations, system/component relationships and first-line support to field units"

d. **Recommendation 14**

"the Canadian Forces continue with common recruiting by trade but with greater attention to environmental preferences"

503. In dealing with these recommendations, the Review Group has taken the "common central support systems" referred to in the Task Force Report to mean:

- a. the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) Group including the Canadian Forces Training System, the Canadian Forces Recruiting System, and the ADM(Per) controlled units;
- b. the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) Group including the ADM(Mat) controlled units; and,
- c. Canadian Forces Communication Command

#### AIM

504. The aim of this Part is to indicate the recommended disposition of the four Task Force recommendations on Support Services.



## **ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

505. During its analysis the Review Group determined that the Task Force had made two vital recommendations (i.e. Recommendation 1 dealing with the retention of the common central support systems, and Recommendation 2 dealing with cross-environmental postings) which subsequently affected its other recommendations, particularly those related to Recruiting and Identity. The first recommendation was taken by the Review Group to confirm the Task Force support of unification as already discussed in Section II of this Report. On the other hand, Recommendation 2 implies a return to a form of former service support systems which in effect would require the splitting of support personnel into navy, army and air force support elements. Thus the Review Group sees an inherent conflict between Recommendations 1 and 2 and has therefore attempted to deal with the question of support services in a way designed to resolve the inconsistency.

506. In view of this inherent conflict, the basic consideration which has guided the deliberation of the Review Group on the central question of support services has been the quite clear support which the Task Force has given to the retention of the organizational structure of the common central support systems in Recommendation 1. The Review Group, therefore, found it necessary to first confirm whether the central systems should be retained before discussing the feasibility of employing support personnel (from the recruit stage on) within a single environment and within the common central support systems. Finally, as part of the review of the common central support systems, the Review Group determined to what extent supply problems identified by the Task Force existed and what action needed to be taken to rectify them.

### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 1**

507. The findings of the Task Force were that the integration of Support Services, facilities and staffs common to all three former Services had undoubtedly created savings and promoted efficiency in some areas. The Review Group supports the recommendation of the Task Force to retain the common central support systems as it has been able to confirm that:

- a. Unification of the support systems has increased their cost effectiveness and efficiency. It has also increased the flexibility of the Canadian Forces to respond to tasking, although this flexibility may be strained under wartime conditions.
- b. A return to individual support systems is neither necessary nor warranted as it would create a need for significantly more support resources without any noteworthy increase in the strength of the operational components of the Forces.
- c. Support personnel serving within the present systems have been given greater professional opportunities and career benefits than before.

- d. The effectiveness of the present support systems could be increased if they were more environmentally oriented.

508. The Review Group's support of the systems is not unqualified as their ability to support mobilization still has to be established. Nevertheless it is recommended that the Minister of National Defence accept this recommendation of the Task Force. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex B.)

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 2**

509. The Task Force's conclusion on this subject was that support personnel could not be effectively trained and employed in more than one environment during their career. The Review Group has already highlighted the conflict which exists between the subject of this recommendation, which would have the effect of reinstituting three separate support systems, and Recommendation 1, which supports the retention of common central systems. The Review Group's support for Recommendation 1 has already been discussed at para 507. The Review Group has determined that a return to separate environmental groupings of support personnel as proposed by the Task Force would be more costly in manpower resources, would give rise to personnel distribution and employment problems, would sow the seeds of dissatisfaction and divisiveness within the support services, and would cause a loss of flexibility and capability within the Canadian Forces. The Review Group has also concluded that such a drastic step as the one recommended by the Task Force is not necessary since, within the present practical limits of flexibility, support personnel with experience in a specific environment are posted back to fill vacancies in that environment whenever possible. Finally, and more importantly, the Review Group believes that all of the benefits which the Task Force has listed in support of its proposal can be realized simply by formal recognition that more emphasis should be placed on the environmental capability of support service personnel. It is therefore recommended that the Minister of National Defence not accept Recommendation 2 but nevertheless direct that every effort continue to be made within the Department to develop and maintain environmental expertise within the Support Services. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex C.)

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 3**

510. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence note that necessary steps are being taken within the Department to correct the supply system deficiencies highlighted by the Task Force and in a manner which will satisfy the needs of the users. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex D.)

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 14**

511. The Task Force brought up the fact that Support Services personnel were not allowed to join the environment of their choice during recruitment. The Review Group, in its analysis of the problem, agreed that environmental preferences could be

identified during the enrolment process and given due consideration on completion of an individual's trade training course. The Review Group determined that, while Service requirements must predominate, the desires of individuals would be met if at all possible. However, the Review Group noted that critical manning deficiencies and personal suitability will continue to limit the choices offered to an individual by the Recruiting System. It is, therefore, recommended that the Minister of National Defence accept Recommendation 14 but note that Service needs will continue to override individual preferences when the two are in conflict. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex E.)

## **RECOMMENDATION**

512. The Review Group recommends that the Minister of National Defence accept the recommendations of the Task Force on the subject of Support Services with the exception of Recommendation 2. The Review Group recommends that the Minister reject Recommendation 2 because of its impracticability but direct that every effort continue to be made within the Department to develop and maintain environmental expertise within the Support Services.



## SECTION III

### PART 6 — BASE CONCEPT

#### INTRODUCTION

601. The Unification Task Force made the following recommendations on the Base Concept:

a. **Recommendation 15**

"more flexibility be exercised in the application of the Base Concept for the army in such matters as personnel administration, pay and social services"

b. **Recommendation 16**

"more resources be devoted to solution of the "double-hatting" problem of army service battalions"

c. **Recommendation 17**

"further consideration be given to the departmental study evaluating the Canadian Forces base system"

602. The "Base Concept" is a term used to refer to the organizational structure of all CF bases. In concept, it is simply a functional distribution of the Base Commanders' support responsibility to four major departments namely; Operations, Technical Services, Comptroller and Administration. This common structure was introduced to provide the Base Commander with unity of command. It has been adopted with varying degrees of success to meet the needs of integral units under the direct command and control of the Base Commander as well as other lodger units who simply reside on the base and require support services. The Task Force recommendations deal primarily with problems of the individual units, army service battalions and the Base Concept. Separate appreciations have been prepared on each of these recommendations and are attached as annexes.

#### AIM

603. The aim of this Part is to indicate the recommended disposition of the three Task Force recommendations on Base Concept to the Minister of National Defence.

#### ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

604. The Task Force concluded that the Base Concept as the focus of activity under the principle of centralized administration of resources is in contradiction with the traditional principle of unity of command. Most of the problems the Task Force

identified in their discussions and findings are deemed to have been initiated or at least aggravated by the introduction of a common Canadian Forces Base Concept. The Review Group considers it important for the Minister to note that persistent problems with span of control, lack of environmental focus and unity of command could be more accurately attributed to reduction in manpower resources and infrastructure, and organizational changes such as the elimination of regional and functional group headquarters. Thus, it is not the Base Concept itself which is inadequate; it is the lack of proper planning and recognition of unique environmental requirements during the implementation of this common system. During that turbulent era, geographical proximity appears to have been the primary consideration in the assigning of support responsibility to bases for particular units. Furthermore the Review Group has determined that the majority of the identified problems are concentrated on only ten of the thirty-one CF bases.

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 15**

605. The Task Force concluded that the application of a common Base Concept across the Canadian Forces had reduced the effectiveness of units, particularly on army bases. The lack of administrative autonomy of combat and combat support units while in garrison was isolated by the Task Force as a matter of primary concern. The Review Group analysis of this recommendation has confirmed that the perceived problems do exist. This lack of autonomy or unity of command for the commanded units is a constant which has an impact on the effectiveness of units on air and maritime bases as well. The need to improve the functional and administrative autonomy of these units is therefore accepted by the Review Group with the realization that it will never be possible to apportion the full spectrum of base resources to make these units truly autonomous or accountable. In suggesting that the Minister of National Defence accept this Task Force recommendation the Review Group has made the following enabling proposals for future action within the Department. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex F.)

606. It is recommended that:

- a. army combat and combat support units be given incremental increases in personnel resources to provide for the same level of administrative autonomy in garrison that these units achieve by augmentation when deployed to the field;
- b. naval training and support units ashore adopt the same leadership system employed in ships; and that,
- c. where resources permit, a return to air squadron maintenance be encouraged.

607. It is further recommended that the Minister of National Defence note that an enlightened, less rigid application of this common base structure has improved the quantity and quality of support provided to most commanded units. Indeed,

increasing the Base Commander's commitment to, and responsibility for, unit mission should improve the effectiveness of the unit and enhance functional communications.

#### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 16**

608. The problem of "double-hatting" of army service battalions is fundamentally related to insufficient manpower resources and overtasking. To absorb the severe personnel reductions imposed on the army following unification, Mobile Command attempted to alleviate these constraints by integrating the static base administrative and logistics functions at CFBs Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier with the combat service support operations provided by 1 Service Battalion, 2 Service Battalion and 5 Service Battalion at these bases. While this expedient was considered a temporary measure to conserve manpower, the long term effect has been to seriously impair the service battalions' mobile capability to support 1 Canadian Brigade Group, the Special Service Force and 5 Canadian Brigade Group. As a result of "double-hatting", complicated by overtasking and personnel instability, the service battalions have been unable to conduct an adequate degree of unit and formation training or provide an effective level of real combat service support to the combat arms units of the formations. Deficiencies of major equipments and a heavy individual training burden required as a result of the lack of sufficient environmental training in the central system have further exacerbated the "double-hatting" problem in the service battalions.

609. The Review Group found that the problem of "double-hatting" had been effectively defined by the Force Structure Review which set service battalion manning at 85% of war establishment, and by recent On-Site Manpower Reviews (OSMER) conducted at the three bases. These OSMERs recommend substantial personnel increases to eliminate the problem and restore an acceptable level of operational effectiveness to the three Canadian based brigade groups. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex G.)

610. The Review Group recommends that the Minister of National Defence endorse this Task Force recommendation and further that he note that the following supporting actions are recommended for the approval of the Chief of the Defence Staff:

- a. The manpower increases approved in the Force Structure Review be provided as soon as practicable along with the acquisition of some logistics support equipments.
- b. The increases in base establishments for CFBs Calgary, Petawawa, and Valcartier, as recommended by the recent OSMERs, be implemented consistent with Departmental priorities.

#### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 17**

611. The Task Force concluded that the application of the common Base Concept



did not recognize fundamental environmental and functional differences in each base. It therefore proposed that the Department give further consideration to current base problems. In its analysis of this recommendation the Review Group noted the "Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System" Project E-17 dated 15 December 1977 which also documented most of the problems identified by the Task Force. This evaluation was presented to senior management within the Department in early 1978. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex H.)

612. In attempting to limit the scope of a further review of the Base Concept, the Review Group has recommended to the Chief of Defence Staff that:

- a. the ten most complex bases be subjected to a thorough evaluation to rationalize their span of control and recognize unique environmental or functional support service requirements;
- b. the full benefits of this common base structure be realized by introducing a more flexible approach designed to provide maximum service to the lodger and integral units;
- c. where practical the Base Commander be given more direct responsibility for the operational effectiveness of his integral units; and,
- d. the Base Commander's tour of duty be more directly related to the best interests of the base than to career progression concerns.

613. The Review Group supports the Task Force recommendation on the need for a further evaluation of the Base Concept and asks the Minister of National Defence to note that this matter is currently under review within the Department.

## CONCLUSION

614. The Review Group therefore recommends that the Minister of National Defence accept all three Unification Task Force recommendations under the heading of Base Concept as being in the best interest of the Canadian Forces, and further that he note that corrective actions on identified problems are currently being considered by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

## SECTION III

### PART 7 — PERSONNEL

#### INTRODUCTION

701. The Unification Task Force made six recommendations on Personnel:

a. **Recommendation 4**

"cross-postings between environments be used only for volunteers or to meet special personnel requirements"

b. **Recommendation 5**

"offering promotions as an inducement to personnel to accept undesirable postings be avoided"

c. **Recommendation 6**

"the rank structure for non-commissioned officers be re-examined"

d. **Recommendation 7**

"the existing study of rank and trade skill be accorded a high priority"

e. **Recommendation 8**

"a more balanced sea/shore and field/static ratio be developed for navy and army operations personnel"

f. **Recommendation 9**

"greater reliance be placed on the formal lines of authority within the chain of command between the central personnel system and the unit commanders"

702. Although these six recommendations are properly placed under a general heading of Personnel, they deal with six different subjects. Moreover, to develop problem definition and full argumentation, each recommendation has been the subject of a separate appreciation, the results of which are attached as annexes.

#### AIM

703. The aim of this Part is to indicate the recommended disposition of the six Task Force recommendations on Personnel to the Minister of National Defence.

## **ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

704. As stated earlier in the "Basic Considerations" section of this report, the unification process was responsible for the creation of a host of common personnel policies. Furthermore the rigid application of the "common approach" was accompanied by a preoccupation with the conditions of service and welfare of the individual. Thus, the unique operational requirements of the Forces received limited attention, particularly during the first few years of the unification era. The Task Force findings relate primarily to a number of residual problems in personnel management which remain to be corrected.

### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 4**

705. The Review Group has found it difficult to determine precisely what the Task Force Recommendations 2 and 4 implied with regard to the need for rigid barriers on postings between environments, although they state "It is intended that posting across environmental lines be eliminated." The Review Group supports the underlying principle that environmental experience and expertise must be nourished by the posting process and has recommended in the proposed disposition of Recommendation 2 that posting patterns be developed which will enhance environmental expertise.

706. In arriving at Recommendation 4 the Task Force concluded that postings between environments were detrimental to the efficiency of both the unit and the individual. They went on to propose that subject postings be used only for volunteers or to meet special requirements. The Review Group and various Branch Advisors agree that problems were created in the past due to officers and men being posted into a totally unfamiliar environment, and note that recent initiatives have been taken within the personnel branch to eliminate these occurrences. However, to assure the continued effective manning of ships and combat units, personnel staffs must be left with the flexibility to cross-post between environments when manning circumstances demand it. Therefore, the Review Group does not support Recommendation 4 in its present form and recommends that it not be accepted by the Minister of National Defence. However, the Review Group recommends that the Minister note the present policy of avoiding cross-environmental postings, subject to the needs of the Forces and to the individual preferences of members. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex J).

### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 5**

707. The Task Force concluded that the use of promotion to obtain volunteers for undesirable postings was creating morale problems and some resentment among the personnel involved in this process. The Review Group has determined that a problem does exist among a relatively small group of service personnel, due primarily to the lack of a straight forward explanation of the reason why promotion inducement is a valid Service requirement.



708. The ability to man operational units such as ships and land combat units is predicated on a search for personnel who are prepared to waive the "vested rights" accorded to them by the Reorganization Act if they were serving prior to 31 January 1968. The need to find volunteers for these units is steadily diminishing and it will disappear when trades are composed entirely of personnel who joined subsequent to 31 January 1968. The use of promotion inducement to find volunteers for hazardous types of employment such as submarines and the airborne regiment will remain a valid requirement for an indefinite period.

709. Moreover, the Review Group has confirmed that the policy of promotion inducement is carefully and honestly administered and that it is applied only when essential Service requirements dictate. Thus the Review Group does not support the subject Task Force recommendation. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex K).

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 6**

710. The Task Force concluded that the current ranks for non-commissioned officers did not adequately express leadership and supervisory requirements of the Forces and recommended that this rank structure be re-examined. The Review Group notes that persistent problems in the complicated matrix of rank and trade structure have led to several major studies within the Department in the past 15 years, most significant of which were the "Minister's Manpower Study (MEN)" and the "Other Ranks Career Development Program Study" completed in 1974. Defence Management Committee gave conceptual approval in May 1976 to a further study aimed at rationalizing rank and trade structure in all trades. The Review Group supports the Task Force recommendation on the need for a further review of the non-commissioned officer rank structure and asks the Minister of National Defence to note that the required study is part of the ongoing action stemming from the Other Ranks Career Development Program. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex L).

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 7**

711. As a corollary recommendation to the review of rank structure, the Task Force proposed that the existing study of the separation of rank and trade skill be accorded a high priority. The need for such a review was based on the Task Force perception that rank had been used as a reward for trade skill progression and that some more practical means should be found to encourage and reward the acquisition of trade skill. The need to motivate trades personnel to increase their skills and thereby increase the inventory of trade expertise available in the Canadian Forces is endorsed by the Review Group. It is noted that these measures are appropriate and timely in considering the technological challenges that face our personnel with the introduction of new generations of equipment. It is therefore proposed by the Review Group that the Minister of National Defence accept the Task Force recommendation for a trade skill enrichment program and further that the current study be given a high priority by the Chief of the Defence Staff. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex M.)

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 8**

712. The Task Force concluded that operational trades were not provided sufficient relief from extended periods of sea and field duty. While they acknowledged that considerable improvements in this area had been made in recent years, the Task Force recommended that a more balanced sea/shore and field/static ratio be developed for navy and army operations personnel. The Review Group notes that the problems related to extended periods of sea and field duty existed before unification, and has demonstrated in the specific appreciation on this subject that improvements in the provision of static employment positions for these trades were facilitated by the existence of the central or unified personnel management system.

713. The 1974 Defence Management Committee direction to provide additional static establishment positions for operational tradesmen triggered an ongoing set of corrective actions to improve the morale and retention of these personnel. Much progress has been made in the past six years, however, a number of residual problems unique to the naval environment remain to be resolved. These problems along with specific proposals for rectification action are contained in the enclosed appreciation on this subject. The Minister of National Defence is therefore asked to note that the Task Force recommendation is supported and further that corrective action has been initiated by the Chief of Defence Staff to eliminate the residual problems in this program. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex N.)

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 9**

714. While the Task Force supported the retention of common central support systems they attached several caveats. In this instance they concluded that unit leadership had been adversely affected by the orientation of the central personnel system to individual rather than unit needs. The Task Force also held the opinion that the unification/centralization process had complicated the unit Commanding Officer's function and reduced his autonomy.

715. The Review Group analysis has confirmed that the complexity of unit personnel administration has increased dramatically during the past decade and further that the individual has become much more dependent on the central personnel system and certainly more aware of the existence of these authorities than in previous service days. It has been determined that the Commanding Officer has lost little real autonomy for vital career actions such as postings, promotion and course selection; however, the Commanding Officer is clearly no longer perceived by the individual as being the predominant figure in his service life.

716. The Review Group is convinced that the Task Force recommendation on the need to enhance the effectiveness of the unit Commanding Officer is valid and that remedial action is needed. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex P.)

717. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence endorse this Task Force recommendation and that he note that the following supporting actions are recommended for the approval of the Chief of the Defence Staff:

- a. Canadian Forces Administrative Orders and related Canadian Forces Publications be reviewed, abbreviated and simplified for use in the field;
- b. a unit supervisor's "record of service" be created and that this document be passed from one Commanding Officer to the next during the posting process;
- c. an effort be made to increase the individual's reliance on his Commanding Officer for all career and employment matters; and that,
- d. direction be given to extend the tour of duty of Commanding Officers where unit effectiveness would be enhanced.

718. It is further recommended that the Minister of National Defence note that the rather more substantial action proposed in disposing of Recommendation 15 on the Base Concept will lend additional strength to the position of Commanding Officer.

## CONCLUSION

719. The Review Group analysis of these six recommendations has confirmed that the Task Force accurately identified a number of problems in the area of personnel management and that the basic thrust of their proposed corrective actions is well founded. There are however, two specific recommendations which are not recommended by the Review Group for acceptance, namely Recommendations 4 and 5. Both center on the basic principle enunciated in Section II of this Report that the requirements of the Forces must be given primary consideration and, while personnel preferences should not be disregarded, the need for effective manning of operational units must prevail. The Minister of National Defence is requested to note that the majority of the problems identified by the Task Force are currently receiving the necessary corrective action within the Department.





## **SECTION III**

### **PART 8 — TRAINING**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

801. The Task Force made the following recommendations on training:

a. **Recommendation 10**

"sea, land and air operational trades personnel undergo environmental training and socialization during both recruit and trades training"

b. **Recommendation 11**

"environmental training take advantage where practicable of existing common training facilities such as Cornwallis, St. Jean, Borden and Chilliwack"

c. **Recommendation 12**

"greater emphasis be placed on environmental training for support services personnel"

d. **Recommendation 13**

"greater priority be given to collective training"

802. While each of the foregoing recommendations deals with a separate aspect of training, there is a common theme which binds the Task Force findings together, namely the requirement for the training system to recognize unique environmental needs. These rather complex issues have been individually subjected to the appreciation format which are attached as annexes to this report.

#### **AIM**

803. The aim of this Part is to indicate the recommended disposition of the four Task Force recommendations on training to the Minister of National Defence.

#### **ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

804. The Review Group treatment of the subject recommendations has been conditioned by the retention of common or central institutions which in this instance means the Canadian Forces Training System. This position is taken, however, with the realization that the common training concept will be thoroughly rationalized in the

current Mobilization Planning Task Force Study. Since the principle "will it work in conflict?", enunciated in Section II of this report has not yet been applied to the concept of common individual training, the Review Group must deal with systems in being.

805. To provide a common basis of understanding in dealing with the subject Task Force recommendations the following definitions have been used:

- a. "Socialization" is the process which replaces civilian ethics and lifestyle with a military ethos and a structured, yet self-disciplining set of military values. This process begins in the recruit training phase and extends through basic trades/classification training to the first few years of military employment.
- b. "Environmental indoctrination" is considered to be a complementary process which nourishes service expertise and identity and enables the individual to perform effectively and relate to an environment, that is navy, army or air force. This process may be initiated during recruit and trades training, however such indoctrination is most effectively provided in an operational setting.
- c. "Environmental training" is deemed to be the provision of an increment of special training beyond basic trades/classification training to enable support service personnel to serve effectively in a specific environment.

#### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 10**

806. The Task Force in arriving at the subject recommendation, concluded that more emphasis should be placed on environmental indoctrination and socialization of operational tradesmen during their recruit training phase. The Task Force also considered that these recruits received some training that would not be needed for their future employment. The Review Group analysis of the current 11 week recruit course, supported by discussions with the operational Commanders, could not identify the redundancy which was perceived by the Task Force.

807. The need to provide a socialization program for these young recruits was acknowledged in October 1979 and resulted in the Commander of Canadian Forces Training System establishing a formal socialization program on each of his five training bases. The Review Group noted that, while the program has only been in effect for ten months, the voluntary attrition of these trainees has been cut in half. Furthermore, it has been recommended that the Chief of the Defence Staff adopt appropriate aspects of this socialization process Forces-wide.

808. The Review Group has confirmed that more emphasis should be placed on environmental indoctrination and that to the maximum possible extent this process should be initiated during recruit training. Initiatives have already been taken by Mobile Command and the recruit schools to enhance the army indoctrination of



combat arms recruits and the practical application of a similar program for sea and air trades is currently being defined. Thus, the Review Group recommends that the Minister of National Defence accept this Task Force recommendation and further that he note the measures which are being taken within the Department to improve the socialization and environmental indoctrination of these young trainees. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex Q.)

#### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 11**

809. The Task Force recommendation that environmental training take advantage where practicable of existing common training facilities appears to have been based on a realization that proliferation of training infrastructure was neither desirable nor economically practical. The Review Group analysis has confirmed that this was a valid premise conditioned only by possible changes that may result from a thorough study of mobilization requirements. It is however noted that the bulk of the environmental training load is now borne by the operational Commands due to the fact that:

- a. field training and range facilities, aircraft and ships are essential physical elements in the environmental training process and with certain exceptions they are not available on CF Training System bases;
- b. the majority of the environmental experts who are required to perform instructional duties are employed in the operational Commands; and,
- c. CF Training System is currently not staffed to handle a larger share of the environmental training workload.

810. The Review Group recommends that the Minister of National Defence accept the foregoing Task Force recommendation and further that he note that the Department is making optimum use of common Canadian Forces Training System facilities. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex R.)

#### **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 12**

811. The Task Force recommendation that greater emphasis be placed on the environmental training of support services personnel has been accepted and reinforced by the previous Review Group analysis under Support Services (Part 5) and Personnel (Part 7). Any further substantiation of this requirement is considered, therefore, to be redundant. It is important however, that the Minister of National Defence be advised of the sequence of events that should be followed to provide this increased environmental expertise. They are:

- a. the specific environmental training requirements must be defined by operational commands and translated into training standards and plans by CF Training System; and,

- b. the decision as to where this training should take place will be based, as it is now, on a rationalization of who is best equipped to ensure an optimum end product.

This environmental training would be given only to those support services personnel whose impending employment required it. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex R.)

## **DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION 13**

812. The Task Force concluded that insufficient priority has been accorded to collective training. This condition was judged to have arisen due primarily to the lack of adequate resources. Specifically the Task Force identified insufficient funds for fuel and ammunition, support inadequacies and time constraints as limiting factors in the conduct of collective training at the scale needed to achieve required professional standards.

813. Researching this conclusion in greater depth through discussion with Commanders of environmental Commands, the Review Group concluded that the navy and the air force are in fact able to conduct an appropriate level of collective training given the limits of ship and aircraft availability. Conversely, the army, faced with a wider range of limiting factors, was unduly constrained in its ability to meet an appropriate standard.

814. Numerous factors impact on the army's collective training capability. Resources such as personnel, equipment and material, ranges and training areas, supplies, airlift, combat service support, availability of funds and time available were all found to be inadequate. Priorities accorded to individual training and to a multiplicity of tasks affect the cohesiveness of units leaving them too few personnel to carry out collective training effectively.

815. These overall inadequacies have markedly affected the ability of the army to attain and sustain the essential general combat competence for operations in war. This capability is fundamental to the army's ability to respond to the wide variety of tasks required of it in peace as well as those which will be needed on the battlefield. (Supporting appreciation is at Annex S.)

816. The Review Group accordingly recommends that the Minister of National Defence accept the subject Task Force recommendation and further that:

- a. the Minister note the requirement that the army concentrate its field units annually to conduct extensive field training over a period of four to five weeks. These concentrations would be held at formation level in one year and at multi-formation level during the next year. Since the first multi-formation concentration to be held in 15 years is planned for the summer of 1981, it is further recommended that the Minister approve this activity and lend his support to its implementation;

- b. the Chief of the Defence Staff examine the current allocation of resources within the Canadian Forces with a view to ensuring that appropriate collective training by the land forces can be supported to give effect to the direction of the Minister which has been recommended above.

## CONCLUSION

817. The Review Group analysis of the four Task Force recommendations on training has led to the conclusion that the problems enunciated in the subject report exist and that corrective action is required. It is, therefore, recommended that the Minister of National Defence accept the subject Task Force recommendations and that he note that a number of the corrective actions have been approved by the Chief of Defence Staff and are in fact being implemented.





## SECTION III

### PART 9 - IDENTITY

#### INTRODUCTION

9.01 The Unification Task Force made nine recommendations on Identity:

a. **Recommendation 22**

"further identification be provided in the Canadian Forces for environment, ship, squadron or unit"

b. **Recommendation 23**

"trade badges be authorized"

c. **Recommendation 24**

"rank nomenclature for naval personnel be recognized throughout the Canadian Forces"

d. **Recommendation 25**

"the army retain the green uniform"

e. **Recommendation 26**

"naval personnel be allowed to select and wear a dark blue walking out uniform as soon as possible"

f. **Recommendation 27**

"air force personnel be allowed to select and wear a light blue uniform"

g. **Recommendation 28**

"any uniform modification take into account the overriding principle that uniforms be distinctly Canadian"

h. **Recommendation 29**

"the need for further support services identity be the subject of further study"

j. **Recommendation 30**

"any retention of the green uniform, in the context of recommendations above, include a complete, rationalized system of identification by environment, unit, rank and trade to be developed and applied by the Department of National Defence in a controlled manner"

902. Because of the complexity of this subject, the Review Group prepared a staff paper on identity which is at Annex T. The reader is advised to consult the Annex for a full treatment of the factors and conclusions.

**AIM**

903. The aim of this Part is to indicate to the Minister of National Defence the recommended disposition of the nine Task Force recommendations on identity.

**BASIC CONSIDERATIONS**

904. The military value system is significantly different from that of other professions. The aspects of self-discipline, a commitment to service and country on behalf and in the defence of society and a desire for recognition of the military role are three traits which may be said to be particular to the Armed Forces. Inherent in the desire to serve is the need for distinctiveness and recognition. Such recognition must be predicated on suitable identification. The Review Group has determined as a result of a thorough analysis of the subject that there are three main types of identity that are most important to service members. In order of their importance, these are:

- a. environment,
- b. unit, and,
- c. trade.

Canadian Forces identity is not listed above because it has been found that the vast majority of service personnel do not associate readily with the CF because of a lack of opportunity to develop a close affinity with the CF as a whole as opposed to the particular element within which they serve i.e. navy, army or air force. This manifestation should not be viewed as a rejection of CF identity. It is rather the natural human tendency to identify with a group of finite size whose roles, mores and raison d'être are understood by and appeal to the individual involved.



## **ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITY**

905. There is no more visible form of environmental identity than that which is provided by the distinctiveness of uniform cut and colour. The Review Group was most conscious of that fact during its analysis of the various factors which bear on the issue of three distinctive uniforms. The Review Group has to conclude however that, just as the structure of one unified force has given rise to the need for one uniform, so would the restructuring of three distinct services give rise to a return to three separate uniforms. To put it another way, it is felt that the structure of the CF must dictate the choice of uniform, not the other way around. For reasons of operational, personnel and cost effectiveness the Review Group has already indicated its support for the implied Task Force conclusion that unification should be retained and notes also that Government policy on this matter has not changed. Having confirmed that the unified structure of the CF is to remain, the retention of a single uniform follows naturally. To support a return to three distinctive uniforms under the present circumstances would be illogical and would be to invite criticism on the grounds of having "backed into" the fundamental issue of unification through the uniform issue. A return to three uniforms would be seen eventually as a shallow gesture which would not change the reality of unification for the large majority of Forces personnel but instead would unnecessarily emphasize and distort the physical differences between people of different environments who have to interact within a unified structure. Finally, it would continue to exacerbate the problems of support services personnel who still would have to be posted across environmental lines regardless of the colour of the uniform they would have chosen to wear.

906. While the Review Group cannot support the solution of three uniforms because of its counterproductivity, it is fully aware of the necessity to emphasize environmental identity in ways which are consistent with the CF uniform and which take into consideration the need of support services personnel to be identified with the element they support. Means which could be used in this regard are outlined at Annex T. Bearing in mind that Recommendation 30 calls for a complete, rationalized system of identification, it is appropriate now to consider other aspects of identity and assess their compatibility with the CF uniform.

## **NAVAL RANK IDENTITY**

907. The Review Group notes that present policy states that naval operations officers and men "shall use and be referred to by the appropriate naval rank". It also feels that there is a need for rank insignia which will indicate readily that the wearer is a naval member. The adoption of measures which would give effect to the policy on naval rank nomenclature and institute naval rank insignia is supported by the Review Group. Such measures would give due effect and pay proper respect to naval traditions and emphasize in a healthy manner the essential differences which exist between this and the other environments. The details of insignia should be entrusted to a special committee having the necessary knowledge to make such decisions.

## **UNIT IDENTITY**

908. The army has been able to foster a sense of unit identity through its regimental system and has pushed for the use of identifying shoulder and hat badges and buttons within the limits permitted by existing regulations. In the case of the navy and the air force, the unit does not provide the same focus and as a consequence, sailors and airmen look ultimately to their element rather than to the unit for identity. Consequently the Review Group is of the view that the present policy dealing with unit identity seems to satisfy the needs of CF personnel, except that these identifiers should be provided at public expense.

## **TRADE IDENTITY**

909. Some support services personnel have expressed a desire for trade badges to be authorized for wear with the CF uniform. This wish can be ascribed to the fact that, up until now, most support personnel have not been able to easily identify with a group other than their own trade. Review Group investigation revealed that the National Defence Clothing and Dress Committee has unanimously and repeatedly rejected the introduction of these badges on the recommendation of its members and with the support of environmental Commanders and of the Command Chief Warrant Officers. The Review Group is of the opinion that, if support personnel were more closely identified with the environment they support, the desire for trade badges would lessen significantly. Consequently, environmental recognition measures should be implemented and evaluated before further consideration is given to the introduction of trade badges.

## **CANADIAN IDENTITY**

910. The Review Group wholeheartedly supports the Task Force recommendation that uniforms be distinctively Canadian.

## **RATIONALIZATION OF CANADIAN FORCES UNIFORMS**

911. Since it has been determined that the policy of unification is to remain in force, the retention of a single uniform is the only course that can be selected. Ways of enhancing the CF uniform have been outlined at Annex T to better emphasize the environmental identity of the wearer. The army has provided an excellent example of this approach which the rest of the forces may wish to emulate. The Review Group, therefore, is confident that a similar rationalized system of identity can be instituted for the navy and air force, including their support services personnel, but does not feel competent to lay down the details of such a policy. This task, it feels, should be left to a specially constituted committee.

## CONCLUSIONS

912. It is therefore concluded that:

- a. the retention of a single uniform follows logically and reasonably from the decision to retain the unified structure of the Canadian Forces. Any other choice would be difficult to implement and thus would be viewed as an attempt to "back-into" the fundamental issue of unification through the uniform question;
- b. there is a need to emphasize environmental identity but in ways which are consistent with the CF uniform, as has been done successfully in the army. There is also a requirement to take into account the need of support services personnel to be identified with the element they support;
- c. naval rank nomenclature and rank insignia should be adopted immediately both to enhance naval rank recognition and to add to the naval distinctiveness of the present uniform;
- d. the provision of unit identifiers at public expense will lead to a more positive, widespread application of existing regulations concerning identity and will foster a greater sense of unit identity;
- e. no action should be taken to introduce trade badges until measures to enhance environmental recognition have been implemented;
- f. the basic principle that uniforms be distinctively Canadian is wholeheartedly supported; and,
- g. a rationalized system of identity should be implemented, the details of which should be set out by a separate committee on identity.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

913. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence:

- a. re-affirm that the Canadian Forces will retain the green uniform for wear by all personnel; and,
- b. concur in the establishment by the Chief of the Defence Staff of a "CF Committee on Identity" to formulate detailed regulations concerning environment, unit and individual identity in keeping with the spirit of the thoughts expressed in this Part and at Annex T.



914. It is further recommended that the Minister of National Defence note the position of the Review Group with regard to each of the Task Force recommendations:

<b>Task Force Recommendation</b>	<b>Review Group Position</b>
22. Further Environmental/Unit Identity	Supported
23. Trade Badges	Supported, with qualifications
24. Naval Rank Nomenclature	Supported
25. Green Uniform for Army	Not supported
26. Dark Blue Uniform for Navy	Not supported
27. Light Blue Uniform for Air Force	Not supported
28. Distinctively Canadian Uniforms	Supported
29. Support Services Identity	Not supported
30. Rationalization of Identification System	Supported

## **SECTION IV**

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

#### **GENERAL**

101. This final section is intended to assist the Minister of National Defence in deciding on the disposal of the Unification Task Force Report and its recommendations. To provide this assistance included below is a summary of the Review Group treatment of the specific recommendations, followed by a re-examination of the main thrust lines, developed in Sections II and underlying Section III.

#### **DISPOSAL OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

102. At Annex U attached is a tabulation of the Review Group's recommended disposal of the 30 Task Force recommendations.

103. In this summary form the Minister will note the strong thread of endorsement of the Task Force recommendations. Of the 30 recommendations, support is recommended for 23, the remaining seven being considered in conflict with the basic policy of unification or with the principle of primacy of Service needs.

#### **OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS**

104. In assessing this report the importance of the basic considerations which have guided the work of the Review Group should be re-emphasized. First among those considerations is operational effectiveness.

105. As will be evident, the Review Group has relied strongly on operational effectiveness as the governing criterion, both in analyzing the Task Force Report and in dealing with the problems it identifies. Concerns about environmental needs, the capacity of central systems to move to a wartime footing, the weight of operational considerations in planning and decision making, all stem from the fundamental need to measure Forces' endeavours by operational effectiveness. The Review Group has, therefore, not only endorsed those Task Force recommendations related to operational effectiveness; but it also recommends that:

- a. operational effectiveness be identified as the governing criterion in monitoring progress and in seeking improvement in all areas of CF endeavour;
- b. the simple yardstick, "will it work in conflict?" be applied in all issues requiring decision; and,
- c. the principle that the needs of the Service come ahead of the aspirations of the individual be re-enunciated.

## RESOURCES

106. As acknowledged by the Task Force, many of the problems the Forces have had to face, including a number reported by the Task Force, are founded in resource allocation.

107. It is worth noting, as did the Task Force, that the process of unification did much to shepherd the Department through a long period of tight resources. Indeed, there is much evidence to support the conviction that the significant capital improvements of the Forces today would not have been possible without the single unified force posture and its supporting central systems.

108. The Minister will note that a number of Task Force recommendations call up increased resources. This is particularly so in the case of alleviating unit problems in administration, in resolving the problem of "double-hatting" of army service battalions, and in redressing supply system inadequacies. The Review Group notes that some of these requirements are currently identified in the Defence Services Program. Furthermore, it is aware that additional resources, beyond those already planned, are not likely to be forthcoming in the near or mid-term future.

## PEOPLE

109. Thus far, this report has not stressed the most critical resource the Department has - its people. Indeed, emphasis on the primacy of Service needs over the aspirations of the individual could be construed as downplaying the worth of the men and women who make up the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

110. The Review Group has taken a strong stand on the primacy of Service needs in the conviction that service members, particularly Canadian service members, are more likely to recognize the need for strong, healthy forces, whose task they understand and support, than they are to place greater weight on their own private aspirations and needs. Such recognition on their part is predicated on one vital consideration: understanding. It is clear that the Forces have not been taking sufficient account of the need for individual service members to personally comprehend, to their own satisfaction, what the Forces are doing and why, or what their own role in them is. All officers of the Canadian Forces, both commanders and staff, share the responsibility for this situation and only the officer corps can correct it. The problem of perception, so well demonstrated in the Task Force Report, is best attacked as a problem of communication within the Forces. How to improve communication is a major current concern of the Chief of Defence Staff and the Principal Commanders.

111. The corollary consideration in seeing to the needs of the individual is that service members must be assured that the Forces are taking care of them. In this context the Review Group notes the emphasis being placed on this critical consideration by the Chief of the Defence Staff, particularly in the accommodation study now launched and in the personnel policies study about to get under way.



112. In the final analysis, true operational effectiveness depends more on the morale and well-being of the Forces' individual members than on any other single ingredient. The Canadian serviceman's, or woman's, characteristics of selflessness and loyalty are unqualified; nonetheless, they are dependent on his own private commitment, on his comprehension of the task before him, and on his sense of belonging to a group with whom he willingly identifies. The Review Group positions on identity, on the recognition of environmental needs, on personnel and training matters and, particularly, on the need to revitalize the military ethos are all related to the vital ingredient of operational effectiveness - morale.

## **UNIFICATION**

113. In Section II the Review Group analyzed the Task Force position on the basic question of unification. In doing so it noted that the Task Force did not recommend the repeal of Bill C243, which created the single unified force. Moreover, as was pointed out, the Task Force based some of its most important recommendations, those on command and control and on retention of central support systems, on continued refinement of existing central institutions. Therefore, one must infer from the Report the Task Force position that the policy of unification should remain in effect, tempered by the adoption of the Task Force's recommendations which pertain to the policy of unification.

114. Investigation has led the Review Group to the same general position, providing the basic policy of unification is attuned to unique environmental needs and the criterion of operational effectiveness is applied. In the process of adhering to this position in its analysis, the Review Group therefore found support for most of the Task Force recommendations, save those, notably on separate uniforms, which were considered to be in conflict with the basic policy of unification.

## **VALUE OF THE TASK FORCE'S WORK**

115. The Review Group considers that a review of unification at this time was appropriate, causing the Department to re-examine many of the basic policies which have governed its development for over ten years. In recognizing the useful work of the Unification Task Force, the Review Group also recognizes the valuable contributions to Task Force endeavours by men and women both in and outside the Forces. The Review Group therefore concludes that the work of the Task Force should be acknowledged as a constructive and timely contribution to the development of the Canadian Forces and the Department. The Task Force has aired a wide ranging set of problems needing resolution. The fact that a number of these problems had already been identified and were being addressed, or that their lack of earlier resolution could be explained, does not detract from the value of having them presented by an outside group and in a manner that commanded broad attention and urged resolution.

## FINAL CONCLUSION

116. There remains only one point that needs further emphasis: that is, the Departmental position on unification. In consideration of the Task Force's general position and bearing in mind the considerations reviewed above, the Review Group concludes that the policy of unification should remain in effect. At the same time, the Review Group notes that there are, and will continue to be, critical problems to be resolved - problems of resources and problems of finding breathing space within the single unified force for the real needs of the Forces, expressed in terms of environmental differences and measured by the criterion of operational effectiveness. It is the Review Group position that solution to these problems should be sought in the spirit of continually striving for professional excellence, building on the strengths of the Forces today and evolving towards greater strength tomorrow.

ANNEX A  
TO: RG/UTF REPORT  
DATED: 31 AUG 80  
1995-1 (VCDS)

National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0K2

27 May, 1980

#### Distribution List

#### NDHQ ACTION DIRECTIVE D2/80

#### FORMATION OF A REVIEW GROUP ON THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON UNIFICATION OF THE CF

- Reference: A. Final Report 15 March 80 - Task Force on  
Review of Unification of the CF  
B. Terms of Reference for the Review Group -  
11500-110T38 dated 7 May 80 (attached)

#### Background

1. On 6 September 1979 the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces was given a mandate to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification and, at the same time, to provide comments on the Unified Command System. The Task Force met its mandate by identifying a series of perceived problems on which it made 30 recommendations. The report was completed 15 March 1980.
2. In order to give due regard to the Task Force's recommendations, on 7 May 80 the MND directed the CDS to form a Review Group. The aim of the Review Group as described in their Terms of Reference is to examine and prepare an appreciation of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces so that appropriate disposition of its recommendations could be achieved.

#### Purpose

3. The purpose of this Action Directive is to formally establish the Review Group and to enable them, under the direction of the CDS, to respond effectively to their Terms of Reference.

#### Execution

4. Scope. The task of the Review Group shall include, but not be limited to, an analysis of the findings and



conclusions of the Task Force and the preparation of an action plan; including the broad policy, military, and cost implications, and alternatives for the disposition of their recommendations.

5. Composition. A Review Group composed of the following senior officers has been established as of 22 May 80 to accomplish the mandate described above:

- a. Review Group Chairman - MGen J.E. Vance;
- b. Member - Commodore W.B. Hotsenpiller;
- c. Member - BGen J.J. Veronneau;
- d. Other personnel may be designated as part of the Review Group at the discretion of the Chairman.

6. In addition to the above personnel who will be tasked on a full time basis, temporary personnel, assistance and advice may be sought from all Commanders and Group Principals, particularly:


- a. DGDAS - for access to existing reports, studies and data as provided to the Task Force;
- b. DG Man S - for management consultant services;
- c. DG Info - to advise on public relations considerations;
- d. A C Eval representative - access to and information from pertinent evaluation reports;
- e. Civilian Consultants - as required; and
- f. Other Government Departments - as required.

7. Support. The Review Group will be supported by administrative facilities and personnel provided upon notice of the Group's requirements to the VCDS. Funding for routine administrative support, travel and civilian consultants will be provided from within VCDS financial resources. The Review Group Chairman will have the administrative authority and prerogatives of a Branch Chief.

8. Channels of Communication. The Review Group Chairman shall have direct access to the CDS.

## Responsibilities

9.     a.   OPI - CDS.   The Review Group will report directly to the CDS. Progress will be monitored by the CDS through the medium of interim reports in the form of briefings and/or memoranda.
- b.   OCIs.   NDHQ Group Principals and Commanders of Commands.
- c.   Milestones.   The Review Group Chairman shall provide the CDS with an action plan and milestones for interim reports within 15 days of commencement.
- d.   Report.   The findings and recommendations of the Review Group will be submitted to the MND through the CDS.
- e.   Timings.   The Review Group Report will be completed before the end of August 1980.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
R.H. Falls  
for Admiral  
Chief of the Defence Staff

DISTRIBUTION LIST (See Page 4)

## DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Action</u>	<u>Information</u>
<u>Internal</u>	<u>External</u>
Review Group Chairman	Commander, Maritime Command Commander, Mobile Command Commander, Air Command Commander, Communications Command Commandant, Canadian Forces Training System Commander, Canadian Forces Europe Commander, Northern Regions Headquarters Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific DCINCNORAD CANMILREPNATO CDLS(L) CDLS(W) All Base Commanders Commandant, National Defence College Commandant, Canadian Forces College Commandant, Royal Military College of Canada Commandant, College Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean Commandant, Royal Roads Military College Commandant, Canadian Forces Land Forces Command and Staff College Director, Canadian Staff School Commanding Officer, CFS Gander All DND OIs
	<u>Internal</u>
	DM VCDS DCDS ADM(Pol) ADM(Mat) ADM(Per) ADM(Fin) Associate ADM(Pol) Associate ADM(Mat) Associate ADM(Per) Associate ADM(Fin) DGDAS DG Info JAG



1150-110/T38

1150-110/T38

7 May, 1980

Le 7 mai 1980

Chief of the Defence Staff

Chef de l'état-major de la Défense

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE REVIEW  
GROUP ON THE REPORT OF THE TASK  
FORCE ON UNIFICATION OF THE CF

MANDAT DU GROUPE DEVANT ETUDIER LE  
RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL CHARGE  
D'ETUDIER L'UNIFICATION DES FORCES  
CANADIENNES

#### Background

1. On 6 September 1979 the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces was given a mandate to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification and, at the same time, to provide comments on the Unified Command System. The Task Force met its mandate by identifying a series of perceived problems on which it made 30 recommendations. The report was completed 15 March 1980.

#### Aim

2. The aim of the Review Group is to examine and prepare an appreciation of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces so that appropriate disposition of its recommendations can be achieved.

#### Historique

1. Le 6 septembre 1979, on donna au Groupe de travail chargé d'étudier l'unification des Forces canadiennes le mandat d'examiner les avantages et les inconvénients de l'unification et, du même coup, de formuler des observations sur le Système de commandement unifié. Le Groupe de travail a rempli son mandat en dégagant une série de présumés problèmes et en formulant 30 recommandations à leur sujet. Le Groupe a présenté son rapport le 15 mars 1980.

#### But

2. Le but du Groupe d'étude est d'examiner le rapport du Groupe de travail chargé d'étudier l'unification des Forces canadiennes et d'en évaluer la teneur afin qu'on donne suite aux recommandations qu'il contient de façon appropriée.



### Scope

3. The task of the Review Group shall include, but not be limited to, an analysis of the findings and conclusions of the Task Force and the preparation of an action plan; including the broad policy, military, and cost implications, and alternatives for the disposition of their recommendations.

### Disposition

4. The findings and recommendations of the Review Group will be submitted to the MND through the CDS. Interim reports to the CDS in the form of a short oral briefing and/or brief memorandum will be required periodically from the date of commencement.

### Coordination/Responsibilities

5. Office of Primary Interest. The Chief of the Defence Staff.

6. Membership. Each of the three environments, land, sea, and air, shall be represented. You are requested to advise me the names of those selected.

7. Inputs. Use shall be made of the existing evaluation reports and many departmental studies pertaining to the subjects raised by the Task Force Report. In addition, inputs shall be sought and shall be provided on a priority basis within the Department from all NDHQ Groups and all Commands. Inputs will be sought outside the Department as may be deemed appropriate.

### Portée

3. La tâche du Groupe d'étude comprendra, sans s'y limiter, une analyse des résultats et des conclusions auxquels est arrivé le Groupe de travail et élaborera un plan d'action; comprenant l'énoncé d'une politique globale, les implications militaires et financières et la formulation d'alternatives permettant de disposer des recommandations faites.

### Disposition

4. Les conclusions et les recommandations du Groupe d'étude seront transmises au ministre de la Défense nationale par l'intermédiaire du CED. Des rapports provisoires seront présentés périodiquement au CED sous forme de brefs comptes rendus verbaux ou de courtes notes de service, et ce dès le début des travaux du Groupe.

### Coordination et responsabilités

5. Bureau de Première Responsabilité. Le Chef de l'état-major de la Défense.

6. Composition. Chacun des trois éléments (terre, air et mer) doit être représenté. Je vous prie de me faire parvenir les noms de ceux qui feront partie du Groupe.

7. Apports. On doit utiliser les rapports d'évaluation existants ainsi que les nombreuses études effectuées par le Ministère sur les sujets abordés dans le rapport du Groupe de travail. De plus, le Groupe d'étude doit obtenir la collaboration de tous les commandements et de tous les Groupes du QGDN, collaboration qui lui sera accordée en priorité. Le Groupe pourra faire appel à des ressources extérieures au Ministère s'il le juge opportun.

8. Timings. The Review will commence 20 May 1980 and the final report shall be completed before end August 1980.

8. Echéance. Le Groupe d'étude doit commencer ses travaux le 20 mai 1980 et présenter son rapport final avant la fin d'août 1980.

Le Ministre de la Défense nationale



Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne  
Minister of National Defence



## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

#### COMMON CENTRAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS

#### BACKGROUND

1. The Task Force in comments dealing with this recommendation, did not specify what it meant by "the common central support systems". The content of its Report makes it clear however that the common central support systems mean:

- a. the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) Group including the Canadian Forces Training System (CFTS), the Canadian Forces Recruiting System (CFRS), and the ADM(Per) controlled units;
- b. the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) Group including the ADM(Mat) controlled units; and,
- c. Canadian Forces Communication Command (CFCC).

2. The following opinions on the subject were expressed in briefs and testimony to the Task Force and were included in its Report.

- a. The need to retain the centralized personnel and materiel systems was stressed by the majority of witnesses in recognition of economic benefits derived; however, the systems needed to become more responsive to unique environmental requirements.
- b. During the period of resource constraints, the existing systems had been successful in ensuring the survival of the Canadian Forces and in allocating scarce funding under strict controls.
- c. Maximum use had to be made of common infrastructure; and joint or integrated training, environmentally streamed, would make this possible and provide for economic use of resources.
- d. Communication Branch/Command had yielded significant economies and given good service in terms of strategic and fixed communication services; however, the Branch had responded to the largest demand, that of fixed communications at the expense of army field communications.



3. In dealing with these observations, the Task Force found that:
- a. The integration of some of the services and facilities common to all three former Services had undoubtedly created savings in some areas. It gave as an example the supply system which consolidated the supply depots, reduced the number of personnel required to operate them, and reduced overall inventory.
  - b. The integration of staffs in some other common services had also probably been beneficial in saving manpower and dollars.
  - c. The personnel system was considered to be highly efficient; however, several areas of the system had not enhanced operational capability of the Canadian Forces.
4. The Task Force Report did not offer specific conclusions on these findings but recommended that:

**"the common central support systems be retained".**

5. While the Task Force recommendation appears to indicate unqualified support for the common systems, it should be noted that the Task Force makes a number of additional recommendations in its Report which, if implemented, would have the effect of modifying those systems. Some of these modifications have already been highlighted in Section II of this Report entitled Basic Considerations and will be the object of further discussions in this and subsequent appreciations.

## **FACTORS AFFECTING THE SELECTION OF THE AIM**

6. Support from the witnesses and the Task Force for the common central support systems is pervasive. Reasons given for this support are mainly those of efficiency and economy. In view of the fact that these reasons are likely to pertain for the foreseeable future, the aim of this appreciation will be confined to validating the need to retain the present systems in relation to other possible alternatives. Since a return to the former tri-Service support systems is the only clear-cut alternative to the present systems, that alternative will be the only one considered in this appreciation.

### **AIM**

7. To confirm that the common central support systems should be retained.

## **FACTORS**

8. **Cost Effectiveness and Efficiency.** While improvements in the cost effectiveness of the common central support systems could not be easily identified by the

Task Force, it nevertheless found sufficient evidence of such effectiveness and efficiency to give qualified support to these systems as quoted at paragraphs 2 and 3 of this appreciation.

**Deduction:** The consolidation of the support systems of the former three Services has increased the overall cost effectiveness and efficiency of these systems.

9. **Flexibility.** The common systems have proven flexible enough to meet current CF commitments. Given the present size of the CF, the unified structural model has allowed for greater flexibility in fulfilling the roles assigned to the CF than would likely have been the case with a tri-Service structure. The Task Force itself stated: "The record of performance of the Canadian Forces in meeting challenges has been high...both in NATO...and NORAD. Canadian contribution to United Nations peace-keeping particularly in logistics and communications, are highly valued because our forces are well trained and well educated. In Canada the Canadian Forces which have participated in tasks relating to aid to the civil power have demonstrated a high level of organizational ability and discipline. In their assistance to civil authorities (i.e., Commonwealth Games, Pan American Games, 1976 Olympics, etc) the Canadian Forces (most of which came from the support elements) have shown excellent capability for planning and for managing complex organizations."

**Deduction:** The common central support systems have increased the flexibility of the CF to respond to such tasking as UN operations although this flexibility may be strained in more intense operations.

10. **Additional Support.** All comments received from the Commanders of Commands and Group Principals unanimously support this recommendation although they also feel that the systems need some modifications.

**Deduction:** Notwithstanding the need for some modifications, a return to individual service support systems is neither necessary nor expected.

11. **Environmental Differences.** A consensus exist amongst most of the witnesses, the Task Force, the Commanders of the major Commands and the vast majority of NDHQ staff officers consulted to show that, the policies and programs of the common systems have been too strictly implemented without giving due regard to the environmental needs and differences of each Command. This standardized approach to problem solving has often exacerbated the problems within a particular element (e.g., the base concept as applied to army bases).

**Deduction:** Many of the problems of the common central support systems would be alleviated if greater environmental orientation was allowed within the systems. Subsequent appreciations will dwell on this requirement.

12. **Mobilization Requirements.** It has been shown that the present systems are cost effective and efficient for the forces-in-being and for the initial expansion that would occur with the deployment of the reinforcements for 4 CMBG, 1 CAG and for the deployment of our northern Norway commitments. Further expansion past that point may dictate a need for modifications such as those outlined below.

- a. **On the Materiel Side.** Mobilization requirements may dictate the formation of an organization apart from the present ADM(Mat) structure to carry out the much increased line functions which could be expected to arise as a result of a major expansion. Conversely, it may be necessary to delegate a great deal more authority and responsibility downwards.
- b. **On the Personnel Side.** Because of the limitations imposed on navy and air force expansion by equipment restrictions, it is felt that these organizations would continue to be supported by the present Personnel System in much the same manner as at present but on an expanded basis. It is felt that any manpower increases required for reasons other than initial European reinforcement would therefore be predicated primarily on the need to expand the army portion of the CF. Such an expansion would affect mainly the combat arms and certain service support elements. Combat arms recruits may have to be streamed directly into a greatly expanded FMC training organization. Most service support personnel, on the other hand, would still have to be trained by the CFTS but in accordance with wartime training standards. It is probable that at a certain point in the expansion, formal trades training at the basic level in certain trades would have to be replaced by on-the-job training within each of the environmental Commands. Accordingly, the Personnel System would have to continue to be responsible for initial selection and allocation of recruits regardless of environment, and for the overall control of all CF personnel and for their allocation to various European war theatres but on the advice of environmental Commanders. Finally, the Personnel System would have to continue to be responsible for personnel policies and plans within the CF.

**Deduction:** The ability of the common central support systems to support mobilization is being assessed by the Mobilization Planning Task Force (MPTF). The measuring yardstick of operational effectiveness ("will it work in war?") will need to be applied to that assessment.

13. **Personnel Considerations.** Appreciations of Recommendations 2 and 4 have demonstrated that a full return to separate environmental systems would create personnel problems within the support services in the areas of sea/shore or field/static ratio, frequency of tours, promotion, professional development and morale. These problems would in turn lead to greater dissatisfaction and possible divisiveness within the support services and, thus, to a loss of capability within the Canadian Forces as a whole.



**Deduction:** A return to separate environmental service support systems would seriously weaken both these systems and the Branches supporting them.

14. **Impact of Returning to Former Systems.** It was the perceived economy of combining the personnel and materiel systems for the combat elements of the three former Services which was persuasive in gaining acceptance of unification. It is generally recognized that this centralizing process more than anything else allowed unification to work and the Forces to survive during periods of tight financial and manpower constraints. Widespread informed opinion in the Forces reflect the fact that considerable savings were achieved although they are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, it can be shown that a reversal of the present policy of unification of the support services would be extremely costly as each of the elements would have to recreate these services either from existing resources, which they could not do without dropping some commitments; or by requesting a manpower increase in support personnel, which would increase the size of the Armed Forces without a commensurate increase in operational capability.

**Deduction:** The systems, if broken up into naval, army or air force elements, would create a need for more support personnel resources.

## SUMMARY OF DEDUCTIONS

15. a. The unification of the support systems has:
- (1) increased the cost effectiveness and efficiency of these systems; and,
  - (2) increased the flexibility of the CF to respond to tasking although this flexibility may be strained in wartime.
- b. A return to individual service support systems is neither necessary nor warranted as it would seriously weaken both these systems and the Branches supporting them.
- c. Effectiveness of the common central support systems could be increased if more environmentally oriented.
- d. The ability of the common services to support mobilization needs to be assessed in the light of requirements established by the MPTF.
- e. A return to the former tri-Service systems would create a need for more support resources.

## CONCLUSION

16. In view of the above deductions it is concluded that the only course open is the retention of the common central support systems modified as required to meet the requirements of the mobilization plan of the MPTF.



## **RECOMMENDATION**

17. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence accept the recommendation of the Task Force.

## **COLLATERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

18. The following collateral recommendations are made:
- a. the application of unification principles be tempered by considerations of environmental requirements; and,
  - b. the measuring yardstick of operational effectiveness ("will it work in war?") be used to assess proposed modifications to the common central support services by the MPTF.

## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

#### POSTING POLICY SUPPORT SERVICES PERSONNEL

##### BACKGROUND

1. The opinions expressed to the Task Force on unification stressed that the lack of emphasis on environmental training produced logistics and finance personnel who did not have the necessary knowledge to operate under field conditions. A major theme was that the knowledge required to perform effectively in all three environments could not be acquired by one individual. It was held that environmental specialization within the support services would increase the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces and correct the perceived alienation of the support services from the operational forces.

2. In its analysis of this problem the Task Force determined that training for support personnel is not environmentally directed. Training is devoted to producing personnel qualified in a trade or classification to the lowest common denominator in considering the requirements of the navy, army and air force. As support personnel do not have the basic environmental skills they must undergo on-job-training when they join the unit. Additionally, the Task Force determined that the creation of what amounts to a fourth service, and the identification of its members with a support branch rather than an operational unit or force has created a rift between the supporters and the operators.

3. It was recommended by the Task Force that:

**"support services personnel rotate between the central systems and their particular environment".**

The Task Force appended comments to its recommendation that stated "it is intended that posting across environmental lines be eliminated. Exclusion from the central/environmental posting could well be medical, dental, postal, legal and chaplain personnel."

4. This recommendation is related to Recommendations 4 and 12.

##### AIM

5. The aim of this appreciation is to confirm that the proposed posting cycle for support services personnel is a practical method of increasing environmental expertise.

## FACTORS

### 6. Confirmation of the Problem.

- a. **Single Service Support Trades.** Although the severity of the problem has not been analytically defined, operational Commanders, past and present, have expressed concern over the loss of single service support tradesmen. The creation of formal environmental training courses at their expense is taken as tangible evidence that a problem does exist for at least the Commanders of FMC and MARCOM. They do not conclude however, that single service support trades is the solution. Furthermore, the Logistics Branch Advisor in a recent special edition of his newsletter stated that proposed branch policy should be "to establish full professional competence in carrying out our mandate, we must have logistics officers who are definably sailors, soldiers or airmen and at the same time definably experts in one of our specialties." He also stated that "while it is desirable to have logisticians who specialize within a particular environment, and while continued employment within the environment is something to be encouraged, such employment patterns are not cast in concrete — there can be no absolute barriers to transfers between environmental commands."
- b. **Support Trades Environmental Components.** In arriving at the conclusion that a split of support trades by environment was neither practical nor desirable the Review Group took four support trades and identified their army and navy components. The resulting rank structure requirements, shown in Appendix 1, clearly illustrate the career structure and employment problems that would be generated by a return to army, navy and air force support trades.

- Deductions:**
- (1) Operational Commanders want more environmental specialization for support services personnel. Return to separate service trades is neither possible nor desirable.
  - (2) Operational effectiveness would be improved by an intangible amount if support personnel possessed more environmental expertise and experience.

### 7. Related Dimensions of Problem.

#### a. General.

- (1) Although not specified by the Task Force, the classifications which face the most significant challenge in effectively serving in more than one environment include, LOG, and to a lesser extent PADM, CELE, MILE, Medical and Dental.

- (2) Of the 100 trades in the CF inventory about 65 seldom cross environmental boundaries. The 17 support trades with the greatest potential for inter-environment moves include eight CELE trades, three workshop trades, Firefighters, Adm Clks, Fin Clks, Cooks, Stewards, Sup Techs and MSE Ops (primarily land and "central systems".)
- (3) Employment in MAG and 10 TAG have been obliquely referred to because it is difficult to separate what should be deemed land duty and to a lesser extent sea duty. A simple definition might be that deployment to the field or a ship is land and sea while the remaining tasks performed in operational support of these environments are air related.
- (4) Certain support services personnel such as LORE trades, MILE classification, MSE Ops etc., serve precisely in the pattern recommended by the Task Force Report, i.e., a single environment to static bases and units. Indeed, a recent Canadian Military Engineering Conference concluded that the MILE officer should be part of a "green" branch which recognizes the realities of an "army stream". The same rationale would be applicable to the CELE classification.

**Deduction:** A limited number of large classifications and trades are subject to postings between environments.

- b. **Static Positions.** The availability of suitable static positions to permit support personnel to follow the proposed employment cycle is also limited to a considerable degree by Ops/Non-Ops needs of operational personnel and an increasing number of women occupying these same "central systems" jobs.

**Deductions:** (1) A policy for support tradesmen cannot be considered in isolation as their employment in the central system may impinge on the sea/shore or field/static ratio of operational tradesmen.

- (2) Employment of women in the central system will limit the ability of the tradesmen to be employed in a single environment.

- c. **Frequency/Duration of Tours.** A related problem to the one being discussed is the fact that fewer personnel would be liable to sea and land postings therefore increasing the frequency and duration of operational tours for those environmentally qualified. The negative aspects of increasing the operational employment of "the few" might be partially offset by very liberal field and sea duty allowances, however, it has never been possible to directly relate morale to money.

**Deductions:** (1) The sea/shore or field/static ratio of environmentally trained individuals would be adversely affected.



- (2) Increased pay benefits would probably not compensate for increased family separation.

d. **Promotion.** The return to a rigid environmental posting system (i.e., three employment patterns within a single trade) would destroy the merit system of promotion. The career manager in attempting to fill a land logistics requirement where promotion was involved would be forced to go down the list to find the most highly rated soldier, perhaps by-passing others who by merit list were more deserving of promotion.

**Deduction:** The merit system of promotion would be distorted or more likely destroyed by rigidly imposing environmental qualifications on selection for promotion.

e. **Geographical Stability.** It is generally accepted that geographical stability has become an increasingly important factor in a serviceman's life. This stability is an inherent part of the regimental system and was a fundamental issue in the Port Division system which existed in the navy until the early 1960's. Support services personnel are now so broadly employed geographically that they might very well welcome fewer posting options than they now face.

**Deduction:** The individual may welcome less frequent geographical postings that could be provided by the recommended posting cycle.

f. **Identity.** It is considered that the individuals desire for identity in practical terms focuses on **service, unit and trade/classification** —perhaps even in that order. If this premise is correct then the proposed posting cycle would reinforce service identity for support personnel who have had to focus on trade identity since unification.

**Deductions:** (1) The individual would become more environmentally oriented and would probably assume a former Service identity.

- (2) The perceived gap between operational and support personnel perception of their military role could be narrowed if greater emphasis and priority were placed on "service" experience and environmental competence of support trades and classifications.

g. **Existing Policy and Procedures**

- (1) There is no current policy which directs career managers to limit the posting of support services personnel between a single environment and "central systems". Furthermore, apart from the identification of former single Service personnel, there has been no formal attempt to environmentally restrict or categorize support personnel since 1968.

- (2) Current posting policy recognizes the need for extensive environmental experience, limited however by the ultimate requirement to fill positions and for service reasons to increase flexibility by having individuals with sufficient expertise to serve in more than one environment.
- (3) Nevertheless, as stated earlier, there are a significant number of trades and classifications whose employment profiles fit the recommended pattern. Furthermore, the intelligent application of the posting process in selecting the most suitably qualified and experienced personnel to meet operational requirements has, without prejudicing essential flexibility, acknowledged the need for environmental specialization.

**Deductions:** (1) In practice, senior tradesmen with experience in a specific environment are posted back to fill vacancies in that environment whenever possible.

(2) The CF benefits by having cross-trained support personnel.

## 8. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** While the premise that support personnel have less environmental experience than in previous single Service days is accepted, there is no substantive evidence to indicate that operational effectiveness has identifiably diminished. However, it could be argued that there is no upper limit on the amount of specialized environmental experience required. On that basis it is agreed that, bounded by other constraints, more emphasis could be placed on increasing the environmental exposure given to selected trades and classifications.

**Deduction:** More emphasis could be placed on environmental posting patterns.

- b. **Morale.** The total elimination of support personnel transfers between environmental commands would have a potentially serious morale impact for those who served exclusively in the land and sea operational elements.

**Deduction:** Attrition rates of those serving exclusively in land or sea units would be higher than the normal.

- c. **Financial Constraints.** The acceptance of the subject recommendation would impose few financial penalties. Indeed, if a posting cycle between operational units and the same part of the "central systems" could be accomplished by fewer "cost" moves, posting costs would be reduced. If the policy generated increased attrition, the replacement costs would be substantial.

**Deduction:** Initial direct costs in following a restricted employment pattern would be minimal, however, if the policy increased attrition, replacement costs would be significant.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

9.
  - a. Operational Commanders want more environmental specialization for support services personnel. A return to separate service trades is neither possible nor desirable.
  - b. Operational effectiveness would be improved by an intangible amount if support personnel possessed more environmental expertise and experience.
  - c. Employment of women in the central system will limit the ability of the tradesmen to be employed in a single environment.
  - d. The merit system of promotion would be distorted or more likely destroyed by rigidly imposing environmental qualifications on selection for promotion.
  - e. The perceived gap between operational and support personnel perception of their military role could be narrowed if greater emphasis and priority were placed on "service" experience and environmental competence of support trades and classifications.
  - f. In practice, senior tradesmen with experience in a specific environment are posted back to fill vacancies in that environment whenever possible.
  - g. The CF benefits by having cross-trained support personnel.

## CONCLUSION

10. The creation of absolute barriers to postings between environments which is implicit in the subject Task Force recommendation has some merit. It would de facto create three former Service elements within a single support trade thereby improving environmental expertise and presumably unit efficiency. The proposed posting cycle would provide an army, navy or air force identity to support personnel and in so doing would help to bridge the perceived military ethic gap between operational and support personnel.

11. The most pertinent arguments against a rigid employment cycle for this large segment of the CF are:

- a. virtually all the foregoing benefits could be realized by formal recognition that more emphasis should be placed on the environmental capability of support services personnel;
- b. the practical realities of the promotion system and the inconsistencies in environmental rank requirements within the total rank structure for most support trades **preclude a return to army, navy and air force support trades**. Furthermore, this conclusion has been accepted by all three operational Commanders; and,

- c. the career management system has for years accepted the need for environmental specialization, and within practical limits of flexibility, has produced marked but evolutionary improvements in environmental trade skill. The Review Group has therefore concluded that, while more emphasis should be placed on employment within a single environment, a return to rigid former support services employment patterns is not in the best interest of the Canadian Forces.

## COLLATERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

- a. ADM(Per) should formally acknowledge the need for environmental employment patterns in overall career development models for support classifications and trades;
- b. the need for geographical stability for other than financial reasons be acknowledged; and,
- c. that the Ops/Non-Ops and Employment of Women studies consider the static (central systems) employment requirements of this large group of support personnel.





APPENDIX 1  
ANNEX C  
TO RG/UTF REPORT  
DATED: 31 AUG 80

SELECTED SUPPORT TRADES

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPONENTS

Rank	ARMY		NAVY	
	Met Tech 121	Adm/Clk 831	Fireftr 651	Fin Clk 841
CWO	1			
MWO	3	13		
WO	5	41		
SGT	11	115	15	23
MCPL	7	118	17	
CPL	18	90		23
C/P	11	142	58	
<b>Total</b>	56	519	90	46
<b>TOTAL TRADE ESTABLISHMENT</b>	324	3,139	784	1,342



## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

### INADEQUACIES IN THE SUPPLY SYSTEM

#### BACKGROUND

1. The following opinions on the subject were expressed in briefs and testimony to the Task Force and included in its Report.

- a. The supply system was viewed as being generally efficient and offering substantial economies as a result of the consolidation of depots and merger of inventories.
- b. Favourable comments referred to the improvements made in the provision of materiel to the operational units of the navy and air force.
- c. The opinion was frequently expressed, however, that the system for the army did not extend beyond the base. It was felt that to properly support mobile units, supply procedures had to be developed and the system had to be adequately manned by trained personnel.

2. In dealing with these observations, the Task Force found that:

- a. the erosion in the provision of operational support to field units beyond the base was of particular concern;
- b. the consolidation of supply depots into four major facilities had increased the average time required to transport materiel to a unit or base;
- c. the system did not have the capability to deal with supply on an integrated component basis; and,
- d. supply personnel were not adequately trained in provision of support either to or in field units.

3. The Task Force concluded by stating that: "There is a lack of flexibility in the supply system to provide first-line support for field units." It went on to recommend that:

**"direction be given to address the recognized inadequacies in the supply system including organization, depot locations, system/component relationships and first-line support to field units".**



4. The Task Force acknowledged in the appended comments to the recommendation that: "(it realized) that these problems (had) been the subject of previous departmental studies wherein the implications (had) been explored, and (trusted) that this detailed knowledge (would) be used to speed their resolution."

## **FACTORS AFFECTING THE SELECTION OF THE AIM**

5. An in-depth study on the CF Logistic System was conducted under NDHQ Evaluation Project E19 dated 31 March 1978. The findings of this evaluation were subsequently staffed within NDHQ. In its review of the Task Force Report, the Review Group has, therefore, taken into consideration the staff comments on E19 in dealing with the specific findings of the Task Force.

### **AIM**

6. To determine to what extent identified supply problems exist and what action should be taken to rectify them.

## **FACTORS**

7. **Confirmation of the Problems.** Comments forwarded by NDHQ staff in response to a Review Group request, acknowledged that deficiencies in the supply system exist in some of the areas identified by the Task Force.

8. **Related Dimensions to the Problems.**

### **a. Organization**

- (1) **The Development of Integrated Logistics (DEVIL) Program.** The original DEVIL program envisaged a technical information system that was to include maintenance and transportation as well as supply. Because of technological difficulties and financial restrictions, a decision was made to proceed only with the supply portion which is simply an automated inventory control system. Maintenance and transportation were to be developed independently to eventually interface with the Canadian Forces Supply System (CFSS). A Materiel Traffic System was developed but proved to be inadequate after a six month trial due to its incompatibility with the Supply System and because of its excessive manpower requirements. A decision was then made to revert to a manual system for tracing high priority demands. This system has subsequently proved to be satisfactory. On the maintenance side, systems such as Aircraft Maintenance Management Information System (AMMIS) and Land Ordnance Maintenance Management Information System (LOMMIS) have not satisfactorily addressed this interface problem. This lack of interface between maintenance and supply has resulted in a lack of ability of the supply system to react to varying rates of maintenance activity. The Chief of Engineering and Maintenance recently raised a contract demand for ADP professional services to assist in the design of a maintenance management information system which will interact with the CFSS.

**Deduction:** It has been recognized that the interdependencies of the maintenance and supply systems are pervasively critical to the achievement of the planned capability of the DEVIL program and of the needs of the CF.

- (2) **CFSS Capability.** Misconceptions still exist regarding the capability of the CFSS to support units deployed from garrison. The CFSS was designed to operate on the base concept. Units have access to the system via terminals located in supporting base supply groups. When deployed, they have access to the system via an assigned support base and in a theatre of war they can make their needs known to the automated CFSS through the echelon system via available communications networks. The advent of automated inventory control has not changed the concept of supply support to army units operating in a field environment which was developed by the former Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. That field supply system, with the exception of several noteworthy improvements, was left intact. That system has been able to respond to emergency and wartime needs in the past. Therefore, the same as it was under the former army manual inventory control system, the problem remains one of communication. That problem is addressed in para 8d below. The other basic problem is stock levels: the capability of the CFSS to respond effectively to user needs has been compromised in recent years by serious reductions in national procurement budgets.

**Deduction:** The CFSS, by and large, is doing what it was designed to do and the problems inherent in today's low inventory of equipment or spares which have been blamed on the system can be attributed directly to the purchasing compromises and deferments which have been made because of fiscal restraints.

- b. **Depot Location.** The Review Group supports the Director General Supply Systems position that the Task Force Report is incorrect in stating that the consolidation of depots increased the average time to transport materiel to a unit or base. The rationale given is that the depots that were closed served each environment in much the same manner and with similar distribution patterns as at present. Furthermore, the composite depot now largely in being, tends to ensure that any base can be served out of the regional depot.

**Deduction:** Location of depots is not the main factor in creating delays but these may be caused by lack of stock or for reasons discussed at paragraph 8a(1).

- c. **Item vs System Management.** In the original DEVIL concept it was intended to make logistics information available from both the "common item across systems" for supply and procurement functions and the "all items belonging to a system" point of view desired by maintenance and operations functions. Manpower constraints forced the adoption of logistics information on an item basis only. As a result equipment

managers, maintainers and operational planners have been unable to obtain accurate and timely information in a usable form. It has been recognized that many time consuming tasks could be avoided if the CFSS were able to accommodate a systems perspective. A program is therefore in progress to change the CFSS to equipment systems management. The Aurora aircraft and the Leopard tank will be managed as systems, as will all new capital acquisitions, such as the NFA, and all existing systems that are expected to remain on inventory for ten years or more and that are amenable to this form of control.

**Deduction:** The recently developed capability to manage inventories on a systems basis will greatly enhance the ability of the CFSS to respond to users needs.

- d. **First Line Support to Army Units.** While MARCOM and AIRCOM have stated that they are generally satisfied with the present and foreseen capabilities of the system, FMC has stated that the peacetime orientation of the CFSS is seriously impairing their ability to train for operations. It is unfortunate that at the time the CFSS was designed, computer technology was not available to do the job in the field. The CFSS, therefore, has no capability to extend automation to remote training and combat areas except through the communication systems to the supporting base. This factor has imposed a requirement to retrain supply personnel in manual operation procedures particularly for those recent entrants who have been exposed only to the automated system. However, the lack of field capability may be put in hand in the medium to long term by the results of the CFSS Field System Study and the Combat Service Support Automated System Study and by the implementation by 1985 of the CFSS Computer Terminal Equipment Life Cycle Replacement Project which will extend automation of supply support down to first-line units in the field.

**Deduction:** The problems of first-line support to army units is being given serious consideration and could well be resolved by 1985.

- e. **Training of Supply Personnel.** Training of supply personnel in the provision of support in field units is the subject of the appreciation on Recommendation 16.

9. **Impact of Recommendation.** Based on the foregoing, the Review Group is satisfied that the Task Force recommendation is being actioned for recognized valid deficiencies in the supply system. The impact of implementation is thus being absorbed by normal staffing processes and through such vehicles as the CFSS Field System Study, the Combat Service Support Automated System Study, and a recently developed preliminary Statement of Requirement (SOR) entitled "CFSS Computer Terminal Equipment Life Cycle Replacement Project." The longer term impact of rectifying the limitations of the CFSS will be felt through increased operational effectiveness of field forces attained largely through allocation of financial resources which have not as yet been identified.



**Deduction:** Rectification of recognized valid deficiencies in the supply system, particularly first-line support to field units, is being addressed and will require allocation of financial resources yet to be identified.

## **SUMMARY OF DEDUCTIONS**

10.
  - a. Appropriate NDHQ authorities have generally acknowledged the existence of the problems described by the Task Force and have taken the necessary steps to:
    - (1) complete the interface between maintenance and supply as originally envisaged for the DEVIL program;
    - (2) change the CFSS equipment to system management; and,
    - (3) study the needs for a CFSS field system and a Combat Service Support Automated System; and develop a preliminary SOR on CFSS Computer Terminal Replacement for implementation by 1985.
  - b. Depot location is not a main factor in creating delays but transportation, stock levels and timely demand actions to support varying maintenance rates of activity are to blame.
  - c. The impact of the recommendation is being absorbed by ongoing action within NDHQ and will be felt in the longer term through financial resource allocation.

## **CONCLUSION**

11. The Review Group acknowledges that direction has already been given to address the recognized deficiencies in the supply system as recommended by the Task Force and, therefore, concludes that no other action is required at this time.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

12. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence note that:
  - a. deficiencies as cited by the Task Force have been recognized within the Department;
  - b. remedial action is underway to satisfactorily address those deficiencies; and,
  - c. final resolution will call up additional resource allocation.





## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

#### ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCE OF THE RECRUIT

#### BACKGROUND

1. In the views expressed to the Task Force many witnesses were concerned with the inability of the Canadian Forces to respond to a recruit's preference for a particular environment. Other serving witnesses commented on the difficulties of remustering to their first trade choice. They were of the opinion that false expectations had been raised at the time of enrolment and that in reality the potential for remustering was rather limited and in some areas virtually non-existent.

2. During the discussion of the issue the Task Force considered that while the operational trades clearly involve environmental specialization, the support trades do not. The recruiting system accepts applicants into these support trades but there is no provision for recognizing and supporting the applicant's preference for service in a specific environment.

3. The Task Force concluded that, "The unified Canadian Forces recruiting system does not allow applicants for the support trades to join an environment of their choice.", and, "Applicants misunderstand the trade reassignment possibilities." It was recommended by the Task Force that,

**"the Canadian Forces continue with common recruiting by trade but with greater attention to environmental preferences".**

#### AIM

4. The aim of this appreciation is to identify the extent to which environmental preferences of support tradesmen could receive greater attention.

#### FACTORS

5. **Confirmation of the Problem.** Although the expressed concern of "many witnesses" with the inability of the CF to satisfy the applicant's preference is undoubtedly valid, it is difficult to quantify the magnitude or severity of this problem.

A large proportion of the 8-10 thousand applicants enrolled annually end up in trades which are identifiably army, navy and air force. The remainder are enrolled in support services trades such as Sup Tech 911, Steward 862, Cook 861, Fin Clk 841 and Adm Clk 831, with no specific environmental label. Since recruit quotas are established by trade, based on known and forecast attrition **without** reference to shortages in a particular environment it would be impractical to designate these recruits land, sea or air. This does not imply that environmental preference of support personnel cannot be given due consideration at a later stage in their careers. Indeed, it would be possible to identify environmental preferences during enrolment and to inject this factor into the development of posting plots for initial employment in operational commands. This initial streaming into navy, army, or air force units would carry no guarantee of a full career in a single environment however, it might partially satisfy the individuals need to identify and relate to a "former service", rather than having to assume a "green" identity which has no historical significance.

- Deductions:**
- (1) The magnitude and severity of the problem cannot be established.
  - (2) Environmental preference could be identified during the enrolment process and given due consideration during the preparation of initial posting plots which takes place during the Basic Trades Training (TQ-3) phase.

## 6. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **Individual Preferences.** The inability of the recruiting system to satisfy individual preferences for trade and/or environment has always been a problem. In reality it existed in pre-unification days at least as applied to the trade selection process. It is inconceivable that a recruiter would deny an applicant his or her preference if a recruit quota existed for that trade, therefore, the CF Recruiting Centers have no option other than to offer alternatives based on existing Service requirements.

**Deduction:** While Service requirements must be the predominate consideration, the desires of the individual are met if at all possible.

- b. **Recruiter Ethics.** Criticisms of lack of integrity in fully explaining employment alternatives or over emphasizing the potential for remuster are primarily based on conjecture and more frequently a considerable degree of selective listening and retention on the part of the applicant. Although there have undoubtedly been occasions when a "press-gang" or "quotas or bust" philosophy prevailed, it is noted that most recruiters are hand-picked from a wide range of operational and support trades and classifications. They are chosen for their professional competence, dedication and the Service image they will project to the public. With few exceptions they perform this recruiting role with distinction. In the current vernacular the "bottom line" of this personnel acquisition system is that legitimate Service requirements **must** take precedence over the wishes of the individual.

**Deduction:** The professional competence of the personnel selected to be recruiters is high and it is unlikely that they would deliberately mislead potential recruits on remuster policies.

- c. **Existing Policy and Procedures.** The TF 2000 Report dated 11 April 1980 has thoroughly examined this entire process and has formulated a number of proposals aimed at "ensuring a consistent and reliable flow of personnel from the civilian sector to employment in Commanded Units during the next twenty years and beyond." Their recommendations represent an enlightened approach to the solution of current and future recruiting problems and they will be presented to Defence Management Committee (DMC) for scrutiny and approval of costing and feasibility in the near future.

**Deduction:** The TF 2000 study has identified current recruiting problems and submitted proposals for DMC approval aimed at rationalizing and streamlining the future recruiting process.

## 7. Impact Analysis

- a. **Remuster Constraints.** Any improvement in meeting individual preferences for environment will have a corresponding positive effect on morale, however, the foregoing arguments suggest there will always be a considerable gap between Service requirements and the wishes of the individual. The magnitude of the problem could be partially reduced by a more liberal policy on remuster, however, practical constraints such as critical manning deficiencies in the losing trade, individual suitability, and the resource implications of re-training, have kept this lateral flow between trades to a minimum. The decision to deny an individual's request for remuster is carefully considered particularly when the stated alternative is a 4(c) release. In such cases both the Service and the individual suffer.

**Deduction:** A more liberal approach to meeting the environmental and remuster preferences of an individual would have a positive effect on morale, however, the scope for improvement in the current system is somewhat limited.

- b. **Related Policies and Procedures.** The Task Force has implicitly suggested that the CF should recruit by environment and that, having completed the indoctrination period to become a soldier, sailor or airman, the individual would then be given a trade. This proposal appears to have been based on a premise that a return to former service support trades was required. The Task Force recommendation on employment within a single environment is also consistent with this theme. Thus Recommendations 2 and 4 are directly linked with the proposal on environmental recruiting.

**Deduction:** The current recruiting practices are relevant to common support trades.



## **SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS**

8.
  - a. Environmental preference could be identified during the enrolment process and given due consideration during the preparation of initial posting plots which takes place during the Basic Trades Training (TQ-3) phase.
  - b. While Service requirements must be the predominate consideration, the desires of the individual are met if at all possible.
  - c. The professional competence of the personnel selected to be recruiters is high and it is unlikely that they would deliberately mislead potential recruits on remuster policies.
  - d. The TF 2000 study has identified current recruiting problems and submitted proposals for Defence Management Committee approval aimed at rationalizing and streamlining the future recruiting process.
  - e. A more liberal approach to meeting the environmental and remuster preferences of an individual would have a positive effect on morale, however, the scope for improvement in the current system is somewhat limited.

## **CONCLUSION**

9. The Task Force recommendation specifically proposes "common recruiting by trade but with greater attention to environmental preferences". The Review Group has concluded that these preferences could be noted during enrolment interviews but for certain support trades could not be actioned until initial posting plots for these individuals are developed. Thus, the Task Force recommendation is supported with reservations as to the point at which the environmental preference is considered. Furthermore, since the entire system is predicated on Service requirements, the latitude available to satisfy personal preferences is deemed to be rather limited.

## **COLLATERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

10. The Review Group recommends that the TF 2000 study include in its deliberations:
  - a. the apparent communication gap between the recruiter and enrollee;
  - b. a thorough rationalization of current remuster policy; and,
  - c. the perceived need for more army, navy and air force content in recruiting advertisements.

## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 15

#### AUTONOMY OF THE UNIT WITHIN THE BASE CONCEPT

##### BACKGROUND

1. In the opinions expressed to the Task Force it was stated that the adoption of the Base Concept was held to have adversely affected the operational effectiveness of the army and to have been unsuitable for the navy.

2. The Task Force considered that in the case of the army, the unit Commanding Officer (CO) is often placed in the position where he must seek, in competition with other units, the support of the base specialists who tend to serve the common good of the base as a priority over the needs of his unit. However, the Task Force recognized that the centralized administration of services has raised problems as regard to coordination, manpower and multi-tasking. In some instances, this has been offset by the unofficial transfer of functions from the Base Commander to unit Commanding Officers and it has enabled these Commanding Officers to fulfill their responsibility more effectively.

3. The Task Force concluded that, "The base concept, as the focus of activity under the principle of centralized administration of resources, is in contradiction with the traditional principle of unity of command." It was recommended that,

**"more flexibility be exercised in the application of the base concept for the army in such matters as personnel, administration, pay and social services".**

##### AIM

4. The aim of this appreciation is to identify specific actions which could be taken to improve the functional autonomy of the commanded unit.

##### CONSTRAINTS

5. This paper will deal exclusively with the problems faced by integral and lodger units. "Double-hatting" of service battalions and the organizational aspects of the Base Concept will be the subject of separate appreciations.

## FACTORS

### 6. Confirmation of Problem

- a. **General.** No attempt will be made to prove that the adoption of a common Base Concept has created a number of problems. The "Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System" Project E-17 dated 15 December 1977 clearly enunciates the difficulties which have been encountered in applying a common support system to distinctly different operational environments. It has been decided therefore, to focus attention in this appreciation on the problems of the integral and lodger units who derive support from the base. While the Task Force recommendation dealt exclusively with the need to provide more flexibility in the application of the Base Concept for the army, many of the problems are equally applicable on air force and navy bases. This is particularly true in bases such as CFB Winnipeg and CFB Esquimalt which currently support large FMC operational units. Indeed, there have been considerable modifications to the previous support philosophy of RCAF bases/stations, and HMCS Stadacona/HMCS Naden, which should not be overlooked in the search for ways to improve unit effectiveness.
- b. **Effect.** The impact of the Base Concept on operational effectiveness appears to vary environmentally in descending order of magnitude from army, to navy, to air force. Furthermore, those bases which have a homogeneous primary mission, i.e., Petawawa, Borden, and Greenwood, have had fewer problems adapting to a common approach.

- Deduction:**
- (1) Project E-17 "Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System" clearly enunciates the difficulties which have been encountered in applying a common support system to distinctly different operational environments.
  - (2) Many of the problems created by the introduction of the common Canadian Forces Base Concept are applicable to all elements. Its impact on operational effectiveness however, varies in descending order of magnitude from army, to navy, to air force.

### 7. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **Unity of Command.** A basic consideration in the design of military structures is the necessity that all actions and resources directed toward the accomplishment of a given aim should be controlled by one individual. An extension of this principle is the requirement for each person to have only one immediate superior and that these persons clearly understand to whom and for whom they are responsible. This ideal circumstance is deemed to exist for operational ships and, with a certain amount of augmentation, for deployed army field units. In the case of the air force it is essentially the Base Commander who has been vested with "unity of command" and the ultimate responsibility for the effec-



tiveness of his operational units. Thus, the focus of any concerted effort to improve the autonomy of the "commanded unit" should be aimed primarily at army units in garrison. If it is essential for an army unit to have "unity of command" when operationally deployed, why is the same principle not equally applicable in garrison?

**Deduction:** Attention should be directed to improve "unity of command" for army units in garrison.

**b. Administrative Autonomy.**

- (1) Administration within a unit may be defined as the provision of, maintenance of and accounting for, all those things which the service member needs to carry out his tasks, including provision for his spiritual, mental and physical well-being. Both officers and non-commissioned officers in a unit have general administrative responsibilities to their subordinates, many of which are inextricably linked to command and control functions.
- (2) Identified deficiencies in the administrative autonomy of army combat and support units consist of the lack of an integral;
  - (a) personnel administration cell based on a unit adjutant and orderly room to handle personnel resource problems, records and general unit administration,
  - (b) pay service,
  - (c) postal service,
  - (d) chaplain service for major units,
  - (e) personnel welfare services, and where practical,
  - (f) unit lines, quarters and messes.

**Deduction:** The primary deficiency in administrative autonomy of army combat and support units relates to the lack of an integral personnel administrative cell.

**c. Functional Communication.**

- (1) The degree of communication which exists between base and unit staffs differs on virtually every base. It can be influenced by a host of circumstances from inter-personal relationships and the degree of



influence exerted by outside authorities, to the quality and effective layout of the physical plant. Nonetheless, there are two constant themes which appear in bases deemed to possess a good system of functional communication. Either the base and units have a common operational/support mission and a Base Commander with the powers of a formation Commander **or** they have adopted a very flexible approach to the common base system. Thus, an organizational reinforcement of the chain of command or practical modifications to the common base system will almost certainly improve the effectiveness of the unit and enhance functional communication.

- (2) The first step in resolving these problems would be to thoroughly review and amend appropriate NDHQ regulations and policy directions which unnecessarily limit freedom of action. Study E-17 provides some specific examples and the current program to revise CFP 110 is precisely the kind of rectification action which must be extended to CFAOs and pertinent CFPs. New base ADP policy must also be sensitive to the needs and prerogatives of commanded units.
- (3) The final and perhaps least significant of the factors to be examined under "functional communication" are Base Routine Orders, Branch and CP Newsletters. The primary rationale for their existence is the accurate dissemination of information to Forces personnel. In the case of Routine Orders they are also used to task and in some instances to give orders and instructions. The CP Newsletter has, in addition to its primary purpose, been used as a forum for individuals to present problems and have "the system" respond. This ombudsman approach bypasses responsible authorities and implies that the CO is incapable of obtaining the desired information. Thus, while the Review Group considers that Routine Orders and various Newsletters serve a useful, ever essential function, their authors must be aware of the potential for erosion of leadership capability and the chain of command.

**Deduction:** (1) Increasing the Base Commanders commitment to, and responsibility for, unit mission should improve the effectiveness of the unit and enhance functional communications.

- (2) Authors of CFAOs, CFPs, Routine Orders and Newsletters must be sensitive to the potential for weakening the legitimate chain of command.

**d. Resource Competition.**

- (1) As with most other factors which affect the "commanded units" ability to perform their mission, the problems of equitable resource distribution are different on every base. A common thread might be that resource allocations to all bases are considered inadequate by the recipients. Unit competition for a fair share of the base financial encumbrance (FE) is therefore, a constant struggle which varies in intensity according to the disparity between what the base

asked for (budgetary submission) and the amount received (base FE). While some progress has been made in transferring financial responsibility and accountability down to the base level, it seems unlikely that this process will be extended down to the unit level in other than a few resource codes.

- (2) Thus the unit CO's financial dependence on his supporting base is not likely to change. A forthright, open distribution of resources based on mutual trust and effective communication between unit and base can at least minimize inherent problems.

- e. **Accountability.** Sadly, one of the most sought after, least attainable Departmental goals is **real** accountability, particularly at the unit level. Given that this concept should be achieved in operational ships, deployed army units and most air bases, it is nonetheless denied to virtually all base lodger and integral units. Furthermore, it is unlikely that an army unit CO, in garrison, can be **legitimately** held accountable for the effectiveness of his unit and the welfare of his men because he does not control the actions and resources required to accomplish "the aim". Both the Task Force Report and the E-17 evaluation address this problem and propose corrective actions from augmenting unit staffs to elimination of "double-hatting" in service battalions.

**Deduction:** Base lodger and integral units as well as army units in garrison cannot reasonably be held accountable for the effectiveness and welfare of the men because they do not control all the actions and resources required to accomplish this aim.

- f. **A Naval Perspective.**

- (1) As stated earlier, the base concept had little if any effect on operational ships. However, the transition from the previous ship/ashore structure of HMCS Stadacona and HMCS Naden to CFB Halifax and CFB Esquimalt was a traumatic experience. The Base Commander's span of control increased considerably to absorb what had previously been regional or functional responsibilities and in the process his attention had to be diverted from his former primary mission (i.e., the provision of administrative support to sailors either undergoing training in the fleet schools, or in depot manning pools on both coasts). Even more serious was the fragmentation of the divisional system which had existed ashore in an identical pattern to that practised aboard ships. This latter problem has never been set right and is at least part of the reason why the attrition is so high for hard sea trades.
- (2) The re-establishment of the traditional naval system of leadership in CFBs Halifax and Esquimalt is not impossible, however, with the current

unified base infrastructure it is unlikely that it could extend beyond the unit level ashore. (i.e., in fleet schools, dockyards and fleet maintenance groups).

**Deduction:** The re-establishment of the traditional naval system of leadership should be encouraged at the unit level in all Maritime Command shore units.

**g. Air Bases**

- (1) Although both the Task Force and E-17 reports have suggested that the Base Concept is essentially a previous air force system and therefore acceptable to the air environment, there is one problem that deserves mention. Centralized aircraft maintenance was introduced prior to unification for "economy of effort" and "cost effectiveness" reasons, however, it has had some rather negative side effects:
  - (a) a significant loss of unit autonomy for the squadrons involved;
  - (b) the virtual separation of the maintainer from the aircrew they once served and thus a reduction in the potential for young aircrew officers to be associated with and responsible for trades personnel they will command at more senior rank levels;
  - (c) individual AERE officers having responsibility for inordinately large numbers of personnel; and,
  - (d) from the airmen viewpoint, less frequent and visible reminders of the need for their skills in an aircrew/maintainer team, as they now serve a maintenance system rather than a squadron.
- (2) Even balanced against resource constraints, the intrinsic benefits of a total team effort implicit in squadron maintenance cannot be lightly dismissed. Inclusion of this factor may be considered to be outside the bounds of even "related issues" since centralized maintenance existed prior to the advent of the CF Base System. It is however, relevant to the aim of improving the functional autonomy of the commanded unit, i.e., a squadron.

**Deduction:** The inherent benefits of "squadron maintenance" should be identified and compared with improved utilization of manpower provided by centralized aircraft maintenance to confirm that an optimum compromise exists.

**Impact Analysis**

**a. Operational Effectiveness**

- (1) The introduction and application of a common CF Base Concept is considered by the Task Force to have had a negative impact on the



operational effectiveness of many commanded units due primarily to implicit reductions in unity of command. The Task Force and E-17 Evaluation Reports contend that the most serious problems exist in the case of army combat and support units who lack administrative autonomy while in garrison and must therefore receive base augmentation prior to operational deployment. The Review Group supports the need to restore "administrative autonomy" to these army units whether in garrison or deployed as a first step in a series of measures designed to enhance the leadership capability/accountability of the unit CO and thus operational effectiveness.

- (2) This restoration of administrative autonomy must however delineate between those measures which will improve unit control and those which will simply add unnecessarily to unit workload. The Review Group notes that the base now relieves the unit of considerable mundane duties.

**Deduction:** Decentralization of responsibility should be limited to those measures that clearly improve the unit Commanding Officer's control.

- b. **Morale.** Measures taken to provide greater "unity of command" and reinforcement of the chain of command cannot fail to improve the morale of the personnel in these units. Restoration of administrative autonomy to army units, formal re-introduction of the divisional systems into naval bases and, where practical, a return to squadron maintenance offer considerable potential for morale enhancement since these measures reinforce teamwork and unit esprit-de-corps.

**Deduction:** Enhanced "unity of command" and greater reinforcement of the chain of command will have a positive effect on unit morale.

- c. **Resource Implications.** FMC, MARCOM and Chief of Program staffs provided a preliminary estimate of additional manpower requirements needed to implement the main findings of the 1977 Evaluation of the CF Base System. The estimate has been included at Appendix 1 and while it has not been subjected to a thorough staff analysis, it does indicate that the probable net manpower costs are relatively small.

**Deduction:** Probable manpower cost of implementing the main findings of E-17 are relatively small.

- d. **Policies and Procedures**

- (1) As stated previously a thorough review of CFAOs, CFPs etc should be initiated with two main aims:

- (a) to consolidate, simplify and reduce the volume; and,



- (b) to search out and eliminate or modify orders and policies which subvert the legitimate chain of command, including those which deal with base ADP systems.
- (2) This would obviously be a major undertaking, however, the proliferation of rules, regulations and directions has become an intolerable burden to the Commanding Officers who are expected to implement them.

**Deduction:** The proliferation of rules, regulations and directions have become an intolerable burden to the Commanding Officer and they must be reviewed and consolidated.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

- 9.
  - a. Project E-17 "Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System" clearly enunciates the difficulties which have been encountered in applying a common support system to distinctly different operational environments.
  - b. Many of the problems created by the introduction of the common Canadian Forces Base Concept are applicable to all elements. Its impact on operational effectiveness however, varies in descending order of magnitude from army, to navy, to air force.
  - c. Attention should be directed to improve "unity of command" for army units in garrison.
  - d. The primary deficiency in administrative autonomy of army combat and support units relates to the lack of an integral personnel administrative cell.
  - e. Increasing the Base Commander's commitment to, and responsibility for, unit mission should improve the effectiveness of the unit and enhance functional communications.
  - f. Authors of CFAOs, CFPs, Routine Orders and Newsletters must be sensitive to the potential for subversion of the legitimate chain of command.
  - g. The re-establishment of the traditional naval system of leadership should be encouraged at the unit level in all Maritime Command shore units.
  - h. The inherent benefits of "squadron maintenance" should be identified and compared with improved utilization of manpower provided by centralized aircraft maintenance to confirm that an optimum compromise exists.

- j. Decentralization of responsibility should be limited to those measures that clearly improve the unit Commanding Officer's control.
- k. Enhanced "unity of command" and greater reinforcement of the chain of command will have a positive effect on unit morale.
- m. The proliferation of rules, regulations and directions have become an intolerable burden to the Commanding Officer and they must be reviewed and consolidated.

## CONCLUSIONS

10. Based on the foregoing deductions the Review Group concludes that there are a number of actions that could be taken to improve the functional autonomy of the commanded unit. The Task Force recommendation is therefore accepted as is the need for corrective action.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- 11. The Review Group recommends that:
  - a. A thorough review of CFAOs and CFPs be initiated with two main aims:
    - (1) to consolidate, simplify and reduce the volume; and,
    - (2) to search out and eliminate or modify orders and policies which weaken the legitimate chain of command.
  - b. FMC submit specific Establishment Change Proposal (ECP) requirements to restore administrative autonomy to army units in garrison and the Chief of the Defence Staff approve these resource needs consistent with other Departmental priorities.
  - c. Maritime Command be asked to consider re-introducing all aspects of the Naval divisional system in its shore based units.
  - d. Air Command be requested to rationalize the benefits of squadron maintenance versus centralized aircraft maintenance.
  - e. Wherever practical the Base Commander should be introduced into the chain of command of the units he supports.



PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

TO IMPLEMENT E-17

COMMAND	MIL	CIV
MARCOM	16	
FMC	<u>254*</u>	<u>153*</u>
CFE	<u>136*</u>	<u>63*</u>
Total	406	216

(\*NOTE: The majority if not all of the civilian positions and a portion in the order of 50% of the military positions would be found from offset action from existing manpower on unit/base staffs. The actual net manpower requirements cannot be determined without a detailed study of all aspects of unit administration.)





## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 16

#### DOUBLE-HATting OF ARMY SERVICE BATTALIONS

##### BACKGROUND

1. The problem of "double-hatting" is fundamentally related to insufficient manpower resources and overtasking. Following unification and reductions of the Canadian Forces in July 1971 from an authorized ceiling of 83,000 to 78,033, a number of measures were taken within FMC to economize on manpower. To absorb the severe reductions assigned to the army, the Commander FMC directed that the personnel establishments of Canadian Forces Bases Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier be largely restricted and that these positions be manned by service battalion personnel from the resident brigade groups. This meant that, on average, approximately 40 percent of the service battalion key appointments and manpower from 1 Canadian Brigade Group in Calgary, 2 Canadian Brigade Group in Petawawa (now the Special Service Force), and 5 Canadian Brigade Group in Valcartier were integrated into base support functions in addition to their combat service support responsibilities to the brigade groups. This system has generally become known as "double-hatting".

2. Essentially, the three Canada based brigade groups, together with 4CMBG in West Germany, comprise the entire combat elements of the army. 4 Service Battalion of 4 CMBG has not been "double-hatted" with base responsibilities and is not considered in this appreciation. The policy of "double-hatting" has had a profound impact upon the operational effectiveness of the Canada-based service battalions and has significantly reduced their capability to provide effective logistics support to their formations.

3. The logistics or combat service support capability of the service battalions has been further diminished by an increased training responsibility. As a result of unification and an overall reduction of land environmental training with the "green" system, the army has been forced to carry out a high degree of individual and on-job training (OJT) which was formerly provided in the army training system. Consequently, personnel who now leave the central training system or another environment for army service battalions cannot be considered as effectively qualified for combat service support duties until they receive extensive individual and collective training.

4. Effectiveness was even further diluted as a result of unification when the base concept was introduced uniformly regardless of the operational characteristics or organizational structure of units or formations. FMC bases were subsequently

reorganized to integrate the logistics and administrative expertise required to support the resident field units. For Maritime and Air Command bases, any reduction in the level or quality of support was largely attributed to resource limitations and they continued to support their operational units in much the same manner as prior to unification. For the army, however, a problem developed in the mobile, logistics support capability of the service battalions. The static-oriented base concept combined with "double-hatting", undermanning and increased training responsibilities to further reduce the operational capabilities of the service battalions.

5. In their report, the Task Force on Unification regarded "double-hatting" as in conflict with the operational duties of the service battalions in that "either the operational requirements deprived the base of necessary support or that the base requirements denied support to the operational unit." The Task Force held that "service battalions should be disassociated from the base support and should be more closely committed to the support of the mobile operational units." They recommended that,

**"more resources be devoted to the solution of the "double-hatting" problem of the army service battalions".**

It is also important to note that although the Task Force addressed only the service battalions, an equally serious problem of "double-hatting" exists within the field ambulance units and the military police platoons of the brigade groups.

## **AIM**

6. To recommend a course of action which will eliminate the "double-hatting" of army service battalion personnel.

## **FACTORS**

7. **Roles and Functions of the Service Battalion.** The operational role of the service battalion in battle, as completely distinct from static base operations, must be clearly recognized and understood. To be operationally effective, brigade group combat service support provided by the service battalion must be totally responsive to the combat requirement. It is fundamental that the service battalion supporting each brigade group be adequately manned, trained, equipped and motivated from the beginning in peacetime to survive on the battlefield and then to provide effective combat service support to the combat arms units. During war the service battalion operates in a "near combat" role within ten kilometers of the units it supports. The service battalion must therefore be trained and exercised to the same level of proficiency demanded of the combat arms. As a total system it is essential that all facets of the brigade group combat service support function be fully effective. On the battlefield there is no substitute for the provision of sufficient combat supplies, transportation and the effective maintenance of technical equipment. An acceptable standard cannot be expected unless the system is manned and trained. It is equally important that combat arms units receive a high level of combat service support and participation from the service battalion to conduct realistic training and exercise their operational capabilities in peacetime. The transition from peace to war must therefore be rapid and efficient, and unencumbered by the static requirements of the

base or the need to change organizations and procedures. Equally important, the base must be fully capable of conducting its support function without the use of service battalion personnel.

**Deduction:** The operational effectiveness of the combat arms units and the brigade group as a formation is dependent upon the capability of the service battalion to provide essential combat service support. Any detracting from this capability has a correspondingly detrimental effect upon the combat capability of the brigade group as a whole.

8. **Canadian Forces Organization Policy.** The principles governing the organizational structure of the Canadian Forces are defined in CFP 219(2) Establishment Policy and Procedures. With regard to the system of "double-hatting", the following principles bear attention:

- a. **Definition of Responsibility.** This principle states that no part of an organization must overlap with the rest. The "double-hatting" system, however, has integrated the static base and mobile combat service support functions in supply, transport and maintenance.
- b. **Unity of Command.** This principle is achieved when all action is directed or controlled by one individual to ensure that effort is concentrated and that there are no conflicting lines of authority. Combining command of service battalion and base support operations imposes a conflict.
- c. **Rational Assignment of Tasks.** This principle states that tasks must be limited, homogeneously grouped and specifically assigned for effective accomplishment. The dual responsibility imposed on personnel by "double-hatting" is in conflict with this principle.

**Deduction:** Double-hatting is in direct contravention of the organizational principles which govern the structure of the Canadian Forces.

9. **Recognition of the "Double-Hatting" Problem.**

- a. **Extent.** The levels of "double-hatting" for the three service battalions range currently from 27 to 42 percent of their posted strengths and frequently exceed this during peak exercise periods. This high level of "double-hatting", exacerbated by external commitments and personnel shortages, means that service battalions are never capable of either conducting full unit training or providing adequate "real" support. At best they can field only a composite support group of company size to support a portion of the brigade group for limited periods away from the base. At the same time, base establishments must continue to receive approximately one-third of their manpower requirements from the brigade groups, of which the service battalions provide the major share. (See Table 1 at Appendix 2.)



- b. **Defence Structure Review (DSR).** To correct the recognized imbalance between the Regular Force levels and assigned tasks, DND completed a thorough review of manpower requirements during 1976. Until this time the manpower deficiency had been absorbed largely by the dedication and special efforts of Canadian Forces personnel. The situation was further aggravated, however, by an increase in attrition between 1974 and 1977, which in turn created a heavier demand on the recruiting and training systems. DSR Phase II, therefore, identified an overall increase of 4707 personnel for the Canadian Forces. Of this total, FMC was to be increased by 1570 personnel including a total of 457 personnel for the three service battalions. (No increase to base establishments was included in DSR II). The increase to the service battalions was planned to bring them to 85 percent of their war establishment. To date implementation of the DSR II personnel increases for service battalions has been far short of the intended target.
- c. **On-Site Manpower Evaluation Reports. (OSMER).**
- (1) During the past year NDHQ conducted on-site manpower evaluations at CFBs Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier. All levels of base activities were systematically examined to determine minimum valid establishments independent of any manpower constraint considerations. These studies indicated necessary increases of 643 military and 216 civilian personnel to the three bases.
  - (2) In addition, FMC HQ also requested that the evaluation teams determine the legitimate manpower burden or "brigade group contribution" (BGC) to be provided by the brigade group while resident at the base. This quantification was achieved through the consensus of NDHQ, FMC HQ, brigade group and base participants and unlike "double-hatting" the BGC is intended to recognize the operational autonomy of the brigade groups and service battalions. The OSMERs thus established a clear distinction between the wholesale "double-hatting" of key personnel and the legitimate contribution of brigade group manpower while resident on the base. This limited degree of employment of service battalion personnel in base functions is acceptable.
  - (3) Details of the OSMER findings and recommendations are described at Table 2 at Appendix 2.
- d. **Personnel Instability.** Through repeated reorganizations since 1968, service battalions have attempted to balance limited resources to meet the simultaneous requirements of static trade OJT, field training, base "double-hatting" and real support to the brigade groups. The adverse effects upon personnel stability, group cohesiveness and morale have been profound and further contributed towards a significant increase in attrition and a consequent decline in valuable expertise. Personnel stability is essential in establishing a realistic balance between resources and commitments if further decline is to be avoided.

- e. **Alternative Sources of Manpower.** An investigation to identify alternative sources of potential manpower considered the conversion of a number of civilian (MDO) drivers to military positions and increased use of militia personnel in the Regular Forces. While both of these alternatives offer slight relief from the real problem of undermanning, they reveal attendant problems of increased costs, reduced flexibility and additional training requirements.

- Deductions:**
- (1) There is a distinct correlation between the level of "double-hatting" and the extent of combat service support and training which the service battalion can perform in support of the brigade group. Service battalions have been unable to conduct or participate in an acceptable level of unit or formation training necessary for operational effectiveness.
  - (2) The lack of full implementation of the DSRII personnel increases to service battalions has further aggravated the problem.
  - (3) OSMERs have effectively identified the unacceptably high level of "double-hatting" which can only be alleviated by significant increases to base establishments.
  - (4) "Double-hatting" combined with undermanning and over-tasking contributes to a high degree of personnel instability which can be directly related to a decrease in motivation and morale and a higher-than-normal rate of attrition.

10. **Base Concept Implications.** The 1977 evaluation project, E17 "Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System", assessed as one of its considerations, whether the base system "conflicts between the requirements of an operational unit and the base for personnel resources." The study noted the conflict of organizational principles described in paragraph 8 and stated also that, as a result of restricted manpower resources, service battalions were unable "either to train as units or provide adequate administrative and logistics support to combat units." The evaluation concluded that "double-hatting" resulted in adverse effects upon operational effectiveness and attributed manpower constraint as the central problem.

**Deduction:** "Double-hatting" establishes a conflict for personnel resources between brigade group combat arms units and the base, particularly when accompanied by manpower deficiencies.

## 11. Training

- a. **Individual.** To maintain an acceptable degree of operational effectiveness it is essential that service battalions be fully trained at all levels including individual, sub-unit, unit and formation. As a result of the reduction in land environmental training within the central training

system and the increased complexity of consolidated trades brought about by unification, there has been a significant increase in the requirement for service battalion individual training and OJT. This is in addition to sub-unit training and refresher courses necessary to maintain general military and combat skills. The effectiveness of instructor expertise is also continually diminished by increased attrition and personnel instability.

- b. **Collective.** Accompanying the requirement for individual training, the service battalion must conduct collective training and participate in exercises at company and battalion level within the formation. Training as a battalion within the brigade group all-arms team is essential if the operational expertise of the total formation support system is to be developed, coordinated and maintained.

**Deductions:** (1) A greater degree of army environmental training is required from the central training system to effectively qualify personnel for service battalion employment and alleviate the individual training problem.

- (2) The high degree of "double-hatting" which has prevented service battalions from effectively training and fully participating in brigade group exercises has had a profoundly adverse effect upon operational effectiveness. This training inability also has a direct effect upon the efficiency and readiness of the combat service support system within the brigade group.

12. **Equipment.** The problems of "double-hatting" and manpower deficiencies within the service battalions have been further exacerbated by an increase in the physical workload of combat service support operations. The performance of labour-intensive field activities could be somewhat ameliorated by the acquisition of some bulk-handling systems such as the Liquid Fuel Supply System and rough terrain forklifts.

**Deduction:** Although the acquisition of labour-saving equipment cannot be considered an acceptable substitute for direct manpower increases, their procurement would assist in using available resources more effectively.

### 13. **Impact Analysis**

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** With the current high levels of "double-hatting" in service battalions, the highly measurable base function and emphasis on financial management have tended to militate against the less visible and less defined field training requirement. OJT and individual training must be conducted at the expense of unit and collective formation training while significant equipment deficiencies further complicate the manpower problem. As a result of the service battalion's inability to conduct a comprehensive field training program and the consequent



reduction of their capability for sustained field operations, the operational effectiveness of both the service battalion and the brigade group as a formation is correspondingly reduced. The effectiveness of base support operations, particularly for mobilization or war is also highly questionable. Base operations during these critical periods must be independent of brigade group involvement.

- b. **Morale.** Undermanning, overtasking, training deficiencies and the lack of key labour-saving equipment have a demoralizing effect upon service battalion personnel. Increased workloads beyond normal duty hours, accumulation of leave and lack of unit cohesiveness contribute to higher release rates and ultimately greater costs to DND than those which would be expended by increasing manpower levels.
- c. **Resources.** A significant increase in financial resources for the provision of adequate manpower, reallocation of training responsibilities, purchase of equipment and a general increase in all types of individual and collective training will be necessary to re-establish an acceptable operational capability for the service battalions. It is also evident that base support operations are significantly restricted as a result of manpower deficiencies.
- d. **Policies and Procedures.** Environmental training policies, the "double-hatting" system and application of the base concept at brigade group bases must be realistically assessed in terms of the capability of the brigade groups to meet their operational requirements.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

- 14.
  - a. The problem of "double-hatting" has been effectively identified and is related directly to **major manpower deficiencies** in Bases Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier, and 1 Svc Bn, 2 Svc Bn and 5 Svc Bn.
  - b. Only substantial **personnel increases** will correct the "double-hatting" problem.
  - c. Current manpower, equipment and training deficiencies **seriously impair the operational effectiveness** of the service battalions.
  - d. The degradation of the service battalion operational effectiveness means that 1 CBG, the SSF and 5 CBG **may not be considered operationally effective.**
  - e. Without alleviation of the undermanning and "double-hatting" problem, the pernicious effects of **personnel instability within the service battalion will continue to deteriorate** resulting in an increase in the severity of the current personnel problems and greater long-term costs to DND.
  - f. Attendant problems of "double-hatting" and undermanning are related to **deficiencies in environmental training** of combat service support personnel and the **lack of some major logistics support equipment** in service battalions.



## COURSES OPEN

15. The problem of "double-hatting" of service battalion personnel has been identified and defined as one of manpower shortage in relation to operational capability. Unless an overall decrease in operational tasking and capability is to be considered, the only effective solution to restore an acceptable level of operational effectiveness is appropriate manpower increases to the service battalions and their supporting bases. The solution may be implemented within a phased program as follows:

- a. **Phase I.** There should be full implementation of the DSR II increases to man the service battalions to 85 percent of war establishment. Concurrent with these increases should be the procurement of the bulk refuelling system and rough terrain forklifts, together with the reintroduction of an effective land environmental training system at the recruit and trades training level. This should promote a concurrent initial reduction in the level of "double-hatting" and improve service battalion capability to train and support the brigade group to a greater degree. This phase envisages only a gradual impact on the training system and financial considerations within DND priorities.
- b. **Phase II.** Over the longer term action should be taken to implement the increases to CFBs Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier as recommended by the OSMERs. "Double-hatting" would be gradually eliminated as increases are made and there should be a significant reduction in attrition resulting from improvement in morale. The operational effectiveness of the service battalions and hence the brigade groups will be significantly improved as a firm basis for mobilization and other emergencies.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

16. It is therefore recommended that the Task Force recommendation be disposed of through the allocation of additional resources. The Review Group is aware of the constraints on resources and thus appreciates the length of time likely to be needed in effecting this recommendation. The phased program outlined above is designed to cater to these realities.

**SUPPORTING REFERENCES - RECOMMENDATION NO. 16**

- References:
- A. Task Force Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces - Final Report 15 Mar 80.
  - B. Defence Structure Review - Phase II, 20 Nov 75 (Cabinet Documents 640-75, 641-75RD and 267-77 (RD(R)).
  - C. Report on Evaluation Project E17 - Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System 15 Dec 77.
  - D. Personnel Instability Study - ICBG 5000-1(Pers) 28 Jul 77
  - E. FMC 4985-1 (D Comd) 29 Aug 77
  - F. OSMER - Valcartier 1920-0106 (DER) 13 Aug 79
  - G. OSMER - Petawawa 1920-0107 (DER) 30 Jan 80
  - H. OSMER - Calgary 1920-0109 (DOSMEP) 30 Jun 80
  - J. FMC 1920-1 (log) 8 Jul 80
  - K. 2SB 1920-2101 (CO) 30 Jun 80
  - L. FMC 3189-3-4 (COS Adm) 30 Jun 80
  - M. 1995-1 (D Log Ops) 30 Jun 80
  - N. 1995-1 (DGOM) 27 Jun 80
  - P. 1995-1 (DTO) 23 Jun 80
  - Q. 1995-1 (DGT) 3 Jul 80
  - R. 1630-1 (D Res 2) 11 Jul 80



TABLE 1

CURRENT LEVELS OF DOUBLE-HATTING

Proportion Of Svc Bn Double-Hatting To Bases

	War Estb.	DSRII Estb.	Peace Estb.	Present Strength	Present Double-Hatting Posns. - % Strength		
1 Svc Bn	969	813	722	629	167	-	27%
2 Svc Bn	967	600	590	551	229	-	42%
5 Svc Bn	967	813	721	670	282	-	42%

Proportion of Base Establishment Double-Hatting From Brigade Groups

CFB	Base Estb.	1 CBG Pers-%	SSF Pers-%	5CBG Pers-%
Calgary	952	282-23%		
Petawawa	899		322-26%	
Valcartier	893			433-34%

TABLE 2

OSMER FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

CFB	Base Estb.	Recommended Base Estb	Present Double-Hatting-%			Recommended BGC - %
Calgary	952	1199	282	-	23%	69 - 8%
Petawawa	899	1134	322	-	26%	119 - 10%
Valcartier	893	1273	433	-	34%	69 - 11%

**Note:** The above figures include military and civilian positions at the bases as follows:

CFB	Present Estb			Recommended Estb			Recommended Increase	
	Mil	Civ	Total	Mil	Civ	Total	Mil	Civ
Calgary	325	627	952	555	644	1199	230	17
Petawawa	220	679	899	393	741	1134	170	62
Valcartier	223	670	893	466	807	1273	243	137
							—	—
TOTAL							643	216





**REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 17  
COMMON BASE CONCEPT**

**BACKGROUND**

1. In the summary of views expressed to the Task Force it was stated that depending on the base, on the number of lodger units supported by the base, and on its parent command, the Base Commander was subject to a confusing chain of command because he was seen to respond to too many demands and/or superiors.

2. In the discussion section of the Task Force Report it was considered that in the case of the navy, the base is no longer dedicated solely to its original, primary mission. There have been difficulties in coordinating requirements of fleet schools, dockyards, and ships in service. In the case of the air force, the base concept has not created significant problems except when dealing with units of other commands. In the case of bases of other commands supporting army units, some unit resources have been subordinated to the needs of the base.

3. It was recommended by the Task Force that,

**"further consideration be given to the departmental study evaluating the Canadian Forces Base system".**

**AIM**

4. The aim of this appreciation is to isolate accepted problems related to the Base Concept which warrant further study and corrective action.

**ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS**

5. The "Evaluation of the Canadian Forces Base System" Project E-17 dated 15 December 1977 appears to have been the primary source document from which the Task Force findings and recommendations were derived.

6. In order to limit the scope of the analysis this appreciation will concentrate on bases which support more than one environment and those which do not have homogeneous missions. The Base Concept problems will be examined from the Base Commander's viewpoint.

## FACTORS

### 7. Confirmation of the Problem

- a. The introduction of the CF Base Concept is considered by many to have triggered a host of problems with which the Forces have struggled ever since. Persistent problems with span of control, lack of environmental focus, unity of command, even leadership could more accurately be assigned to force reorganization, infrastructure reduction, and the elimination of regional commands and functional groups than on the system which by default had to pick up the pieces.
- b. Admittedly, the Base Concept was not subjected to a thorough staff analysis on the most cost effective means to provide unique environmental and functional support before it was implemented. The pressures of that era were such that "geographical proximity" was the primary analytical measure in determining which base got what responsibility. As far as the Review Group can determine there has been no thorough base-by-base evaluation in the ensuing years to rationalize the original ad hoc implementation process.
- c. The Base Concept is however derived from a very practical functional grouping of support responsibilities. It can be designed and modified to satisfy unique environmental and operational requirements, including deployment, for one environment or one primary mission. However, system effectiveness is markedly diminished when it is required to serve many masters and satisfy more than one environmental ethic. A rationalization of the Base Concept must recognize the unique environmental requirements of the different elements of the Canadian Forces and the primary need to enhance the operational effectiveness of the supported unit.

**Deduction:** A thorough base-by-base evaluation should be undertaken to rationalize the original ad hoc implementation process.

### 8. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **Organizational Authority.** CFP 219(1) "Organization - Concept for the Canadian Forces" provides an overview of the concept and states that "since the precise relationship between a Base Commander and various superior headquarters, other Base Commanders in his area, and Commanding Officers of lodger units may vary, this will be specified in Canadian Forces Organization Orders (CFOOs)." Thus the CFOO has become an enabling direction from which each Base Commander derives his authority and responsibility. In carefully reviewing a representative sample of Base/Unit CFOOs, the Review Group makes the following observations:
  - (1) By and large, they describe existing "definition of responsibility" in terms of "support services capability" in one Annex, followed by a

further Annex which lists the support services required by integral and lodger units. Statements such as support is to be provided "by the base commensurate with its capability" suggests that the assignment of responsibility is being given without any prior assessment of the base's capacity to provide the support (the base has inherent capability - perhaps not capacity).

- (2) **Command and Control** is not clearly defined in some CFOOs particularly as it relates to the integral units. As examples: CFOO 3-21 for CFB Petawawa does not distinguish between integral and lodger units; CFOO 9.4 for CFB Halifax and CFOO 9.24 for Ship Repair Unit Atlantic identify two different "next superior" officers to whom the integral unit CO must report; and, the CFOO for CFB Comox does not refer to Commander MARCOMs operational control over two squadrons on the base.
- (3) **Span of Control** is not visibly portrayed in most CFOOs, nor is there an adequate definition of internal base relationships.
- (4) The effectiveness of "rational assignment" and "delegation of authority" could only be verified by a thorough review of each base CFOO and OSMER.

The common CFOO structure should be analyzed to confirm that it is serving the intended purpose. If appropriate, they should be completely re-written to provide a clear, precise recognition of the unique base support responsibility.

**Deduction:** The standard CFOO structure should be analyzed to confirm that it is serving the intended purpose and where appropriate should be re-written to identify unique support requirements.

#### b. **Complex Bases**

- (1) Having stated a requirement to review the base structures and associated CFOOs, it should be possible to limit the magnitude of the task or indicate a sequence for examination according to the complexity or diversity of the individual base mission. Of the 31 bases in the CF inventory it is considered that at least 21 meet the criterion of either supporting a common homogeneous task or providing support services primarily to a single environment. It is assumed that these bases are, or at least should be, capable of meeting required levels of effectiveness.

##### (a) **More Complex**

This group of bases has some complicating feature such as:

**CFB Comox** - An AIRCOM base which belongs to the Air Defence Group but contains two squadrons which are operationally tasked/controlled by MARPAC/MAG;



**CFB Esquimalt** - A MARCOM base with an operational infantry battalion, a large industrial complex (dockyard) and a host of regional responsibilities;

**CFB Chilliwack** - A CFTS base with an operational FMC unit and most of the regional support responsibilities for British Columbia; and,

**CFB Shilo** - An FMC base, an operational unit under command of Comd 1 CBG and a major permanent contingent of the German army.

**(b) Most Complex**

The remaining six bases would appear to face the most significant challenge in providing an effective, environmentally tailored service:

**CFB Winnipeg** - An AIRCOM base supporting the Command HQ, infantry battalion, two schools, a host of lodger units and very diverse regional support requirements;

**CFB Ottawa** - An AIRCOM base with ATG and 10 TAG squadrons and a huge miscellaneous role in support of NDHQ;

**CFB Kingston** - The most complicated CFTS base with schools, colleges and an FMC operational signals regiment;

**CFB Halifax** - A MARCOM base complete with Command HQ, a large school and dockyard, many lodger units and an extremely diverse regional support role; and,

**CFB Lahr/Baden** - Supports both land and air operational forces, CFE HQ and provides a focal point for CF air transport in Europe.

- (2) Although the practical scope for re-assignment and reduction of support tasking of these designated bases may be limited, they could not help but benefit from a thorough analysis and a better definition of their unique environmental or operational requirements.

**Deduction:** Ten of the 31 CF bases face the most difficult challenge in providing adequate support service. They should receive top priority in any future study.

- c. **Span of Control.** The span of control of bases such as Winnipeg, Ottawa and Halifax is enormous even though, in Base Concept theory, it flows vertically through only four departmental channels. Minor new construction priorities, equitable resource distribution, and effectively written

performance evaluation reports for integral unit personnel are several of the many reasons why the subject Base Commanders require at least a working knowledge of their often far-flung empire. These bases exceed tolerable limits of "span of control" by such a margin, that it would be unreasonable to expect their Commanding Officers to be truly accountable for the effectiveness/efficiency of their bases.

**Deduction:** The span of control required of certain Base Commanders makes it unreasonable to expect them to be truly accountable for the effectiveness/efficiency of their bases.

- d. **Unity of Command.** One of the most persistent criticisms found in both the E-17 and the Task Force Reports concerns the failure of the base system regarding "unity of command". In reality, it is the unit which suffers from a lack of autonomy rather than the base. Certainly there are bases which provide support and receive direction from various senior authorities, however, the Base Commander has only one immediate superior. As mentioned previously, most Base Commanders control the actions and resources necessary to accomplish the aim, and while they probably have inadequate amounts of discretionary funds, they have attained "unity of command". Assigning to the Base Commander the responsibility for the operational effectiveness of his integral units has been a most successful policy of the air force for years. It also works well on FMC bases where the Brigade Commander is also the Base Commander. The degree to which similar action could be taken on other bases is worthy of further investigation.

**Deduction:** Much of the effectiveness achieved on most air and land bases can be attributed to the fact that the Base Commander is operationally responsible for his integral units, not just a provider of support services.

- e. **The Base Commander.** During the past ten years there have been noticeable improvements in the effectiveness of a number of bases due primarily to the leadership and management skills of certain Base Commanders. These officers have modified the common base system to suit the integral and lodger units and to recognize unique environmental requirements. Their competence and professionalism have been vital to the successful accomplishment of the base mission and the morale and well being of thousands of military and civilian personnel. Yet, over the years the system has:

- (1) selected officers to command bases who had neither the experience nor motivation for the job;
- (2) posted "high profile" officers as Base Commanders for very short periods as a career broadening measure; and,
- (3) moved effective Base Commanders on a cyclical 2-3 year tour criteria with no apparent consideration of what would have been best for the base mission, its personnel and a myriad of base development programs.

**Deductions:** (1) Great care should be taken in the selection of Base Commanders particularly for complex bases and the "good ones" should be left for a minimum of 3-4 years.

(2) More emphasis should be placed on the Service or base requirement and less on career interests of these officers.

- f. **CF Image.** The geographical dispersion of CF bases across Canada and their proximity to large cities and small towns make the base an ideal focal point for public relations tasks. The Base Commander should be the catalyst in this process. He has become too restrained in direct communications with the public and particularly the media. Thus, Director General Information has had to assume both in NDHQ and regional offices most of the responsibility for the CF Public Relations Program. The Forces have never been given a policy related to the benefits to be achieved by a conscious effort at all rank levels to educate and inform the Canadian public about the military. This requirement should be developed and become part of each base CFOO with the Base Commander being given the latitude to develop unique programs that suit his operation.

**Deduction:** Base Commanders should be tasked with the responsibility to implement a local public relations program.

- g. **Leadership and Discipline.** CFTS has devised and implemented a personal development/socialization program for young service members on each of its five bases. The main thrust lines of this program include:

- a. a firm standard of discipline and consistent leadership goals;
- b. a mandatory requirement for a "supervisors notebook" (similar to previous platoon commander's and divisional officer's notebooks) which guarantees that every supervisor has a thorough knowledge of a subordinate's military and personal needs and aspirations;
- c. no authority given single privates to live off base for at least six months, or until the supervisor considers them mature enough to live out;
- d. dry social centers as alternatives to bars; and,
- e. special emphasis on sports, fitness and recreation activities and on providing academic upgrading.

These and other similar measures designed to improve individual life styles and more important to reinforce old leadership values have Forces-wide applicability. The tendency to blame the "Base Concept"



for a host of problems that it did not spawn is unfortunate. It is simply another system which can be systematically modified to meet not only operational roles but virtually any sensible approach to leadership and discipline.

**Deduction:** The "Base Concept" can be modified to reinforce leadership concepts and benefit both the service and the individual. This is a primary goal on all CFTS bases now.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

9.
  - a. A thorough base-by-base evaluation should be undertaken to rationalize the original ad hoc implementation process.
  - b. The standard CFOO structure should be analyzed to confirm that it is serving the intended purpose and where appropriate, should be re-written to identify unique support requirements.
  - c. Ten of the 31 CF bases face the most difficult challenge in providing adequate support service. They should receive top priority in any future study.
  - d. The span of control required of certain Base Commanders makes it unreasonable to expect them to be truly accountable for the effectiveness/efficiency of their bases.
  - e. Much of the effectiveness achieved on most air and land bases can be attributed to the fact that the Base Commander is operationally responsible for his integral units, not just a provider of support services.
  - f. Great care should be taken in the selection of Base Commanders particularly for complex bases and the "good ones" should be left for a minimum of 3-4 years.
  - g. More emphasis should be placed on the Service or base requirement and less on career interests of these officers.
  - h. Base Commanders should be tasked with the responsibility to implement a local public relations program.
  - j. The Base Concept can be modified to reinforce leadership concepts and benefit both the Service and the individual. This is a primary goal on all CFTS bases now.

## CONCLUSION

10. The Review Group has concluded that most Base Commanders have only moderate difficulty in working within the Common Base Concept. The Review Group



does however, enthusiastically support the Task Force recommendation for a more intensive review of the structure and span of control problems on those bases which have been designated as "complex".

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

11. The Review Group recommends that:
  - a. the purpose and application of CFOOs be reviewed and further that they be particularized to define the unique responsibilities and primary mission of every base;
  - b. a concerted effort be made to reduce the span of control of appropriate Base Commanders, and that where practical they be given operational control and responsibility for their integral units;
  - c. selected aspects of the CFTS leadership program be applied Forces-wide; and finally that,
  - d. the tours of effective Base Commanders be extended to three to four years.

## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

#### CROSS-ENVIRONMENTAL POSTINGS FOR VOLUNTEERS

##### BACKGROUND

1. In the discussion section of the report the Task Force considered that cross-posting of support personnel has an effect on morale both of the individual and the unit. In addition, it was felt that there is an effect on both the unit efficiency which results from the individual's lack of specific knowledge and the requirement for the unit to train him. If the individual cross-posted is a senior non-commissioned officer, his lack of environmental training is a handicap in doing his job of supervising and instructing others. His performance evaluation report would judge his performance in relation to his peers, which may well be to his disadvantage.

2. From the above information the Task Force concluded that "cross-posting of personnel between environments is detrimental to the efficiency of operational units. Unless it occurs voluntarily, it can result in a dissatisfied serviceman." The Task Force recommended that:

**"cross-postings between environments be used only for volunteers or to meet special personnel requirements".**

3. This recommendation is closely aligned with Recommendation 2 and to a lesser degree Recommendation 5.

##### FACTORS AFFECTING SELECTION OF THE AIM

4. Because Recommendations 2 and 4 are so similar, this appreciation will deal primarily with the "voluntary" or "special personnel requirements" aspect of cross-postings between environments (i.e., could the operational requirements of the Forces be met primarily by individuals who volunteer to serve in more than one environment?).

##### AIM

5. The aim of this appreciation is to confirm that a voluntary approach to inter-environmental postings would satisfy Service requirements.

## ASSUMPTIONS

6. Although not specifically stated in the Task Force Report it is assumed that the personnel referred to are not limited to support trades and classifications, otherwise, Recommendation 4 is simply another way of phrasing Recommendation 2.

7. While no hard evidence is provided in the study as to the actual loss of unit efficiency or the numbers of personnel whose careers have suffered due to the subject postings, the premise that career broadening is less significant than unit effectiveness is accepted.

## FACTORS

### 8. Confirmation of the Problem

- a. **Cross-Environmental Postings.** The Task Force Report contends that cross-postings between environments have a negative effect on unit efficiency and on the level of Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) awarded to the subject individuals. The underlying problem, as it was with Recommendation 2, related to inadequate levels of environmental knowledge and experience and to a basic belief expressed by the Task Force that an individual cannot effectively serve in more than one environment. In researching various reports and previous correspondence on this subject it is apparent that the problem is real and although serious, it is not likely that this situation occurs frequently. No doubt personnel involved in the subject postings are legitimately concerned with the potential career impact, however, these fears must be somewhat diminished by the acknowledged improvement in promotion potential inherent in larger trades and classifications.

**Deductions:** (1) The Review Group could not define the extent of the problem, however, the unit and the individual suffer if the individual is inadequately trained or environmentally inexperienced.

- (2) The larger classifications/trades employment patterns improve the promotion potential of the individual.

### 9. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **Volunteering.** While the analogy is not perfect, one need only examine the historical manpower distribution problems in effectively manning the airborne regiment and submarines to gain an insight into the real limitations inherent in finding sufficient volunteers to meet legitimate Service requirements. If further evidence is required it can be found in the constant struggle to fill positions in "consent to serve" units such as Helairdets and ships where individuals are requested to give up their "vested rights" and volunteer! Even within the overall concept of a

volunteer force operational requirements must take precedence over individual wishes. To add yet another dimension to the current problems associated with "volunteers" is difficult to contemplate seriously.

- b. **Employment Areas.** The frequency and extent of inter-environment postings varies from the "logistics family" to the Air Operations group of officers and men who, proportionate to their total employment spectrum, have very limited field or sea duty. The bulk of the established positions whose manning generates the inter-environment moves are found in service battalions, signals field units, medical/dental field units, Helairdets, field engineering squadrons, 10 TAG and ships. Although no positive proof exists, it is most unlikely that these operational units could be effectively manned from a pool of volunteers in the relevant trades and classifications.

**Deduction:** The Canadian Forces has had persistent difficulty in manning of "volunteer units" in the past and it is most unlikely that HMC Ships and Land Service Support Units could be manned to "operational" levels if cross-environment moves required volunteers.

- c. **Existing Policy and Procedures.** Current CFAOs and personnel policies outline the procedures to be followed in manning units which require volunteers because of either potential hazard or because of individuals "vested rights to serve". Other than the specific limitations imposed for the above reasons, Service requirement is the predominant consideration in the manning of operational units. There is currently no formal requirement imposed on career managers to identify personnel who would be willing to serve in more than one environment.

**Deduction:** Current policy ensures the needs of the Service have priority over individual wishes.

## 10. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** A review of historical manning patterns of units which rely on volunteers graphically illustrates that it has been a constant struggle to maintain even minimum manning levels. Acceptance of Task Force Recommendation 4 would literally add thousands of established operational and operational support positions to the list of those which currently require volunteers. None the less, postings between environments can reduce operational effectiveness of the unit if the individual has inadequate experience and expertise in that environment.
- b. **Morale.** The elimination of inter-environment moves would undoubtedly be welcomed by some of the personnel now involved in this process. It would also be consistent with the increasing attention being paid to "human rights" in the civilian sector. Conversely, the time away from



home and the hardships of field and sea duty would be shared by far fewer personnel than at present. The quality and level of PERs for those who remained in a single environment would presumably improve consistent with enhanced environmental expertise.

- Deductions:**
- (1) An undetermined number of tradesmen would be pleased by elimination of cross environment postings.
  - (2) Fewer support tradesmen would share the demanding sea and field duty.
  - (3) The individuals PER may improve with enhanced environmental expertise.

- c. **Financial Constraints.** The proposed change in posting policy would have few financial implications, indeed, if implemented it might reduce posting frequency and save money.

**Deduction:** Financial considerations would be minor.

- d. **Current Policies and Procedures**

- (1) A rigid acceptance of "volunteering to cross environmental boundaries" would necessitate major changes in personnel policy and even philosophy. That is not to say that more emphasis could not be placed on individual preferences for environment than at present. In reality however, the latitude available to provide more preference postings **without** prejudicing operational effectiveness is considered to be minimal.
- (2) On the assumption that "central systems" will not be dramatically changed, it would be argued that personnel with multi-environment experience have a potential advantage in effectively performing these duties over those who have a more narrow single service background, particularly at more senior ranks.

**Deduction:** The need for environmental expertise at more junior ranks is accepted, however, a process of selective broadening provides advantages for more senior employment in "central systems".

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

- 11. a. The Review Group could not define the extent of the problem, however, the unit and the individual suffer if the individual is inadequately trained or environmentally inexperienced.
- b. The larger classifications/trades employment patterns improve the promotion potential of the individual.

- c. The Canadian Forces has had persistent difficulty in manning of "volunteer units" in the past and it is most unlikely that HMC Ships and Land Service Support Units could be manned to "operational" levels if cross-environment moves required volunteers.
- d. An undetermined number of tradesmen would be pleased by elimination of cross environment postings.
- e. The need for environmental expertise at more junior ranks is accepted, however, a process of selective broadening provides advantages for more senior employment in "central systems".

## CONCLUSION

12. The Review Group has concluded that the ability of the personnel system to effectively man operational units would be seriously impaired by a rigid policy to prohibit inter-environment posting. Moreover, the Review Group determined in its analysis of Recommendation 2 that employment patterns must be developed and formally introduced to reinforce the previous ad hoc efforts of career managers to establish environmental expertise. It has also been demonstrated that while the system must be sensitive to personal preferences it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find sufficient volunteers to cross environmental boundaries and man ships and combat support units. Although the fundamental need to nourish environmental expertise and experience is recognized, the Review Group does not support the subject Task Force recommendation.



**REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 5  
PROMOTION INDUCEMENT FOR UNDESIRABLE POSTINGS**

**BACKGROUND**

1. The Task Force Report stated at Section V that there was some resentment expressed in the Canadian Forces that promotion was frequently used as an inducement to circumvent the vested rights of individuals who had joined prior to unification. Another source of resentment mentioned was the practice of using a promotion to persuade an individual to accept an undesirable posting, particularly to an environment in which he did not wish to serve. This latter comment was expressed by personnel who have enrolled since unification and who did not have vested rights to protect them against undesirable postings. However, it was recognized by some that this had introduced a greater flexibility in the system.

2. In the discussion section of the report the Task Force considered that offering promotion inducement to personnel to gain their acceptance of an undesirable posting was creating problems. Promotion by this means is damaging to the morale of other personnel who are already serving in these environments and who may also be due for promotion.

3. The Task Force concluded that "Promotion as an inducement to accept an undesirable posting has caused much resentment." They recommended that:

**"offering promotions as an inducement to personnel to accept undesirable postings be avoided".**

4. This recommendation is linked to Recommendation 4.

**AIM**

5. The aim of this appreciation is to confirm that promotion inducement is an essential practice in effectively manning operational units.

**ASSUMPTION**

6. The individual has the right to refuse promotion, however, with the exception of vested rights related to "consent-to-serve" as specified in QR&O 10.015 and CFAO 10-3, the Service can legitimately demand that individuals take up their postings.



## FACTORS

### 7. Related Dimensions of Problem

a. **Manning "Volunteer" Units.** Not considering trade/classification shortages, a review of manning levels for operational units whose "strength" over the years has been dependent on volunteers, graphically illustrates the fact that a problem exists. Furthermore, it varies in severity in direct relation to the proportion of total unit strength who must volunteer (i.e., from the airborne regiment and submarines which are 100% VOLUNTEER, to ground combat units and ships companies which require a limited number of support personnel to waive "vested rights" in comparison to the total unit or ship complement).

#### b. The Central Issue - Vested Rights.

- (1) There are two aspects of this overall operational manning problem. The first relates to the process of finding volunteers for hazardous types of employment such as in the airborne, submarine, diver and para-rescue, and the second to the "vested right" given to former Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, who could not be forced to serve as a member of a ground combat unit, an aircraft crew or a ships company if such duty was not part of their employment pattern prior to 31 January 1968.
- (2) Discounting for the moment the problems associated with the manning of the airborne and submarines, since they do not stem from unification and integration, leaves "vested rights" as the central issue. Furthermore, the Review Group noted that the problem was most severe in early unification days when virtually everyone had "vested rights", and that it will be entirely resolved when trade and classification inventories contain sufficient personnel at appropriate rank levels who joined subsequent to 31 January 1968. Some progress is also being made at more senior rank levels since acceptance of an Indefinite Period of Service (IPS) offer now includes waiving of "vested rights".
- (3) Currently, the most difficult manning problems for "consent-to-serve" units are in Helairdets, and to a lesser extent ships companies and land combat units. Perhaps the most vivid example of the extent of the problem is the Helairdets whose crew chief is established as a MWO while air trade personnel with no "vested rights" have only reached the rank of MCpl. Thus, the problem identified by the Task Force defies resolution, at least in some trades, for many years.

**Deductions:** (1) The central issue is that of vested rights for individuals who joined the Services prior to unification.

- (2) The vested rights issue will be resolved with the passage of time. However, there are still many operational units which could not be manned without volunteers.

c. **Promotion Inducement.** The original purpose of the subject promotion policy was the requirement to effectively man operational units. This policy did, and still does, follow the basic precepts of the "merit" principle. (i.e., the individuals are offered promotion in strict descending order from the merit list to fill a vacancy in an operational unit, which is deemed to have generated promotion quota.) Current practice recognizes the individual's right to refuse promotion as a separate issue from the Service authority to post, since the refusal of a legitimate posting automatically results in an item 5(d) release. While the concept of "promotion inducement" is viewed by many as an unethical practice - certainly a process that is not adequately understood, there can be no doubt that it has kept operational units at least viable and further that it has eliminated enormous losses of experienced tradesmen who would otherwise been driven out of the Service.

**Deductions:** (1) Current promotion inducement practices ensure at least minimum manning of "volunteer" units.

(2) The policy has been sensibly employed to avoid forcing men out who would not accept certain postings.

(3) A better understanding of all aspects of the current policy would reduce misconceptions as to how and why promotion inducement is required.

d. **Existing Policy and Procedures.** The authorization for the above policies are contained in QR&O 10.015 and CFAO 10-3 while the specific procedures are defined in CPCSA OPM 115-1 and DGPCOR Instruction - 802.

## 8. Impact Analysis

a. **Operational Effectiveness.** Removal of the authority to use various legitimate forms of promotion inducement would seriously affect the manning levels of various operational units. The adoption of a more rigid posting policy, as an inevitable next step, would significantly increase voluntary attrition.

**Deductions:** (1) The ability to man operational units would be reduced by the removal of promotion inducement.

(2) Voluntary attrition would increase with the adoption of a more rigid posting policy.

b. **Morale**

- (1) Unit Commanding Officers and career managers have confirmed that there is some resentment over the use of "promotion inducement". However, the extent of this morale problem is limited to those few trades listed in Appendix 1 who are involved in the process of manning consent-to-serve units and normally to ranks above MCpl.
- (2) A second, potentially more serious morale problem stems from a steadily increasing number of personnel in ranks from Cpl to CWO who seek geographical stability and less onerous employment. The fact that career managers are frequently required to use "promotion inducement" to fill positions that are perceived by the individual as being undesirable - the alternative being to post and drive experienced personnel out of the service, is a practical illustration of a "Catch 22" position which defies simple resolution and one which cannot legitimately be blamed on unification.

**Deductions:** (1) The morale effects of using promotion inducement to man consent-to-serve units are limited to the trades involved in the process.

- (2) The need to use "promotion inducement" to fill certain undesirable positions is a relatively new and potentially serious phenomenon.

- c. **Financial Implications.** The use of "promotion inducement" in its various forms does not have any direct financial implication. Its intelligent application has however, been responsible for retaining the services of hundreds of senior personnel who would otherwise have required replacement at considerable cost to the training and personnel systems. While no dollar value can be assigned to a loss in unit effectiveness, the use of promotion has identifiably improved the manning of operational elements of the force utilizing fewer cost moves than would otherwise have been necessary if a more rigid approach to postings had been taken.

**Deduction:** Current policy increases retention thus creating savings in personnel, training and posting costs.

- d. **Related Policies.** Having identified the problem in manning "volunteer" units and described the procedures which have been adopted and followed, it is considered that an associated issue requires further consideration. There seems to be a growing perception on the part of Service personnel that promotion is the "least" one can expect if faced with a difficult or undesirable posting. The primacy of "service rights" has become somewhat blurred by a philosophy of, "what's in it for me?". A change in perception would be easily achieved by returning to more rigid posting policies based exclusively on Service requirements, however, it is



considered that any dramatic change in attitude, particularly for trades and classifications that are critically under strength, would result in intolerable increases in attrition. Nonetheless, this particular aspect of the "promotion inducement" concept warrants further examination.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

9.
  - a. The central issue is that of vested rights for individuals who joined the Services prior to unification.
  - b. The vested rights issue will be resolved with the passage of time, however, there are still many operational units which could not be manned without volunteers.
  - c. Current promotion inducement practices ensure at least minimum manning of "volunteer" units.
  - d. The policy has been sensibly employed to avoid forcing men out who would not accept certain postings.
  - e. A better understanding of all aspects of the current policy would reduce misconceptions as to how and why promotion inducement is required.
  - f. The ability to man operational units would be reduced by the removal of promotion inducement.
  - g. Voluntary attrition would increase with the adoption of a more rigid posting policy.

## CONCLUSIONS

10. "Promotion inducement" in its various forms does create resentment among those who are involved in the process, including many career managers who regard it as a necessary but unethical expedient. The policy which governs the promotion inducement procedures has been carefully conceived and meticulously applied to ensure that the "merit principle" is not violated. Many of the concerns expressed to the Task Force, particularly from individuals not directly affected, stem from an incomplete understanding of the procedure.

11. The use of promotion inducement to obtain volunteers for "hazardous" employment is an intermittent but continuing requirement. However, the "vested rights" application will disappear entirely as post 1968 personnel are promoted to more senior ranks, or pre-unification servicemen accept an Indefinite Period of Service offer.

12. There can be no doubt however, that current and foreseeable operational requirements could not be met if CFAO 10-3 was cancelled. The Review Group is therefore forced to conclude that, since operational effectiveness must be the



paramount consideration, the use of promotion inducement in its various forms must continue.

#### **COLLATERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

13.
  - a. The entire process including the basic rationale should be the subject of a CP Newsletter article to clear up apparent misconceptions.
  - b. ADM(Per) should be asked to review the perceptual problems which are being nurtured by the use of promotion to fill less popular positions.

**UNITS, TRADES AND RANK LEVELS  
AFFECTED BY  
THE POLICY OF OFFERING PROMOTION  
AS AN INDUCEMENT TO SERVE**

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Trade</b>		<b>Rank Affected</b>
Airborne Regiment	INFMN	031	All rank levels
	RAD OP	211	MCPL to MWO
	COM OP	213	MCPL to MWO
	RAD TECH	221	MCPL to MWO
	COM TECH	224	MCPL to MWO
	ADM CLK	831	MCPL
	SUP TECH	911	MCPL
Submarines	WU TECH	064	MCPL to MWO
	COM TECH SEA	252	MCPL to MWO
	RDR TECH SEA	272	MCPL to MWO
	SONAR TECH	282	MCPL to MWO
	MAR ENG T	311	MCPL to MWO
	E TECH	331	MCPL to MWO
	MED A	711	MCPL
Ships	MET TECH	121	SGT
	FIREFTR	651	MCPL and SGT
	ADM CLK	831	SGT
	STWD	862	SGT
CFB Shearwater (Helairdets)	AVN TECH	513	SGT
	IS TECH	521	CPL and WO
	CS TECH	522	CPL and WO
	RS TECH	523	CPL and WO
	AVS TECH	525	CPL and WO



## REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF

### TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

#### NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS RANK STRUCTURE

##### BACKGROUND

1. In the opinions expressed to the Task Force it was considered by many that the common rank structure disregarded the differences in environments and created superfluous ranks within some environments. It was observed that the implementation of a uniform rank structure had distorted the rank structure and had diluted the significance of some ranks. Some testimony indicated that the equal opportunity principle which had been applied to branches of the Canadian Forces had led to inflated rank pyramids for some branches, trades or classifications. To provide equal opportunity for members of small specialties, a number of specialties have had to be amalgamated to create a large enough rank pyramid, thus creating senior rank levels in excess of the requirements. Additionally, it was considered by many that the present common terms of service did not meet the requirements of all environments; each environment had its own requirements for rank structure and for service career patterns. Prior to unification, environments had used short service commissions and varying terms of service to meet their own requirements.

2. As part of the analysis of this problem in Section VI of its Report the Task Force determined that the rank structure common to the navy, army and air force is not suitable for all of the forces. In all three environments the loss of an effective Corporal through automatic promotion to that rank has meant a reduction of responsibilities assigned to rank. There are also too many non-commissioned officer ranks for the navy to suit the employment of sailors in a ship.

3. The Task Force concluded that the common rank structure has created rank distortions in the army and air force. It also has created superfluous ranks for the navy and a junior leadership problem for the army. It was recommended by the Task Force that:

**"the rank structure for non-commissioned officers be re-examined".**

##### AIM

4. The aim of this appreciation is to confirm that sufficient problems exist to warrant a complete review of the rank structure for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).



## ASSUMPTIONS

5.
  - a. Equitable promotion opportunity will be retained as a basic element of personnel policy.
  - b. It is not essential that every trade peak at the CWO level.
  - c. Rank structure cannot be treated in isolation from trade progression, or compensation.

## FACTORS

### 6. Confirmation of the Problem

- a. **General.** Rank Levels are initially derived from job requirements and are validated and approved by the "establishment" process. In theory therefore, they are a legitimate expression of the level of leadership/supervision skill needed to meet operational requirements. In reality it has become extremely difficult to isolate rank and trade skills since they are bound together by trade progression patterns. This has forced units who were searching the inventory for a specific level of trade knowledge and skill to request and ultimately employ the rank level that guaranteed trade skill despite the fact that the job did not require that level of leadership/supervision. This process has led to a degree of over-ranking in all but a few trades in the CF inventory; e.g., rank redundancy and over-ranking was confirmed by a Personnel Applied Research Unit (PARU) job analysis of the 500 series trades and a Director Military Occupational Structures (DMOS) evaluation of specific job requirements for the Sea Technical Trades conducted in the mid-1970s.

**Deductions:** (1) To acquire essential trade skill a unit may be forced to demand a higher rank level than is actually required for leadership/supervision content of the job.

(2) Current rank and trade progression structures contribute to over-ranking of positions.

- b. **Working Relationships.** Rank has also been established to facilitate working relationships and status, (e.g., departmental CPOs on warships, the flight engineering trade and the Helairdet crew chiefs). Furthermore, the quest for "equitable" trade promotion opportunity has led to direct comparisons and a concerted effort to achieve "equal" promotion potential.

**Deduction:** Rank requirements have been established in some cases, for the primary purpose of improving working relationships and status.

## 7. Related Dimensions of the Problem

- a. **Benchmarks.** An associated issue, not identified by the Task Force, but one inextricably linked to rank/trade employment problems, is the question of demarkation lines between the journeyman tradesman and the supervisor. Treasury Board (TB) guidelines on pay structure established several benchmarks to be used in pay comparability with the public service and private sector. The Corporal (Cpl) rank was selected as the lowest benchmark since the Cpl was deemed for employment purposes and pay to be the journeyman level. Historical employment practices in former Service days varied on a trade-by-trade basis according to operational and Service requirements and for many trades the Cpl equivalent was not the rank level which held or practised journeyman skills. Major revisions to trade specifications were undertaken to ensure that the Cpl was trained as a journeyman and to introduce a hitherto unknown rank of Master Corporal (MCpl) as the first level of supervision. This massive effort had a number of negative and positive side effects such as splitting all but two sea trades into operators and maintainers and forcing advanced training to be undertaken by scores of additional junior ranks. The navy has still not recovered from the increased training load. Furthermore, this TB/UNIFICATION policy implied that skilled tradesmen should lay down their tool boxes on reaching the rank of MCpl because the "system" now considered them to be supervisors. Aircraft maintenance personnel, mobile support equipment operators and hard sea trades, to name a few, have struggled with this problem ever since. This further example of a "civilian comparability" does not recognize either the unique operational employment patterns of specific trades or the strong desire of many tradesmen to be able to practice their craft without having to refuse the tangible recognition and rewards associated with promotion.

**Deductions:** (1) Civilian comparability and TB Pay Guidelines caused an enormous trade restructuring effort and initiated training overloads which will take years to correct.

- (2) Current policy does not recognize the unique operational employment patterns of specific trades or the desires of many tradesmen to practice their craft beyond the rank of Cpl.

- b. **Responsibility Centers.** A further aspect of the senior NCO rank structure problem which warrants examination has been the gradual shift of duties and responsibilities to higher rank levels. The upward migration of authority has been widely recognized throughout the CF, however, it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the problem in specific terms, since it varies considerably from trade to trade. This perception of lost authority and responsibility is in fact not limited to senior NCOs as it is shared by warrant officer and officer levels up to and including very senior ranks. Given the existence of a CF wide policy designed to progressively reverse this unfortunate migration, it would be necessary to objectively define the "responsibility foci" on a trade-by-trade base, and then to re-assign duties and responsibilities to appropriate rank and trade skill levels.

**Deduction:** Upward migration of authority also contributes to over-ranking and is a commonly expressed dissatisfier.

- c. **Rank Structure.** Common rank structure policies have been implemented through the medium of the establishment process so that "hard" established positions have been approved for virtually every rank in each individual trade. Where these specific Service requirements do not provide the desired rank-to-rank ratios, "generic", "any" and Advanced Training List (ATL) man-years have been added to flesh out the rank models. The net result of this lengthy process has been that "Other Ranks" in all but a few small trades have "equitable" promotion opportunity. These policies and procedures have been the subject of considerable scrutiny and soul-searching over the years. They are scrupulously administered, and while the rank models and implicit promotion potential are not identical for every individual, they are at least as fair as possible. Any departure from the current practice of full utilization of the entire "Other Rank" structure, utilizing the establishment process, would have to be based on a thorough trade-by-trade job analysis and a corresponding introduction of lateral skill progression.

**Deduction:** Any deviation from current policy on rank structure should be based on a thorough trade-by-trade job analysis.

## 8. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** Apart from the difficulties encountered with the introduction of the MCpl rank into operational and support units, common rank structure and over-ranking for NCOs do not appear to have had an identifiable effect on operational effectiveness. This fact should not be ignored in the final determination of proposed courses of action to particularize rank structure to actual job requirements.

**Deduction:** Adoption of the common rank structure has had no apparent effect on operational effectiveness.

- b. **Morale.** The elimination of redundant rank, even if it is somehow matched by tangible rewards associated with lateral skill progression, is likely to be a very emotional issue. We/they comparisons which significantly increased during the unification era will undoubtedly cause morale problems in those trades which lose currently held ranks. The impact on morale, if rank reduction is approved, cannot be quantified. However, it could certainly be kept to reasonable levels by a thorough pre-conditioning and a well conceived briefing program in advance of its implementation. Furthermore, while rank redundancy does not appear to be a problem in the officer classification rank structure, the perception of rank escalation in the officer corps would certainly have to be at least addressed.



- Deductions:** (1) Any significant change in NCO rank structure will create major morale problems.
- (2) The officer rank structure would have to be examined as part of the rank structure review.
- (3) The rationalization of NCO rank structure is not borne out of operational necessity.

- c. **Resources.** It need hardly be argued that a thorough rationalization of the senior NCO rank structure would produce significant financial benefits, assuming no significant change in pay increments. It is further assumed that most of this money would have to be translated into lateral skill progression benefits. Furthermore, it is not known how much latitude is available for the CF to determine its own pay philosophy considering the myriad of TB guidelines on compensation which have been imposed in recent years.

**Deduction:** It is important to determine the latitude available to the CF to shape its own rank/pay/trade structure before undertaking a major study on what is required.

- d. **Current Policies and Procedures.** Any significant modification to the NCO rank structure will have a profound effect on trade specifications, promotion and pay policies. As mentioned earlier, these proposed changes could not be developed in isolation from the current study on lateral skill progression. Indeed, in spite of the legitimate involvement of both ADM(Per) and CProg Staff there should be a single OPI.
- e. **Rank/Trade/Pay Matrix.** Common rank structure, trade structure and the payfield system are currently linked together in a complex matrix. The transition from a separate rank/trade group system prior to unification to common rank and a pay for trade skill/payfield system required a massive staff effort. It was a period of considerable turmoil and the resulting caste system of trades (standard, Specialist 1 and Specialist 2) has produced a divisive force in many operational teams. (i.e., The Flt Eng/Observer, BOSN and SIG SEA vs remaining hard sea trades, etc.) The requirement to provide tangible recognition for leadership/supervisory skills and responsibility by rank must not overlook the team ethic. Furthermore, it should provide for a meaningful system of rewards to individuals who pursue and acquire more trade skill than their peers. Thus, compensation policies are inherently related to rank structure and lateral skill progression.

**Deduction:** The complex relationship between rank/trade structure, payfield/operational teams cannot be effectively examined in isolation. There should be one OPI.



- f. **Compensation Evolution.** Prior to 1967, it was possible for the individual serviceman to receive compensation and recognition for his progression in trade skill (known as trade groupings) independently from his advancement in rank. Although certain linkages existed (e.g., in RC Sigs, Trade Group 4 was not granted below the rank of S Sgt), it was possible for a subordinate to possess a higher trade grouping, and in some cases to be paid more, than his supervisor. The Minister's Manpower Study (MEN) however, recommended that the trade group system be abandoned. Since its authors did "not believe that one can differentiate between rank and trade skill, as has been attempted in the past. These are diverse aspects of the same thing." Later the Study declares that, "the good technician makes a good leader." This rationale was accepted and the recommendation was approved, thus, the system of paying men for their individual trade skills was replaced by one in which payment for those of equal rank varied according to an evaluation of each trade (the payfield system). The current system, with its Standard, Specialist 1 and Specialist 2 fields, is in effect a modification of the payfield system. Now, it appears, the pendulum has swung back. Nonetheless, the need for a thorough rationalization of rank structure has been recognized for many years and although several trades were subjected to a DMOS job evaluation, this process has never been applied Forces-wide.

**Deduction:** We appear to be returning from whence we came.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

9. a. Current rank and trade progression structures contribute to over-ranking of positions.
- b. Civilian comparability and TB Pay Guidelines caused an enormous trade restructuring effort and initiated training overloads which will take years to correct.
- c. Upward migration of authority also contributes to over-ranking and is a commonly expressed dissatisfier.
- d. Any deviation from current policy on rank structure should be based on a thorough trade-by-trade job analysis.
- e. Any significant change in NCO rank structure will create major morale problems.
- f. The officer rank structure would have to be examined as part of the rank structure review.
- g. The rationalization of NCO rank structure is not borne out of operational necessity.
- h. It is important to determine the latitude available to the CF to shape its own rank/pay/trade structure before undertaking a major study on what is required.

- j. The complex relationship between rank/trade structure, payfield/operational teams cannot be effectively examined in isolation. There should be one OPI.

## **CONCLUSION**

10. The Review Group has concluded that there are sufficient problems directly or indirectly associated with the rank structure for non-commissioned officers to warrant a further, more thorough, examination. While agreeing with the Task Force on the need for the subject rationalization, the Review Group notes that this requirement is not based on potential identifiable improvements to the operational effectiveness of the CF.

## **COLLATERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 11. It is further recommended that:
  - a. the forthcoming Personnel Policy Study be tasked to co-ordinate rank and trade structure studies which are currently under way and further that the "Compensation system" become an added feature of the review;
  - b. an attempt be made at the outset to identify potential Treasury Board constraints; and that,
  - c. a rank restructuring study not be considered as primarily a financial expedient to offset potential costs related to the introduction of Lateral Skill Progression.



**REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 7  
RANK AND TRADE SKILL**

**BACKGROUND**

1. The opinions expressed to the Task Force on Unification and contained in its Report (Section V) considered rank should be associated with leadership rather than with skill or trade. It was felt that rank should be related to the granting of authority over other individuals and should not be used to provide a higher pay level for skilled tradesmen.
2. In its analysis of this problem in Section VI of the Report the Task Force determined that the association of rank and trade skill in some cases has resulted in promotion which recognizes progression in trade skill only. This does not always cater to the requirement for leadership skills which should be inherent in rank.
3. The Task Force concluded that, "the association of rank with trade skill has diluted the authority of leadership of non-commissioned officers." It was recommended by the Task Force that:

**"the existing study of the separation of rank and trade skill be accorded a high priority".**

The following comments were appended to the recommendation, "This is recommended to accommodate the unique need of each environment and to ensure that leadership requirements are duly accounted for."

**AIM**

4. The aim of this appreciation is to identify the practical extent to which lateral skill progression will permit greater separation of rank from trade skill.

**ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS**

5. Lateral trade progression is an integral part of the Other Ranks' Career Development Program (ORCDP) and as such received conceptual approval from Defence Management Committee (DMC) in May 1976. Since it is currently the subject of a separate review this appreciation will not re-substantiate the requirement for a study.



6. This appreciation is directly linked to the study of common rank structure proposed by the Task Force in Recommendation 6.

## FACTORS

### 7. Confirmation of the Problem

- a. **Lateral Skill Progression (LSP).** The ORCDP Study identified considerable dissatisfaction with the payfield system. In particular, it was felt that trade pay differentials should be based on individual achievement as distinct from the concept of paying all members of certain groups of trades at higher rates than those given to other groups. It was also felt that the good technician did not necessarily make a good leader and that the single-reward (promotion) system often succeeded in transforming a good technician into an inadequate supervisor. In May 1976, DMC APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE the ORCDP Study recommendation that a compensation system known as Lateral Skill Progression be developed as a means for recognizing and rewarding individual trade skill advancement. ORCDP went on to recommend that the promotion in rank would apply only to those who possessed the potential to become leaders and supervisors. It is noted that many of the ORCDP findings with regard to rank and trade progression totally contradict the findings of the previous "Minister's Manpower Study (MEN)" which stated that "the good technician makes a good leader" and "we do not believe that one can differentiate between rank and skill."
- b. **Trade Skill Recognition.** The requirement to establish a means to encourage and tangibly reward individual initiative in striving for increased trade is widely accepted. It not only enhances personal motivation and job satisfaction but more important, it has the potential to benefit the Service by significantly increasing the inventory of trade skill available to meet the technological challenges of the future. On its own merits therefore, tangible recognition of trade skill is a worthwhile venture **without** the need for a corresponding reduction in promotion opportunity.

**Deductions:** (1) Two very credible major studies, Minister's Manpower Study (MEN) and ORCDP, have produced conflicting recommendations on rank/trade progression.

- (2) Implementation of a lateral skill progression policy has considerable merit as a "stand-alone" program without searching for matching rank reduction.

- c. **Leadership.** Another fundamental issue that should be accepted at the outset is the fact that there will never be, in any trade, a total separation of rank and trade progression. For example, the combat arms face significant leadership challenges and they must therefore be allowed to move rapidly through the current rank structure to permit the exercise of responsibility and leadership at as early an age as possible. In fact, this advance is logically constrained at every rank level by formal

or informal confirmation that the individual has attained the prerequisite trade skill and experience which will permit the legitimate exercise of leadership. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a large number of technicians would achieve the highest trade skill progression levels without having some aptitude to supervise and direct the efforts of other, less skilled tradesmen. The current policy of rigidly locking trade advancement to promotion does not however adequately recognize the differences in individual knowledge, motivation and determination to advance more rapidly in acquiring trade skills.

**Deduction:** Total separation of rank and trade progression will never be achieved.

- d. **Training Methods.** Certain new training development techniques such as self paced and computer assisted learning have opened the door to a more enlightened era, however, even these modest attempts to relax the rigidity of historical training systems are understood and supported by few.

**Deduction:** New training development techniques provide the means to reduce the rigidity of the trade progression system.

- e. **Operational Requirements.** The fact that the operational mission and the weapons/equipment systems employed in waging or being prepared to wage war are the basic determinants on which all trade skill requirements must be substantiated, has not always been placed squarely in front of those responsible for the Personnel Management System. The unification era has been marked by turbulence, trade consolidation, force reduction and pervasive financial constraint which has distracted the CF from a number of fundamental issues. It permitted the introduction of a number of major personnel policies which were individually well conceived and thoroughly staffed but which in fact were **not allowed** to recognize fundamental differences in operational employment and the unique trade progression problem. It is therefore important that the study on lateral trade progression visibly re-establish the vital theme that operational requirements and the associated hardware now and soon to be in the inventory, provide the foundation on which trade structure must be constructed.

**Deduction:** The requirement for trade skill stems directly from operational missions and equipment. This fact should be an underlying principle on which the need for LSP is based.

## 8. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **Trade Unionism.** Although the Task Force Report did not express significant concern over the possibility of unionization of the Forces, it is interesting to note that our current trade payfield structure includes a fundamental trade union principle that all members of a specific trade will receive the same pay regardless of individual differences in the skill levels held and the effectiveness and enthusiasm with which these skills are applied.

Certainly we did not move from former Service trade grouping to a "payfield structure" with any thought of trade unionism. We have however, established a system where promotion has become a pre-occupation throughout the CF since, apart from acquiring trade pre-requisites for advancement and professional pride, there is little incentive for an individual to enhance his/her trade skill.

- Deductions:** (1) The current trade/payfield system rewards members identically regardless of individual skill and effectiveness.
- (2) Promotion is the primary method of rewarding professional competence and it has become a pre-occupation for most of our personnel.

- b. **Leadership Training.** The ORCDP Study suggested that good technicians are not necessarily good leaders or supervisors. It would be reasonable to assume, perhaps to a lesser extent, that a good infantryman will not necessarily be a good troop leader. The point being that while many technical and support personnel in former Service and early years of unification were ill-equipped to perform leadership roles, that is certainly less true today. Many things have changed. Junior and senior leadership courses are promotion prerequisites for all trades and new employment areas have been made available to these personnel such as recruit training, and Base Warrant Officer and Command Chief Warrant Officer positions. Also support and technical trades are employed at every rank level. As a group they are much better trained to perform leadership and supervisory functions and the majority are most effective. The need for lateral skill progression should not therefore be viewed as a means to placate large numbers of personnel who have no legitimate right to be considered leaders and supervisors.

- Deductions:** (1) The quality of leadership of technical and support personnel has improved as a result of the current employment and training patterns.
- (2) LSP should not be viewed conceptually as a pallative to thousands of technical and support personnel who cannot legitimately aspire to lead and supervise.

## 9. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** A thorough rationalization of rank and trade structure, **if** it is based on CF missions and operational requirements, could have a considerable although somewhat intangible positive impact on operational effectiveness. Streamlining and reducing the length of the "chain of command", exercising maximum responsibility and authority at minimum practical levels and a potential growth in level of trade skills available to the Forces if LSP is implemented offer sufficient potential benefits in CF effectiveness to justify the effort.

**Deduction:** A carefully conceived lateral skill progression program should result in an increase in operational effectiveness.



- b. **Morale.** Viewed as an entirely separate Service requirement, lateral skill progression would be welcomed by every one of the thousands of tradesmen it could apply to. If, on the other hand, this concept is presented as a preliminary event leading ultimately to rank reductions, it will be very poorly received. Implementation of major changes in rank and trade structure provide the greatest potential for morale problems of any of the Task Force recommendations since they would probably have an impact on all but four or five trades in the current inventory.

**Deduction:** Potential morale problems must be thoroughly examined during the development of the LSP program.

c. **Financial**

- (1) **Expected Cost.** Implementation of an enlightened, effective policy of lateral skill progression could cost a great deal of money. Preliminary discussions with appropriate staffs suggest that some or all of the required financial resources could be obtained by stripping unnecessary rank structure from these same and other trades. While rank reduction is theoretically possible, the Review Group is unable to confirm that elimination of rank will provide the financial means to accomplish lateral skill progression. Indeed, it is considered that LSP has merits as a stand-alone policy and that it should therefore be costed out on that basis.

**Deduction:** LSP should be developed and costed as an autonomous program.

- (2) **Guidelines.** It is considered essential that DND autonomy vis-à-vis Treasury Board (TB) pay structure guidelines be established at the outset of the LSP study. Without suggesting that the study be totally based on potential TB constraints, it would be a mistake to waste this enormous effort and to raise the expectations of Forces personnel if the CF has little if any latitude to change its trade/pay structure.

**Deduction:** TB guidelines should be identified prior to commencement of the study.

- d. **Current Policies and Procedures.** The potential impact of instituting only a program of lateral skill progression would necessitate relatively few policy and procedural changes other than those related to identifying skill increments, however, pay policy would require a major overhaul. If rank and trade structure changes are part of the overall implementation plan, then the impact on current policy and procedures is enormous.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

10. a. Two very credible major studies, Minister's Manpower Study (MEN) and ORCDP, have produced conflicting recommendations on rank/trade progression.



- b. Implementation of a lateral skill progression policy has considerable merit as a "stand-alone" program without searching for matching rank reduction.
- c. The requirement for trade skill stems directly from operational missions and equipment. This fact should be an underlying principle on which the need for LSP is based.
- d. The current trade/payfield system rewards members identically regardless of individual skill and effectiveness.
- e. Promotion is the primary method of rewarding professional competence and it has become a pre-occupation for most of our personnel.
- f. The quality of leadership of technical and support personnel has improved as a result of the current employment and training patterns.
- g. A carefully conceived lateral skill progression program should result in an increase in operational effectiveness.
- h. TB guidelines should be identified prior to commencement of the study.

## CONCLUSION

11. The need for a study on lateral skill progression has previously received Departmental approval. The Review Group has however, attempted to provide the Chief of the Defence Staff with an overview of the many complex issues which surround this study.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

12. Appreciating that a Director General Personnel Research and Development (DGPRD) study is currently under way, the Review Group makes the following recommendations;

- a. The Chief of the Defence Staff should rationalize the conceptual conflict between the Minister's Manpower Study (MEN) and ORCDP as this determination is a central issue in future personnel development policy for the CF.
- b. Having identified existing TB guidelines on rank, trade and pay progression, the DGPRD study team develop a system of lateral skill progression as a stand alone CF requirement.
- c. That the soon to be commissioned Personnel Policy study be made responsible for ensuring that trade, rank and pay restructuring concepts are not developed in isolation.

**REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF**  
**TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 8**  
**OPS/NON OPS RATIOS**

**BACKGROUND**

1. In the views expressed to the Task Force the witnesses stated that many static positions were filled by personnel who by reason of health, age or sex could not be posted to operational units, thereby decreasing the numbers and types of positions available to operational personnel on static relief duty. It was considered that this was particularly noticeable in the navy where the sea/shore ratio has been such that many personnel have had to spend extended periods of service on sea duty. Many army personnel also commented on the lack of available static vacancies after operational postings.

2. The Task Force considered that the unsatisfactory ratio of operations versus static base employment creates a hardship for environmental sea and land personnel. Base positions are occupied in large measure by support personnel. Generally, this limits operational personnel in the navy and army to operational positions. Shore billets which were formerly used to provide some relief for sea duty for naval personnel, such as shore patrol and vehicle drivers, are now held by specific trades, for example military police and mobile support equipment operators (drivers). If static employment is available for navy personnel, it will probably be at a base well removed from the sailor's home base and, if he is married, he faces separation from his family unless they are moved with him. A somewhat similar situation exists in the army.

3. It was concluded by the Task Force that "The unsatisfactory sea/shore or field/static ratio has adversely affected the conditions of service for operations personnel." The Task Force recommended that:

**"a more balanced sea/shore and field/static ratio be developed for navy and army operations personnel".**

**AIM**

4. The aim of this appreciation is to determine what additional measures are required to meet the original program objectives.

## ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

5. It is assumed that current force structure ceilings will not be altered solely for the purpose of creating more shore/static employment opportunities.

6. The Ops/Non-Ops Study and a number of implementing directions were approved by DMC on 18 November, 1974. Although target ratios for sea/shore - field/static employment were arrived at somewhat arbitrarily, this appreciation will not attempt to re-affirm either the ratios or the need to provide relief from continuous operational employment.

## FACTORS

### 7. Confirmation of The Problem

#### a. The Ops/Non-Ops Study

- (1) The problems which led to the 1974 study on Ops/Non-Ops Duty Ratios were low morale and an extremely high attrition rate in those trades required to spend a disproportionate time away from home on operational deployment. It was particularly serious for the hard sea trades who spent a high percentage of their careers aboard ship with a very limited opportunity to serve ashore. This situation existed in pre-unification days, however, it became more critical as the Forces were reduced to an established strength of 80,000 thereby eliminating many shore positions as well as the Halifax/Esquimalt manning pools.
- (2) In November 1974 DMC was informed that, "current establishments and manning levels require members of many trades to be employed away from home for portions of their careers which are considered to be unreasonable and which are thought to contribute to high attrition." While it was acknowledged that the determination of "reasonable" ratios of away-from-home content in employment patterns was unavoidably judgemental, DMC accepted the target ratios as follows:

Duty	Away-From-Home / Home Ratio
Combat or Combat Support Duty	80/20
Sea Duty	60/40
Flying Duty	80/20
Isolated Duty (Varied between Dew Line/Alert)	20/80

- (3) The ratios should apply over the course of a career from the rank of MCpl on, except for certain Cpl positions for combat arms (CBTA) and sea trades. The ratios were not to be applied as rigid constraints or accounts to be kept in perpetual balance, rather they were to be viewed as targets towards which establishments and other trade structuring mechanisms should be aimed.
- (4) DMC issued the following enabling directions:
- (a) redesignation of established positions should be accepted as a viable method of attaining desired ratios;
  - (b) the distribution of Any Trade Requirement (ATR) positions/man-years should accept Ops/Non-Ops ratios as first priority but continue to use the remainder for equitability of rank-to-rank ratios;
  - (c) the personnel accounting system should continue to be completely reviewed and audited to include;
    - (i) reviewing the entire process from the creation of an Establishment Change Proposal (ECP) to the posting of a man on the ground;
    - (ii) determination of a method to relate actual training requirements to establishments;
    - (iii) developing a method of reducing tasking so that it is compatible with actual and predicted manning and capable of accomplishment while providing reasonably balanced home, away-from-home ratios;
  - (d) the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff be designated OPI for the program of developing and maintaining Ops/Non-Ops ratios and should "take account of the number of women" there should be in trades with present or potential rank imbalances;
  - (e) begin to shift ATR positions to increase the allocation to CBTA, sea trades and air ops trades (about 200 more ATR positions at expense of support and technical trades);
  - (f) commands be surveyed and requested by C Prog to designate additional ATR and shared positions to all rank levels and to identify other positions which could be converted to CBTA and sea trades; and,
  - (g) recognizing that the ratios represented an ideal situation, the introduction of this program must not reduce the operational capability of the CF.



- b. **Corrective Measures.** Concerted efforts during 1975 reduced the overall shortfall of "static" positions to about 400. This reduction was achieved primarily by a redistribution of ATR man-years (i.e., 580 out of 694 MCpl and above were assigned for Ops/Non-Ops reasons), and a partial recognition was made of Advanced Training List requirements for the Sea Trades. (They are currently assigned 430 from a total of 690 available man-years.) The net effect of all these actions was that target ratios were met for most trades from an **establishment/Preferred Manning Level (PML)** viewpoint. The MCpl rank had the most serious residual deficiency and this problem could be further isolated as being most critical in sea trades, with one exception. The magnitude of the deficiency in "static" employment for the Communicator Research trade was so large that it was felt that the only practical solution was a concept of greater "cross-breeding" in the communications/electronics family of trades.
- c. **Current Status.** Very much over-simplified, the current status of the Ops/Non-Ops program is that progressive actions during the past five years have virtually eliminated the **establishment** deficiencies for all but the MCpl rank level. The sea/shore status is outlined in Appendix 1 and except for the Mar Eng Tech 311, Bosn 181 and Electrical Tech 331 meets minimum ratios. Manning shortfalls also shown in Appendix 1 exaggerate what would appear to be minor shortages in established shore positions in that a significant percentage of the overall naval trade strength deficiency of 400 is in the controlled ranks from MCpl up, thereby increasing the actual time spent at sea by senior tradesmen.
- d. **Effect on Attrition**
- (1) Attrition is still considered as providing the most visible and obvious reaction to excessive employment in demanding operational areas in the field and in ships. It need hardly be said that CBTA and sea trades continue to experience the most serious levels of voluntary attrition, thus, relief from constant sea and field employment remains as a valid requirement.
  - (2) Appendix 2 provides an illustration of the voluntary attrition (Item 4a/4c) covering the nine month period from October 1979 to June 1980 for hard sea trades, including the reasons given for premature release. Three hundred and fifty of a total of 820 sailors lost during this nine month period offered reasons which could be considered to be related to life and amount of time spent at sea. It can therefore be safely assumed that the lack of suitable employment opportunities ashore remains a problem, at least as it applies to the hard sea trades.
  - (3) While CBTA attrition is also a matter of great concern, particularly during the initial engagement period, the thrust lines of the reasons given do not appear to directly relate to excessive employment in the field. It is further noted that the more senior members of these trades now have considerably greater opportunity for extra-regi-

mental employment than was possible during the critical period prior to the Ops/Non-Ops study in 1974.

- Deductions:** (1) Policies implemented within the past five years have virtually eliminated Ops/Non-Ops establishment deficiencies for all but the MCpl rank level, however, manning shortfalls tend to increase the actual time spent at sea by senior tradesmen. The residual problems are more critical for sea trades than for CBTA personnel.
- (2) Lack of suitable employment opportunities ashore for hard sea trades contributes significantly to attrition of these tradesmen.

## 8. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **East/West Balance.** Aside from the stated shortfall in manning approved positions and the impact that this has on the real attainment of target sea/shore ratios, is the fact that there are considerable imbalances in the number of shore positions available to various sea trades on the east and west coast. That means that the only shore employment available for west coast MAR Eng Techs and Sig Sea Tradesmen for example exists in Halifax or other areas which require a move of Dependents, Furniture and Effects (DF&E). To a man who has just spent eight consecutive years at sea to gain two years ashore, an out-of-area move is **not** shore time. This is essentially a problem for the Maritime Commander to resolve as it requires a shift of training (Flt School) and maintenance (FMG) functions from Halifax to Esquimalt or the addition of more positions to the west coast shore infrastructure. This problem is thoroughly examined in Appendix 3.

**Deduction:** Particular attention should be directed to providing additional shore positions on the west coast in activities such as the Fleet School and the Fleet Maintenance Group.

- b. **Percentage of Women.** A second issue which must be considered in meeting target ratios concerns those support trades who provide operational support in the field and at sea. They have more than sufficient static employment potential to meet Ops/Non-Ops criteria, if the numbers of women in these trades is constrained to practical limits. However, if recent recruiting shortfalls dictate more women as a sensible alternative to "no recruits", it is possible that in the future, male members of these support trades will spend excessive periods in "operational units" since the females have no current option but to fill the static positions.

**Deduction:** Long term requirements to maintain Ops/Non-Ops ratios in support trades dictate a measure of control on the number of women enrolled into "sea/land support trades". These ceilings should not be violated to meet short term recruit quotas.

- c. **Geographic Stability.** This is a matter of growing concern to most CF personnel. The need to establish family roots is even more significant for those men who spend a great percentage of their time operationally deployed. Thus, the provision of ATR employment which necessitates uprooting the family is less desirable than static jobs in the same geographical area. Most of the 560 ATR man-years currently assigned to operational trades create static employment opportunities that involve a move of DF&E.

**Deduction:** The provision of geographic stability should be accorded a high priority when posting plots for "Ops/Non-Ops" trades are being developed.

- d. **Out of Trade Employment.** In a related sense, DMC provided the authority for certain semi-skilled support positions to be re-designated for operational trades. Although misemployment of "operators" seems like an attractive alternative, a thorough analysis showed that:

- (1) there are very few positions that lend themselves to the subject conversion;
- (2) those that might be converted are too low in rank level to assist in resolution of Ops/Non-Ops problems; and,
- (3) they are not likely to provide even minimum levels of job satisfaction to misemployed operational tradesmen. (This may not be true for the CBTA who have historically been employed in non-trade areas such as driver, cook, steward etc.)

**Deduction:** Conversion of selected support positions offers virtually no relief from MCpl up. It is not inconsistent however with previous army employment practice for junior personnel.

## 9. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** It is considered that high levels of attrition for sea trades and, to a lesser extent CBTA trades, are due in part to prolonged period of field and sea employment. Thus, persistent manning shortages in ships and field units are at least partially attributable to the Ops/Non-Ops problem. In the case of critical sea trades, such as the MAR ENG Tech, ships and submarines have been unable to sail due to shortages at the more senior rank and trade skill levels.

**Deduction:** Providing relief from excessive periods of "Ops" employment will improve retention and thus have a positive effect on operational effectiveness.



- b. **Morale.** Morale problems in the CBTA have never been positively linked to the absence of static or extra regimental employment. Indeed, it has often been suggested that discontent and dissatisfaction are bred during prolonged periods in garrison rather than during the more professionally rewarding time spent operationally deployed. Naval experience, on the other hand, suggests that the incidence of morale problems and ultimately attrition is highest among that group of sailors who have had virtually no relief from continuous employment at sea. As family problems and pressures tend to increase with age, the morale of the older sailors becomes a more fragile commodity. Thus, the priority for providing adequate static employment alternatives is directly proportional to rank and years of service.

**Deduction:** The priority for providing appropriate static employment for morale purposes is directly proportional to rank and years of service and primarily a "navy" problem.

- c. **Financial.** Apart from the cost of additional man-years which would be required to completely achieve the desired Ops/Non-Ops ratios, the only other potential requirement for resource expenditure relates to the essential expansion of the physical plant for both the west coast Fleet School and the Fleet Maintenance Group (Pacific). These costs would only arise if the Maritime Commander considers that east/west imbalances in sea/shore ratio are serious enough to warrant upgrading facilities and shifting some training load from Halifax to Esquimalt.

**Deduction:** Improvements to the current Ops/Non-Ops ratios will require some additional man-years and some expansion of the physical plant for MARPAC, if MARCOM decides to redress east/west imbalances.

- d. **Current Policies and Procedures.** The direction received from DMC was quite explicit and with the exception of its recommendation No. 4 (Personnel Accounting System should continue to be completely reviewed and audited), all the required actions have been taken. C Prog has devised a system of designation and update of the automated file and ADM(Per) staffs adjust PMLs for appropriate trades within the overall limits of ATR man-years available. All that remains to be done is a thorough trade-by-trade review to identify critical residual problems. The magnitude of these trade deficiencies would dictate the kind of solution required. Indeed the dimensions of the Ops/Non-Ops problem vary as frequently as establishment changes are approved, therefore, **the purpose of the ratios should be kept in focus as much as the actual numbers.**

**Deduction:** In addition to what has been accomplished, a further update is required to identify the magnitude of the deficiencies on a trade-by-trade basis.



## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

10.
  - a. Policies implemented within the past five years have virtually eliminated Ops/Non-Ops **establishment** deficiencies for all but the MCpl rank level, however, manning shortfalls tend to increase the actual time spent at sea by senior tradesmen. The residual problems are more critical for sea trades than for CBTA personnel.
  - b. Lack of suitable employment opportunities ashore for hard sea trades contributes significantly to attrition of these tradesmen.
  - c. Particular attention should be directed to providing additional shore positions on the west coast in activities such as the Fleet School and the Fleet Maintenance Group.
  - d. Long term requirements of maintaining Ops/Non-Ops ratios in support trades dictate a measure of control on the number of women enrolled into "combat/sea support trades". These ceilings should not be violated to meet short term recruit quotas.
  - e. Conversion of selected support positions offers virtually no relief from MCpl up. It is not inconsistent however, with previous army employment practice for junior personnel.
  - f. The priority for providing appropriate static employment for morale purposes is directly proportional to rank and years of service and primarily a "navy" problem.
  - g. Improvements to the current Ops/Non-Ops ratios will require some additional man-years and some expansion of the physical plant for MARPAC, if MARCOM decides to redress east/west imbalances.

## CONCLUSION

11. Based on the foregoing deductions the Review Group has concluded that the Task Force recommendation to improve Ops/Non-Ops is valid. In spite of the considerable improvements in the availability of static employment relief which has been realized in the past five years, the basic intent of the 1974 DMC direction on this subject has not been totally fulfilled.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

12. The Review Group therefore recommends that;
  - a. Director General Personnel Careers, Other Ranks (DGPCOR) be tasked to provide an update on the current Ops/Non-Ops status to identify trades which have residual problems in either establishment or manning capacity;
  - b. the Commander Maritime Command be requested to consider specific infrastructure solutions aimed at resolving east/west employment imbalances; and that,
  - c. Director General Manpower Utilization (DGMU) confirm that the intent of the Ops/Non-Ops program as it relates to the maximum number of women in support trades will not be compromised by persistent male recruit shortfalls.



SEA/ShORE RATIO - CURRENT STATUS

		Establishment	Current Manning State
Weapon Surface Tech	063)		
Weapon Surface	061)	61/39	56/44
Weaponman Underwater Tech	064)		
Weaponman Underwater	062)	65/35	69/31
Firecontrol Tech	072)		
Firecontrolman	071)	58/42	46/54
Boatswain	181	72/28	73/27
Electronic Warfare Tech	243)		
Electronic Warfare Op	242)	62/38	61/39
Com Tech Sea	252)		
Rad Sea	251)	49/51	37/63
Sig Sea	261)	62/38	62/38
Rdr Tech Sea	271)		
Rdr Pltr	272)	61/39	42/58
Sonar Tech	282)		
Sonarmn	281)	58/42	53/47
Mar Eng Tech	311)		
Mar Eng Mech	312)	75/25	78/22
Hull Tech	321)	59/41	61/39
Electrical Tech	331)		
Marine Electrician	332)	71/29	65/35
C1 Div Tech	342)		
C1 Div	341)	15/85	16/84





REASONS GIVEN FOR REQUESTING  
VOLUNTARY RELEASE (ITEM 4A/4C)

- A. — To further education
- B. — Family Problems (Girlfriend, wife, children)
- C. — Family Problems (Mother, father, siblings)
- D. — Lack of Job Satisfaction
- E. — Better Job Opportunity
- F. — Pay
- G. — Don't Like Sea, Navy, or Military
- H. — Can't Adjust to Lifestyle
- I. — Other (includes such things as: Don't like my boss, etc)
- J. — Personal (Unspecified)
- X. — No Reason Given
- Z. — Four or more of above reasons

12 Reasons

Most Prevalent Reason to Date is "G" (Don't Like Sea, Navy, or Military)

	Oct 79	Nov 79	Dec 79	Jan 80	Feb 80	Mar 80	Apr 80	May 80	Jun 80	Total for Reason	Monthly Average For Period	% of Total
A.	16	11	8	8	18	8	8	8	3	88	9.8	10.7
B.	8	5	9	10	16	19	4	11	3	85	9.4	10.4
C.	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	8	0.9	1.0
D.	16	9	9	1	9	7	10	7	5	73	8.1	8.9
E.	22	13	4	10	13	24	6	6	9	107	11.9	13.0
F.	4	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0.8	0.9
G.	34	35	16	27	44	25	28	32	15	256	28.4	31.2
H.	15	7	2	1	2	5	2	6	4	44	4.9	5.4
I.	5	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	0	15	1.7	1.8
J.	2	1	4	3	3	6	1	5	1	26	2.9	3.2
X.	9	10	6	2	8	11	5	12	7	70	7.8	8.5
Z.	5	9	7	4	6	5	2	1	2	41	4.6	5.0
<b>Total For Month</b>	137	103	67	69	121	115	67	91	50	820	91.1	100%

# RELEASE REQUESTS BY MOC ITEM "G"

MOC	Oct 79	Nov 79	Dec 79	Jan 80	Feb 80	Mar 80	Apr 80	May 80	Jun 80	Total For MOC
061	1	1		1	3	1	1			8
063					1	1				2
062	1	2	1	1	2	4		3		14
064		1		1						2
071	5	3		1	1			1	1	12
072		1		1			1	1		4
181	2	5	1	5	4	1	5	4	2	29
191										0
242	2	1			3	2		1		9
243										0
251	1	2	1	1	3			2		10
252							1			1
261		1		2		1	2			6
271	7	3	3	2	4	4	4	5	3	35
272			1		1				1	3
281	2	1	1	4	3	4	2	2	1	20
282	1			1	1		2			5
311				1		1	2			4
312	8	11	4	3	12	4	7	10	6	65
321	2	2		2	2			1	1	10
331			1					1		2
332	2	1	2		4	2	1	1		13
341				1						1
342			1							1
<b>Total For Month</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>256</b>





## EXTRACTED FROM THE MARITIME OTHER RANKS PRODUCTION STUDY

### CHAPTER 7

#### SEA/SHORE RATIO AND HOME PORT DIVISIONS

##### SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

#### 701. BACKGROUND

1. The problem of operations/non-operations or sea/shore ratios has always been a difficult one for Hard Sea trades. All too few shore jobs are available for tradesmen who specialize in being sailors, especially under current Canadian Forces policies of "one-man, one-job". However, in modern Canadian society, personnel of the calibre of Hard Sea tradesman have come to expect that they are entitled to considerably longer periods ashore with their families than they used to have.

2. In 1975, the Commander, Maritime Command directed that a Study be conducted on the operations/non-operations ratios in Maritime Command<sup>1</sup>. The study included an examination of sea/shore ratios for all trades and attempted, by changes to establishments and reallocation of personnel between units, to arrive at a sea/shore ratio of 60/40 for Hard Sea tradesmen of the rank of Master Corporal and above. This ratio was not considered possible for each rank of each trade, but was to be the average over the whole, from Master Corporal to Chief Warrant Officer.

3. To achieve this ratio for all Hard Sea trades, it was necessary for the Maritime Commander to obtain a higher proportion of generic and "ATR" establishment positions than the Hard Sea trades had been allocated previously, including the transfer of some positions from other commands. Unfortunately, many of these positions were some distance from Halifax and Esquimalt, and proportionately more were obtained on the East Coast than on the West Coast. Also, many of the positions originally negotiated have not been made available.

4. Prior to and during this period, Maritime Command was consolidating its training in the Halifax area. Where previously there had been a significant amount of trades training carried out for all Hard Sea trades in Esquimalt, by 1972 virtually all trades training except certain courses in communications, marine engineering and hull was given on the East Coast. This transfer of a large proportion of trades training from West to East also included the transfer of instructor positions, reducing the number available ashore in Esquimalt for West Coast Hard Sea tradesmen.

5. Another factor which plays an important part in making a sailor's life satisfactory or unsatisfactory is posting stability. Part of the reason that many Hard Sea tradesmen accept long periods at sea and away from home is because of the form

of posting stability that is available by having a home port. Prior to unification, the RCN used Port Divisions; a man belonging to either the Halifax or Esquimalt port division was virtually assured that he would remain there throughout his career, leaving his coast only for long courses and exceptional circumstances. Thus, his family could put down roots and establish a circle of friends that could provide companionship and assistance when the sailor was away at sea.

## **SECTION 2 - DISCUSSION**

### **702. CURRENT SITUATION**

1. Today, the sea/shore ratio problem is still not solved. Annex A to this Chapter outlines current sea/shore ratios by rank and by trade for each coast. As can be seen from this table, of the twelve "sea going" Hard Sea trades, only six on the East Coast have a 60/40 ratio or better, and only three on the West Coast.

2. As can be seen from the figures, one trade may have an adequate ratio on the East Coast but an unsatisfactory one on the West Coast, and vice versa. The simple solution would appear to be to balance off the discrepancies by allocating the sea and shore positions of a trade equitably between the two coasts. However, this solution is even less acceptable to most Hard Sea tradesmen than having a poor sea/shore ratio. In many cases, especially on the West Coast, Hard Sea tradesmen would prefer to remain at sea beyond their normal tours rather than move to a shore job away from their home port.

3. Another difficulty in the East Coast/West Coast situation concerns promotions. An NCO may be required to change coasts because he is promoted and there is no position for a tradesman of his rank on his present coast. It has been reported that several tradesmen have turned down promotion in order that they could stay on the West Coast, and when told they must accept the promotion, have requested voluntary release.

4. Another severe dissatisfier among West Coast personnel is the consolidation of training in Halifax. With the exception of those courses noted in paragraph 4 above, all trade courses, including those under six months, are given in Halifax. Thus, a tradesman who is posted ashore after a long period at sea may find himself moved to Halifax to undergo training (without his family in the case of courses under six months) instead of being able to spend a reasonable period in his home port with his family. Alternatively, if he is a senior NCO, he may be posted to the Fleet School Halifax as an instructor for several years.

### **703. SOLUTIONS**

5. The present situation with respect to sea/shore ratios in the Hard Sea trades and home port stability to compensate for time at sea is clearly unsatisfactory. Conditions as they exist today are causing high numbers of voluntary releases, especially among the higher ranks of NCOs. The two dissatisfiers must be addressed:

- a. Sea/shore ratios on both coasts must be improved; and
- b. A form of posting stability must be introduced so that the Hard Sea tradesman does not move between coasts so often.

6. **Sea/Shore Ratios.** Ratios on both coasts must be improved, but particularly on the West Coast. The most obvious area in which to look for shore positions is in the Fleet School Esquimalt and the Fleet Maintenance Group. Also, with the introduction of the DELEX and CPF programs, consideration should be given to consolidating particular kinds of training, perhaps for older ships, on the West Coast. The personnel increments provided by the MacLaughlin Report<sup>2</sup> should provide some positions as well. Nevertheless, the aim for the immediate future should be to reduce the sea/shore ratio of every trade to 60/40 or better on each coast. However, MORPS also considers that this ratio will prove to be inadequate in meeting the aspirations of the Hard Sea tradesman and that the ratio for the senior ranks should be improved in the long term to at least 50/50.

7. **Home Port Divisions.** Although many officers and NCOs have advocated the re-introduction of the Home Port Divisions of Esquimalt and Halifax, MORPS considers that the formal establishment of port divisions would be counter-productive. With a one-man, one-job policy and perennial personnel shortages, the Study Team considers that locking a Hard Sea tradesman to one coast or the other would not work. Instead, MORPS recommends "enlightened career management" by the obviously competent career managers of NDHQ. The Posting and Careers Directorate for the Hard Sea Trades is already endeavouring to stabilize the moves between coasts. With official recognition of the problem by ADM (Per) and appropriate direction, it is considered that this dissatisfier can be significantly reduced.

## SECTION 3 - CONCLUDING MATERIAL

### 704. CONCLUSIONS

- 1. It is concluded that:
  - a. severe dissatisfiers among Hard Sea tradesmen, especially those on the West Coast are -
    - (1) poor sea/shore ratios, and
    - (2) lack of home port stability.
  - b. efforts by the Commander, Maritime Command to alleviate the situation, offset by the consolidation of almost all training in Halifax, have to date been unsatisfactory;
  - c. unless improvements are made in these areas, they will continue to contribute to high attrition, especially among senior NCOs;



- d. Maritime Command should continue its efforts to improve sea/shore ratios, to at least 60/40 in every trade in the near future, and to 50/50 in the long term;
- e. more shore positions might be created in the Fleet School Esquimalt and the Fleet Maintenance Groups;
- f. Maritime Command should consider improving sea/shore ratios on the West Coast by consolidating particular types of training on the West Coast when the DELEX and CPF programs are introduced; and
- g. Home Port Divisions should not be officially reintroduced, but NDHQ should officially accept the necessity of managing the careers of Hard Sea tradesmen so that as much stability is maintained as possible on a particular coast.

## 705. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. It is recommended that:
  - a. Maritime Command continue its efforts to improve sea/shore ratios to at least 60/40 in every trade in the near future and to 50/50 in the long term;
  - b. more shore positions be created on the West Coast by -
    - (1) increased trades training in that area,
    - (2) consolidating particular types of training on that coast, and
    - (3) increasing the number of billets in the FMG;
  - c. Home Port Divisions not be officially re-introduced, but NDHQ accept the necessity of managing the careers of Hard Sea tradesmen so that as much stability is maintained as possible on a particular coast.

## REFERENCES

- 1. Operations/Non-Operations Duty Ratios, MARC 1920-1 (COMD), July 1975, Halifax, N.S.
- 2. Report of the Defence Structure Review Working Group, November 1976, Ottawa, Ontario.

**SEA/SHORE RATIOS - HARD SEA TRADESMEN**

**EAST COAST**

	<b>CWO</b>	<b>MWO</b>	<b>WO</b>	<b>SGT</b>	<b>MCPL</b>	<b>AVERAGE</b>
WS TECH	50/50	40/60	43/57	36/64	78/22	57/43 *
WU TECH	100/0	20/80	60/40	50/50	92/8	66/34
FCTL TECH	33/67	46/54	38/62	50/50	94/6	52/47 *
BOSN	50/50	54/46	66/34	69/31	81/19	71/29
EW TECH	33/67	40/60	54/46	66/34	80/20	63/37
COMM TECH (S)	50/50	50/50	34/66	60/40	50/50	50/50 *
SIG SEA	75/25	58/42	77/23	64/36	66/34	67/33
RDR TECH (S)	55/45	47/53	47/53	45/55	88/12	57/43 *
SONAR TECH	25/75	50/50	32/68	48/52	74/26	53/47 *
MAR ENG TECH	56/44	62/38	69/31	68/32	82/18	71/29
HULL TECH	50/50	43/57	9/91	51/49	82/18	51/49 *
E TECH	67/33	50/50	51/49	63/37	83/17	62/38

**WEST COAST**

	<b>CWO</b>	<b>MWO</b>	<b>WO</b>	<b>SGT</b>	<b>MCPL</b>	<b>AVERAGE</b>
WS TECH	0/100	34/66	90/10	73/27	92/8	80/20
WU TECH	50/50	40/60	57/43	94/6	100/0	80/20
FCTL TECH	50/50	25/75	89/11	80/20	80/20	75/25
BOSN	75/25	60/40	77/23	79/21	74/26	75/25
EW TECH	100/0	50/50	66/34	82/18	100/0	84/16
COMM TECH (S)	50/50	40/60	25/75	70/30	35/65	47/53 *
SIG SEA	50/50	75/25	76/24	82/18	81/19	78/22
RDR TECH (S)	100/0	69/31	82/18	80/20	82/18	80/20
SONAR TECH	50/50	50/50	73/27	77/23	100/0	71/29
MAR ENG TECH	71/29	68/32	75/25	85/15	81/19	79/21
HULL TECH	33/67	14/86	47/53	25/75	76/24	43/57 *
E TECH	0/100	25/75	55/45	79/21	80/20	43/57 *

\* Acceptable sea/shore ratio.



REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 9  
AUTONOMY OF UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER

BACKGROUND

1. In the opinions expressed to the Task Force on Unification, many service personnel considered that the centralized system has had an adverse effect on leadership, and has eroded a Commanding Officer's ability to deal with his subordinates' personnel problems. It was considered by many that the centralized personnel system elevated minutiae to the National Defence Headquarters level, thereby leaving little or nothing to be resolved at the unit or command level. Additionally, from outside National Defence Headquarters, the chain of command was perceived as being blurred. The opinion expressed was that many communications to National Defence Headquarters from units by-passed the command headquarters and in other cases, the command acted only as a "clearing-house" for information. The majority of decision making was seen to be done at National Defence Headquarters.

2. As part of the discussion section of the report, the Task Force considered that the centralized system has created an imbalance between the career management aspects of the system and the collective needs of the units, thereby eroding the leadership capabilities of the unit Commanding Officer. This problem exists primarily in the army and is reflected in the unit Commanding Officer's reduced ability to deal directly with those under his command in matters concerning their personal problems and careers. In the case of promotions and postings, whether for training or other purposes, the career manager has supplanted the Commanding Officer as the advisor to unit personnel and is the person who has the ultimate responsibility in these areas.

3. The Task Force concluded that, "unit leadership has been adversely affected by the orientation of the career management system towards individuals as opposed to the collective needs of units." It was recommended that:

**"greater reliance be placed on the formal lines of authority within the chain of command between the central personnel system and the unit commanders".**

AIM

4. The aim of this appreciation is to identify the extent to which traditional authority and responsibility of the Commanding Officer has changed and where Service interests dictate to propose ways to enhance the primacy of the unit CO.



## ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

5. To limit the scope of this appreciation it is assumed that the concept of centralized personnel management will remain. Since the Base Concept and Command and Control are more specifically dealt with in separate Task Force recommendations, this appreciation will deal with the relationship between the individual, his unit CO and the central personnel system.

## FACTORS

### 6. Confirmation of the Problem.

#### a. Real Limitations.

- (1) It is of primary importance in dealing with this subject to identify what **real** limitations have been placed on the unit CO in discharging his basic responsibilities. The responsibility matrix attached as Appendix 1 shows that individual unit COs in pre-unification days relied upon a senior agency for the final authority to promote, post, release and approve formal training beyond the unit level. They were therefore required to feed personnel management information to some central system which would then issue posting and release instructions, promotions and course loading directions. Career management for officers in the three former Services was essentially centralized in functional CHQs and Ottawa. Operational Commanders had much greater direct control of vital career management actions for the "other ranks" although, dependent on rank, promotion authority was vested in NDHQ. Thus, the centralized personnel management system has had a far greater impact on the authority and responsibility previously exercised at command and regional headquarters levels than on removing prerogatives once enjoyed by unit Commanding Officers.
- (2) Indeed, the only significant examples of lost autonomy that can be identified include:
  - (a) the authority for promotion to Cpl and L/Cpl; and,
  - (b) a host of personnel administrative functions which will be more specifically addressed in the appreciations on the Base Concept.

#### b. Current Perception of the Commanding Officer.

- (1) Notwithstanding the foregoing, one absolutely critical change which

has had a negative impact on the military ethic and the leadership system is that **most individuals no longer consider their COs to be the focal point in their service life that they formerly perceived him to be.** (i.e., The Navy, Army and Air Force nurtured the concept that the Commanding Officer was a paternalistic, all-powerful, firm but fair disciplinarian who was intensely interested in their welfare and development. The individual seldom had any contact with career managers, or headquarters staff and was effectively insulated from "central systems".)

- (2) The problem which must be faced therefore, is how to re-affirm this vital perception of the Commanding Officer by ensuring that this officer once again becomes the predominate source of career development, discipline, assistance and guidance.

**Deductions:** (1) The actual authority which has been lost by the unit Commanding Officer since unification has been minimal.

- (2) The Commanding Officer must be seen to be the predominate source for career development, assistance, guidance and discipline by the individual under his command.

## **7. Related Dimensions of Problem.**

a. **Main Grievances.** Somewhat oversimplified, the main grievances against the centralized personnel management system from the unit Commanding Officer's view point include:

- (1) the considerable staff effort required to feed vital data on performance, career progression and personnel administration information into the central system;
- (2) his frustration at being unable to have direct involvement in the actual selection for career courses and promotion, coupled with concerns over the growing recognition on the part of service personnel that the career manager has a far greater awareness, and more control, of significant career progression events than he does;
- (3) the enormous increase in the volume and complexity of policies and directions in CFAOs, CFPs etc which he is expected to apply, or at least be aware of, if he is to effectively lead and administer his personnel. This situation has forced a growing dependence on base staff in all personnel administrative areas;

- (4) while acknowledging the fundamental need for a CO to acquire the knowledge from each of his personnel of their personal circumstances, career status and aspirations, there is no longer any official means to transfer this vital data from one unit to another (i.e., Navy S264, Army Platoon Commander's Notebook);
- (5) while there is a clearly defined policy on channels of communication into and out of the unit through the Commanding Officer, which is rigidly adhered to by most career managers, individuals persist in attempting to deal directly — some career managers respond. The CP "Newsletter" is also considered by many to violate the chain of command and who feel at the very least that it should be more carefully edited; and,
- (6) the dedication to the concept of unification and the "common approach" which was its cornerstone during the early years of this decade, caused an upward migration of decision making, in a host of relatively minor issues, which would be better dealt with at the unit level.

**Deduction:** It is perceived that the Central System is not there to assist the unit Commanding Officer, rather he is expected to serve the system.

#### **b. Existing Policies and Procedures**

- (1) The Chief Personnel Careers and Senior Appointments (CPCSA) Operating Manual clearly identifies the steps to be followed by the career manager for discussion of personnel management matters. Better communication and enforcement of these procedures should ensure that the CO is the primary source of all vital career information.
- (2) The channels of communication between other "specialists" and an individual are more complex and not nearly so explicitly dealt with in existing orders. This will be more fully explored during discussion of the Base Concept.

**Deduction:** Orders which permit or even encourage specialist staffs to circumvent the chain of command and deal directly with an individual should be identified and re-written.

### **8. Impact Analysis**

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** In its broadest context the lack of "unity of command" faced by most unit COs can have a major impact on their unit capability. Overtasking, resource restraints and manning shortfalls however, create problems of significantly greater magnitude in meeting



operational commitments than might occur due to improper communication between the individual and the Central Personnel System. While every effort should be made to increase the autonomy and pre-eminent position of the Commanding Officer, the degree of improvement potentially available is unlikely to produce major, visible improvements in operational effectiveness.

**Deduction:** Improved autonomy will have less effect on unit morale and effectiveness than would resolution of overtasking, resource restraints and manning shortfall problems.

- b. **Morale.** Based on increasing complexity of the COs function, and a multitude of constraints, the current policy of two year tours for COs cannot very often be in the best interests of the effectiveness and morale of the unit. The Commanding Officer must be given time to fully comprehend his duties and responsibilities; he should then be encouraged to innovate and improve not only in mission related areas but in the well being and professional development of subordinates; and finally, he should be allowed to remain long enough to implement and be accountable for the programs he creates. The widespread perception of a self-seeking officer corps who has lost touch with their leadership responsibilities to their troops must be changed. If this can be achieved, the payback in improved morale would be significant.

**Deduction:** Short tours of duty for unit Commanding Officers have had an adverse effect on unit morale and efficiency. Operational effectiveness has a higher priority than career development.

- c. **Financial.** Increased delegation of responsibility and a program designed to improve "unity of command" and enhance the image of the unit Commanding Officer would require further study, modifications to current orders, and a cost-benefit analysis.

**Deduction:** Further study is required to determine what savings would accrue from the delegation of some responsibilities to unit Commanding Officers which are now controlled centrally.

- d. **Existing Policies and Procedures.** A concerted effort to establish the Commanding Officer as the most significant link in the chain of command and to re-affirm his vital leadership role would require considerable revision to existing orders. By far the most contentious area which should be examined lies in the current relationship between an individual and his career manager. As a prerequisite to any change however, it would be essential that the CO possess the same in-depth



knowledge of career and employment progression criteria now held by career managers. Consequently, other than merit list position and PER files, he would have to be fed the same personnel management information currently provided to the career manager. If this can be accomplished, it might be possible to reduce the dependence of the individual on his career manager.

**Deductions:** (1) To reduce the individuals reliance on his Career Manager, the unit Commanding Officer would be required to possess the same in-depth knowledge of career and employment progression criteria now held by career managers.

(2) Increased demand on the unit Commanding Officer's time is implicit in his becoming more personally involved in the career management process.

## **SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS**

9.
  - a. The actual authority which has been lost by the unit Commanding Officer since unification has been minimal.
  - b. The Commanding Officer must be seen to be the predominate source for career development, assistance, guidance and discipline by the individual under his command.
  - c. Orders which permit or even encourage specialist staffs to circumvent the chain of command and deal directly with an individual should be identified and re-written.
  - d. Short tours of duty for unit Commanding Officers have had an adverse effect on unit morale and efficiency. Operational effectiveness has a higher priority than career development.
  - e. Further study is required to determine what savings would accrue from the delegation of some responsibilities to unit Commanding Officers which are now controlled centrally.
  - f. To reduce the individuals reliance on his Career Manager, the unit Commanding Officer would be required to possess the same in-depth knowledge of career and employment progression criteria now held by career managers.
  - g. Increased demand on the unit Commanding Officer's time is implicit in his becoming more personally involved in the career management process.

## CONCLUSIONS

10. There are two basic options available to the Review Group in dealing with the recommendation that "greater reliance be placed on the formal lines of authority within the chain of command between the central personnel system and the unit commanders", to retain the status quo or support the Task Force recommendation. The weight of evidence available and summarized in major deductions clearly indicates that there is a problem. Thus, the Review Group not only agrees with the Task Force recommendation but is moved to propose several corrective measures for consideration by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

11. While concluding that the unit CO has suffered no tangible loss of authority or responsibility through the "unification process", he has certainly become a less significant entity in the chain of command in the eyes of his subordinates than he was, and more important, than he should be.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

12. The Review Group recommends that the following rectification action be approved by the Chief of Defence Staff:

- a. that direction be given to the CF to establish a unit supervisors' record of service similar to the Navy S 264 and Army Platoon Commander's Notebook which will be passed from one Commanding Officer to the "gaining CO" on posting;
- b. that ADM(Per) be tasked to review and amend specific orders and policies which violate the legitimate chain of command;
- c. that a concerted effort be made to reduce the dialogue between the individual and his career manager, consistent with the COs capacity and capability to absorb more career management responsibility; and,
- d. that where unit effectiveness would be enhanced, the tours of Commanding Officers be extended beyond two years.



## RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX — MAJOR CAREER ACTIONS

		APPROVING AUTHORITY		
		Pre-Unification	Post-Unification	
Officers	Sea	Land	Air	
Promotion	NHQ	AHQ	AFHQ	NDHQ
Release	NHQ	AHQ	AFHQ	NDHQ
Training	NHQ	AHQ Commands	AFHQ Command	NDHQ
Posting	NHQ	AHQ	AFHQ Commands	NDHQ
Reclassification	NHQ	AHQ	AFHQ Commands	NDHQ
<b>Men</b>				
Promotion	NHQ	AHQ Sgt + above	AFHQ Sgt + above	NDHQ
		Command Sgt + below	Command Sgt + below	
Release	NHQ	AHQ Command	Commands	NDHQ
Training	Commands	AHQ Commands	AFHQ Commands	NDHQ
Posting	Commands	AHQ	AFHQ	NDHQ
		Sgt + above	Commands	
Remuster	Commands	AHQ	AFHQ Commands	NDHQ



## PRE-UNIFICATION CAREER MANAGEMENT

### Postings

1. Naval postings and careers were managed at four control points including CFHQ. In Navy personnel management:
  - a. internal posting and career management of men within Maritime Command and Naval Divisions were performed by the Maritime Command Depots in Halifax and Esquimalt and Depot Gloucester moved men within the Canadian Forces Radio System. CFHQ controlled such matters as promotions through the use of machine type recommendation forms;
  - b. movement of men between commands was the exception to the norm. The "Home Port Division" system reduced postings between coasts to a minimum but when such a move was needed, it was authorized by NHQ; and,
  - c. the career management of officers was authorized by NHQ.
2. In RCAF personnel management, authority for postings and careers was split between AFHQ and Command HQ for both officers and non-commissioned ranks. Command HQ was responsible for the career management of officers of Flight Lieutenant (Captain) rank and below, and for men up to the rank of Sergeant. AFHQ retained the authority for the career management of all other officers and men. When movement between commands was necessary, AFHQ issued the authority in a separate fashion depending upon whether the requirement was for an officer or a man. Officers were normally moved between commands by a name posting whereas men were moved on a quota basis. Promotions involved both Command HQ and AFHQ action.
3. In the Army, Command HQs were delegated with the postings and career management of Corporals and below; responsibility for Sergeants and above plus all officers was retained in Ottawa. As in the case of the navy and air force, personnel movements between commands was authorized at AHQ.

## PROMOTIONS

	Officers	Men
1. Navy	Promotion Boards	NHQ through Depots
2. Army	Promotion Boards	AHQ by seniority Cpl and above Cpls and below by Commands
3. Air Force	Promotion Boards	By Promotion Boards within Commands up to Sgt Flight Sergeant and above by AFHQ

## RELEASES

	Officers	Men
1. Navy	NHQ	Depots
2. Army	AHQ	AHQ/Command
3. Air Force	AFHQ	Commands

## TRAINING

	Officers	Men
1. Navy	NHQ	NHQ/Commands
2. Army	AHQ/Commands	AHQ/Commands
3. Air Force	AFHQ Trg/Command	AFHQ Trg/Command

## RECLASSIFICATION/REMUSTER

	Officers	Men
1. Navy	NHQ	NHQ/Commands
2. Army	AHQ	AHQ/Commands
3. Air Force	AFHQ	AFHQ/Commands



**REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 10  
ENVIRONMENTAL INDOCTRINATION AND SOCIALIZATION**

**BACKGROUND**

1. The opinions expressed to the Task Force and recorded in their Report observed that recruit training constituted the lowest common denominator of the various service requirements. Many operational personnel expressed the view that time spent on initial recruit training could be better spent on specific environmental training. Most army and navy personnel considered early socialization and environmental indoctrination to be important in order to prepare the recruit for service life and to provide a first impression which was appropriate to the environment to which he would be posted. Many operational personnel were of the opinion that training time would be considerably reduced if initial recruit training and environmental indoctrination were combined. Alternatively, many suggest that recruits should be streamed during initial recruit training under instructors from the environment in which they are to serve.

2. In its discussion of the problem the Task Force considered that common recruit training, as conducted at Cornwallis, does not fully meet the needs of operational personnel. Following common recruit training, environmental indoctrination must be given by the fleet schools and in the army operational units to which the recruit is assigned. The Task Force recognized the need for early environmental socialization and found that this does not exist to a sufficient degree within the common recruit structure.

3. The Task Force concluded that, "Environmental training, indoctrination and socialization processes are not sufficiently emphasized in recruit training." It was recommended that:

**"sea, land and air operational trades personnel undergo environmental training and socialization during both recruit and trades training".**

**AIM**

4. The aim of this appreciation is to identify how operational trades can be given environmental indoctrination and socialization during recruit and trades training.



## ASSUMPTIONS

5. The Task Force's use of the term "environmental training" during the recruit training phase is assumed to mean "environmental indoctrination" for the purpose of this appreciation.
6. Socialization will be taken to mean that process which replaces civilian value and ethics with military ethics and the self discipline necessary to exist and thrive in a modern military force.

## FACTORS

### 7. Confirmation of The Problem

- a. **Socialization Process.** Recent discussions with the three operational Commanders have identified a common concern with the lack of environmental indoctrination provided during the 11-week recruit training course. Although the Canadian Forces Training System has been aware of the need for more "environmental indoctrination" in the recruit training phase and in cooperation with FMC has attempted to "group" combat arms recruits and stream them through under "regimental" supervision, the primary focus of recruit schools has been to effectively deal with the cultural transition from a civilian to a military oriented value system. Based on the conviction that this "socialization" process must occur **first** as the foundation on which to build and nurture the indoctrination process, the CFTS has implemented major changes to improve the quality of the recruit graduate during the past two years. This "socialization" process is now an integral part of the recruit and trades training courses in every school in Training System. This process is regarded by those who have become familiar with it as a major breakthrough, as it has achieved a 50% reduction in trainee voluntary attrition since its inception in October 1979.
- b. **Environmental Indoctrination.** Air Command's concern for early environmental indoctrination is evident in their establishment of the "CONTRAIN" system for the bulk of the 500 series tradesmen. This "air force indoctrination" takes the form of unit contact training by the young trainees during the period from completion of recruit training until they commence their formal TQ-3 courses. MARCOM would prefer to have its recruits steeped in the "ways of the navy" from the day they join the Forces. This process is not currently initiated until they arrive in the fleet schools Esquimalt and Halifax after recruit school to undertake TSQ AB environmental training. A 1977 Special Naval Recruit Course was conducted at the Fleet School Halifax to resolve a recruit overload situation and, while MARCOM lacks the infrastructure to conduct their own recruit training on a continuing basis, this trial showed that early indoctrination could reduce basic trainee attrition. As a step in that direction the Maritime Commander has requested that the CFTS batch and stream naval recruits in a similar manner to that now employed for combat arms recruits.

- Deductions:** (1) The socialization system instituted by the CFTS appears to be effective.
- (2) The need for early environmental indoctrination is widely acknowledged. It should be a continuous process through recruit and basic trades training.

## 8. Related Dimensions of Problem

- a. **Resource Restraints.** The need for early environmental indoctrination is widely acknowledged and, were it not for potential major increases in the required infrastructure, the three Commanders would prefer to isolate their trainees and conduct their own recruit training. They do however, acknowledge the practical resource limitations of such a scheme and are prepared to work with the CFTS to improve the current system and where possible supplement initial recruit training and socialization with environmental indoctrination. It should be noted that the question of separate recruit training for operational trades has been raised before and that, in addition to resource implications, the creation of a divisive force implicit in having separate basic recruit standards and facilities for support personnel also reinforced previous decisions to remain with a common system.

**Deduction:** Separate recruit training by environment would require increased staff and additional facilities which would be difficult to justify in the current financial climate.

- b. **Recruit Training Standards.** The primary documents which provide the authority and direction for recruit training are:
- (1) CFAO 9-47 - which outlines CF Training System responsibility;
  - (2) DIT "BLUE BOOK" - which provides a 3-year numerical forecast of requirements; and,
  - (3) GSOR Ch 5 Annex D - which outlines by general specification the qualitative aspects of this training.

The actual syllabus for the 11-week recruit training course at CFB Cornwallis is shown in Appendix 1. There are several minor differences in the course given at CFB St Jean.

- c. **Recruiting Philosophy.** These policies are based on a recruiting concept which limits the screening done at recruit centres as well as the time spent outside the Service waiting to be loaded on a recruit course serial. "Enroll quickly before they change their minds" has been accepted as a necessary expedient to enhance the recruiting process. Return to the previous system of exhaustive screening, prior to enrolment and a "wait till we call you" approach seems most unlikely in the immediate future. Thus, a departure from the current policy of individually loading serials in favor of assembling large homogeneous groups of operational recruits

outside the Service should be carefully considered as some potential recruits could be lost during the waiting period.

**Deduction:** The recognized benefits of early environmental indoctrination gained through batching and streaming "operational" recruits could be nullified if an extended "enrolment period" increases pre-recruit attrition.

## 9. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** Initiation of environmental indoctrination at the earliest possible moment is a widely accepted requirement. It offers the potential to improve retention during the critical initial engagement period and thus a modest improvement in the capacity to fill positions at the Pte/Cpl level. If this premise is correct, there will be fewer supervisors involved in unit training and OJT and thus a potential improvement in availability of staff for their primary operational mission. It is impossible to predict the extent of improved retention based on experience in an operational setting however, the "socialization" process employed in CFTS units has markedly reduced attrition as mentioned earlier. The CFTS experience suggests that the operational Commands should identify and integrate appropriate aspects of these recruit/TQ-3 socialization programs into their environmental indoctrination process. If they do not, the transition from basic training to operational employment will be even more traumatic than it is today.

**Deduction:** Certain aspects of the CFTS "socialization" program should be integrated into the environmental indoctrination process since they have been shown to reduce attrition.

- b. **Morale.** The creation of an effective, rewarding trainee socialization and environmental indoctrination program is bound to have a positive effect on the morale of these young service members. To be successful, however, the program must be extended beyond normal working hours at considerable cost in off-duty time for the supervisors. Thus, each CO is faced with the challenge of convincing his NCOs and junior officers that their efforts and dedication to these young people are essential to the CF. Otherwise improvements in trainee retention would be offset by increases in supervisor attrition.

**Deduction:** Attempts to improve the socialization and environmental indoctrination programs of young service members may increase voluntary release among participating supervisors. Implementing an effective, imaginative program presents a leadership challenge to unit COs.

- c. **Resources.** The Task Force recommendation concerning socialization has been actively pursued for ten months in CFTS bases without any increase in staff but with a moderate expenditure of public and non public funds to improve the training plant, quarters, messes and various recreational/dry social facilities. Widespread adoption of the socialization



program coupled with increased emphasis on environmental indoctrination would require a significant initial outlay of dollars for physical plant improvements and some increase in staff to accomplish the added workload. The costs would depend on the extent to which each Commander was prepared to support the program and the differences in quality of existing physical facilities at each base.

**Deduction:** Increased emphasis on socialization and environmental indoctrination will necessitate improvement in the physical plant and some increase in supervisors, or extended working hours for existing staff.

d. **Future Concepts.**

- (1) The need for a revitalized, forward looking examination of recruiting and subsequent recruit training has been acknowledged in the Chief Personnel Development commissioned "Task Force 2000 Report" dated 11 April 1980. The team has identified 14 major recruit-related policy statements with accompanying implementation actions and has recommended that they be approved for costing and feasibility analysis within NDHQ and Commands. The basic thrust of these proposals is to provide the Canadian Forces with an adequate supply of manpower at an affordable cost during the 80s and 90s.
- (2) Any changes to the current recruit training system to increase the environmental indoctrination content should be considered in the light of the TF 2000 Report. It is also essential to consider as an overriding principle "will it work in war?", therefore, the approval of an effective mobilization plan is seen as a vital foundation which must be "in place" before major revisions to the common recruiting system are considered.

**Deduction:** TF 2000 Study should include potential conceptual changes related to mobilization and the need for socialization and environmental indoctrination.

## **SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS**

10. a. The socialization system instituted by the CFTS appears to be effective.
- b. The need for early environmental indoctrination is widely acknowledged. It should be a continuous process through recruit and basic trades training.
- c. Separate recruit training by environment would require increased staff and additional facilities which would be difficult to justify in the current financial climate.
- d. The recognized benefits of early environmental indoctrination gained through batching and streaming "operational" recruits could be nullified if an extended "enrolment period" increases pre-recruit attrition.



- e. Attempts to improve the socialization and environmental indoctrination programs of young service members may increase voluntary release among participating supervisors. Implementing an effective, imaginative program presents a leadership challenge to unit COs.
- f. Increased emphasis on socialization and environmental indoctrination will necessitate improvement in the physical plant and some increase in supervisors, or extended working hours for existing staff.
- g. TF 2000 Study should include potential conceptual changes related to mobilization and the need for socialization and environmental indoctrination.

## CONCLUSION

11. The Review Group supports the subject Task Force recommendation and agrees that it is feasible to introduce more environmental indoctrination into the recruit training given to operational trades. However, the ultimate success of such a program would be conditioned by:

- a. the ability of Director Recruiting and Selection (DRS) and the CFTS to recruit and group into platoon sized batches to facilitate special handling, quartering, instruction etc;
- b. the agreement of the operational Commands to provide senior NCO and junior officers to assist in the indoctrination process;
- c. the fact that most of the existing course is required to satisfy fundamental requirements for screening, introduction to general service knowledge, rudimentary drill, physical, medical and dental fitness, initial exposure to weapons, barrack life etc, leaves little scope for additional training within an 11-week period;
- d. the realities of the physical plant at CFB St Jean and CFB Cornwallis make it virtually impossible to stream operational trades through the recruit phase in complete isolation from the remainder; and,
- e. the ability of the recruit to absorb and retain much more than is currently provided in such a short period is questionable.

12. The Review Group has further concluded that the socialization and environmental indoctrination programs complement each other. They should be integrated into a "continuum" to ensure an effective transition from civilian ethics and lifestyle to a military ethos and vocational consciousness.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is therefore recommended that the Personnel Policy Study include:

- a. a thorough examination of the potential impact of the Mobilization Planning Task Force Study on the overall, recruiting/training process; and,
- b. a coordinated review of operational Commanders' requirements for socialization and environmental indoctrination.

RECRUIT TRAINING SYLLABUS

CFB CORNWALLIS

WEEK	BASIC CONTENT				
1	In Routine Basic Lectures	Drill, PT, Chaplain Visit	Kit Quarters	Fire Safety	
2			Dress	First Aid	National Defence Act
3					General Service Knowledge
4	Security			NBCD	History, Roles, Government
5	Driver Safety	Assault Course		C1 Rifle	Map Use
6		Observe Grad Parade			
7	Leave Policy				National Survival Casualty Course
8				C2 Rifle Range Safety	Casualty Evac
9		Route March		Grandville Ferry Range, Camouflage	
10	Innoculations	Sports Day		SMG	
11	Out Routine	Graduation Parade			



REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS NO. 11 AND 12  
ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING

**BACKGROUND**

1. In the summary of views expressed to the Task Force it was reported that most witnesses stressed the importance of support personnel receiving adequate environmental training prior to serving with combat units. Some felt that support personnel should receive initial recruit training, trades training and then environmental training prior to posting.

2. The quality of support to operational units was criticized by some army witnesses. It was stressed that the lack of emphasis on environmental training produced logistic and finance personnel who did not have the necessary knowledge to operate under field conditions.

3. Most witnesses asserted that maximum use should be made of common infrastructure and that joint or integrated training environmentally streamed would not only make this possible but would also provide for an economic use of resources.

4. In the discussions of the problem the Task Force considered that trades and classifications training is adequate for requirements of the central support systems but does not meet specialized environmental needs. To adequately support operational units to which they may be assigned, support personnel must have the basic skills required for working and surviving in that environment, prior to joining the unit.

5. The Task Force concluded that, "Support services personnel receive inadequate environmental training prior to serving with combat units", and that, "The lack of emphasis on environmental training for members of the support services trades and classifications has produced personnel without the necessary environmental knowledge to perform adequately under operational conditions." It was recommended that:

**"greater emphasis be placed on environmental training for support services personnel", and that, "environmental training take advantage where practicable of existing common training facilities such as Cornwallis, St Jean, Borden and Chilliwack".**



## AIM

6. The aim of this appreciation is to identify the practical limitations of providing environmental training in CF Training System bases.

## ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

7. The requirement for environmental training is accepted not only for personnel on entry into the Service but at appropriate later stages for tradesmen who have been selected for cross-environment postings.

8. The requirement for "environmental indoctrination" of operational trades is a related subject which was dealt with in Recommendation 10. This appreciation will therefore deal primarily with the environmental training requirements of support services personnel.

## FACTORS

9. **Confirmation of the Problem.** Both Task Force Recommendations 11 and 12 relate to a basic need for more environmental training for support services personnel and a suggestion that where possible this training should be given by CF Training System schools. Since it has been assumed that the requirement for such training is not questioned, the problems are, simply stated, to define **what** formal environmental training is required, **who** should conduct the courses and finally, **to whom** this supplementary training should be given.

a. **Requirement.** The statement of the requirement for environmental training must initially come from the operational Commands who would identify the unique skill and knowledge required, as prerequisites to employment in land, sea or air units, beyond that currently provided as part of trade/classification courses. Specifications currently available and in various stages of implementation include:

- (1) Officer
  - CSQ CA (FMC)
  - Sea Logistics Course (CFSAL)
  - Land Field Force Logistics Course (CFSAL)
  - Advanced Field Surgeons Course (CFMSS)
  - CSQ AB (MARCOM)
- (2) Other Ranks
  - TSQ AA (FMC)
  - TSQ AB/AN (MARCOM)

The absence of formal CSQ/TSQs for air environmental training is taken as evidence that for Air Command the augmentation of basic trade/classification skills is accomplished by On-Job-Training (OJT) and instruction in Field Technical Training Units (FTTU). The Review Group could not confirm in reviewing the evolution of environmental training requirements for the past 6-8 years that the current family of CSQ/TSQs was arrived at by a thorough overall analysis of what was required, or that

these courses are in fact **prerequisites** to employment in FMC combat units, combat service support units and the fleet.

**Deduction:** Commands must ensure that the content of environmental training courses specifically identifies the unique skill and knowledge required as prerequisites for service in that environment.

**b. Training Responsibility**

(1) This training is now provided in FMC, MARCOM and CFTS schools for reasons such as proximity to ships, access to suitable field deployment and range facilities and availability of trained instructional staff. Thus, the definition of who is best equipped to provide environmental training will differ for virtually every trade/classification. One simple option might be to task FMC and MARCOM to accept total responsibility since they have a genuine vested interest in the quality of the product. They have the appropriate physical plants and, disregarding for the moment their chronic manning deficiencies, more suitably qualified instructors than CFTS. On the other hand, CFBs Borden, Chilliwack and to a lesser extent CFB Kingston, have an acknowledged capability to provide environmental training for FMC, indeed, certain career course performance objectives now taught relate specifically to employment in field units. Regrettably CFTS is currently not staffed for an expanded program.

(2) Practical sea requirements cannot be effectively taught in CFTS schools, however, it would be possible to increase the naval orientation of those destined for initial employment at sea. A sensible compromise would require a thorough review and updating of the requirement for environmental training and a division of responsibility for this training between the commands and CFTS on the basis of who is best equipped to ensure an optimum end product.

**Deduction:** Responsibility for environmental training will continue to be shared between CFTS, MARCOM and FMC. Access to appropriate facilities will dictate who is best able to provide the training on an individual trade basis.

**c. Recipients.** Assuming that solutions to the problems of "what" and "By Whom" can be found leaves only the question of who should undergo this environmental training. Since the scope of this paper is somewhat limited, no attempt will be made to identify specific trades and classifications but rather to propose several guidelines for future consideration:

(1) A return to pre-unification days where trade advancement courses contained integral elements of environmental skill/knowledge would significantly lengthen courses and provide redundant expertise that might never be utilized by an appropriate posting.

- (2) It is noted that environmental training must be available not only to the basic trainee but also for those who will be posted between environments at more senior levels. Maximum, progressive use of previous environmental experience in posting cycles should however limit the extent to which this kind of training is required.
- (3) Using the CSQ/TSQ as the **primary** means of acquiring formal environmental accreditation seems sensible as it permits the selection and attendance on an individual basis at an appropriate point in the posting cycle.
- (4) If the stated requirement is considered to be vital to the operational Commands then every effort should be made to provide the CSQ/TSQ training **prior** to reporting to an operational unit.

**Deduction:** All support personnel should receive environmental training just prior to their initial operational employment by means of CSQ/TSQ courses.

## 10. Related Dimensions of Problem

### a. Utilization of Common Training Facilities

- (1) It is possible that the current Mobilization Study may indicate that the common CF Training System infrastructure could not cope with a massive influx of personnel and further that a decentralization of at least the recruiting and recruit training functions would be inevitable. Discounting, for the moment, potential changes to CF Training System due to the Mobilization Study, the economic realities of today suggest that maximum use be made of the existing common training plants.
- (2) A "Training Costs Definition Report" 7100-7 (DIT 2-5-2) dated 19 Dec 79, provides 1978/79 cost analysis figures. Although the use of this data "out of context" could be misleading the following highlights are pertinent.
  - Military Training services consume 13% of the DND budget, not including PO&M costs for support bases and training agencies.
  - Discounting DRS staff and advertising, it costs over \$2,000 per recruit up to arrival at the recruit training facility.
  - CFRS Cornwallis combined base and school support costs \$4,700 per student while the cost per graduate of ERFC St Jean is \$4,245.
  - Average cost per course graduate from CFSAOE is \$8,700 while a similar graduate at CFSME costs \$13,400 and CFSCEE \$10,500.



**NOTE:** These figures do not include the estimated value or amortization of the physical plant in CF Training System.

**Deduction:** The CF training cost currently consumes a significant amount of the DND budget, thus maximum utilization of the existing common training plant is an economic necessity.

- b. **Suitability of CFTS Facilities for "Socialization".** Common training facilities such as CFB Cornwallis, St Jean, Borden, Chilliwack and Kingston are ideally suited to the "socialization" role as described in the appreciation on Task Force Recommendation 10. Since the primary mission of these bases is training, it has been possible to reap the maximum benefits from a command policy on:

- (1) consolidation of messes and quarters into school lines;
- (2) improvements to physical fitness and recreational facilities;
- (3) providing dry social centers as alternatives to wet canteens; and,
- (4) adopting a common leadership structure and goals within a disciplined atmosphere to nourish the military ethos and self discipline of the young trainees.

CFTS bases have in fact become models with regard to this "trainee development" process, and assuming that socialization is deemed to be a significant contribution to the long term health of the Forces, certain aspects of this program should be adopted by the operational Commands.

**Deduction:** Due to the common base mission and the quality of the physical plant within CFTS, their current socialization programs could not be duplicated in an operational setting.

## 11. Impact Analysis

- a. **Operational Effectiveness.** Without some means to provide formal environmental training at schools in FMC, MARCOM and CFTS, the entire burden for this additional training would fall to the operational units. The supervisor/instructor time implicit in OJT would obviously be at the expense of the primary operational mission and would thus exacerbate chronic shortages at the senior NCO level. The negative impact on operational effectiveness can be kept at tolerable levels by:

- (1) a posting policy which enhances environmental expertise; and,
- (2) ensuring that all support tradesmen posted to operational units have had the prerequisite formal course before joining.



- b. **Morale.** It is of little consequence to the individual tradesman **where** he receives the environmental training, however, arriving at a new unit as a TQ-3 or worse at more senior levels, without having had the appropriate environmental training or experience, is a traumatic experience. While it may not happen frequently, this situation is known to have been the catalyst in the ultimate premature release of a number of support tradesmen.

**Deduction:** For the morale of the individual and unit effectiveness, a support tradesmen must receive adequate environmental training prior to an initial posting to that element.

- c. **Resource Implications.** Until a thorough definition of environmental training requirements has been completed and assessed against what is currently provided, it would be impossible to determine the resource implications. "Greater emphasis" on this training, however, regardless of where it is conducted will require additional skilled instructors.

**Deduction:** A thorough definition of environmental training requirements is required before detailed resource implications can be established. However, it is apparent that additional skilled instructors will be required if this subject is to receive "greater emphasis".

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

12. a. Commands must ensure that the content of environmental training courses specifically identifies the unique skill and knowledge required as prerequisites for service in that environment.
- b. Responsibility for environmental training will continue to be shared between CFTS, MARCOM and FMC. Access to appropriate facilities will dictate who is best able to provide the training on an individual trade basis.
- c. All support personnel should receive environmental training just prior to their initial operational employment by means of CSQ/TSQ courses.
- d. The CF training cost currently consumes a significant amount of the DND budget, thus, maximum utilization of the existing common training plant is an economic necessity.
- e. For the morale of the individual and unit effectiveness, a support tradesmen must receive adequate environmental training prior to an initial posting to that element.
- f. A thorough definition of environmental training requirements is required before detailed resource implications can be established. However, it is apparent that additional skilled instructors will be required if this subject is to receive "greater emphasis".

## **CONCLUSION**

13. The Review Group has concluded that greater emphasis should be placed on the environmental training needs of support personnel and that where appropriate this training should be given within CFTS. The Task Force conclusions and Recommendations 11 and 12 are well founded and warrant further action.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

14. Based on its findings and major deductions, the Review Group recommends, that the forthcoming Personnel Policy study be given the responsibility for coordinating the required improvements in Environmental Training.



**REVIEW GROUP APPRECIATION OF  
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION NO. 13  
COLLECTIVE TRAINING**

**BACKGROUND**

1. The Task Force concerns for collective training arose from discussions revolving around the more general subject of training in its broadest sense. The impression gained was that:

"A low priority is given to collective training. The lack of resources assigned to group training imposes restrictions on unit training in ships, land units and air units. The funds for fuel and ammunition have not been made available for the scale of group training necessary to achieve required professional standards."

The Task Force, therefore, concluded that:

"collective operational training at the sub-unit, unit and formation levels has been degraded by support inadequacies, priorities which have been placed on individual training, and lack of resources."

This conclusion led the Task Force to recommend that:

**"greater priority be given to collective training".**

**AIM**

2. To recommend ways to accord greater priority to collective training.

**ASSUMPTION AND CONSTRAINTS**

3. It is assumed that while current resource constraints can be expected to continue at Departmental level, the present application of resources within the Department is not immutable.

4. Overall concern for any degradation in individual training is common to all three environments. Basic training and the development of individual skills within all trades and specialties are the foundation upon which all further training (collective,



joint or team) rests. For that reason any impetus to give greater priority to collective training should not be construed to mean priority at the expense of individual training.

## FACTORS

5. **Confirmation of the Problem.** In discussion between the Review Group and the Commanders of environmental Commands, environmental Branch Chiefs at NDHQ and DGMAP/DLOG OPS, representing overall combat service support elements, an attempt was made to define the problem and to quantify it. These discussions led to the conclusion that the three environments do not share a common perception of collective training. Neither do they have a common perception of the extent to which there is a problem.

- a. **A Naval Perspective.** The naval view is that deficiencies in individual training have had an impact on preparing a man for duty at sea in general, and this does alter the quality of personnel available for collective training. Diminished environmental general duties training and reinforcement have reduced the cross-employment flexibility for watch on deck, combat and damage control teams, emergency and boarding parties, casualty replacement, etc., so necessary given the finite size of a ship's company. Attrition of pre-unification trained personnel and the lack of cross-trade leadership development reduce the reservoir of team leaders and general seamanship expertise to the detriment of collective training; however, the sequence, amount or type of collective naval training have not been essentially altered by unification.
- b. **An Air Force Perspective.** The air force view is that in respect of the "fixed wing" side of the operation the term "collective" would be better replaced with the word "joint". There has been more rather than less operational training with the army and the navy since unification. Also, within the air world there has been a steady increase in the amount of inter-force training (i.e. between air forces). From the point of view of tactical helicopter operations, there is a direct involvement in all aspects of army collective training. The extent to which tactical and medium transport helicopter squadrons can achieve a proficient collective training posture is predicated heavily upon the level and scope of collective training of army units and formations. As with the navy, adequate and effective individual training is seen to be essential to successful collective training. Collective, or joint, training per se is not, therefore, seen to be a problem from the air point of view, except insofar as the army's ability to carry out an adequate level of collective training affects the training of the ground/air team.
- c. **An Army Perspective.** The army's view of collective training is that it has been adversely affected by a wide variety of factors, including the unification process, or at least some of the events attending it. Land force collective training has been reduced or rendered less effective by

inadequate resources and the application of inappropriate priorities. It is generally conceded that the army is considered able to carry out a multiplicity of tasks only by training for a general purpose combat capability on a high intensity battle field. The need for adequate, effective and regular collective training is fundamental to the attainment of that capacity. Hence the army's concern for collective training.

**Deduction:** The navy and the air force have no significant problems with collective training, however, the army does.

**Conclusion:** The balance of this paper will deal with the land force problem.

## 6. Resources

- a. **Personnel availability** is key to the conduct of meaningful collective training as complete, or near complete, establishments are necessary to ensure the practice of essential skills within the complex interaction that characterizes field operations. Establishments in the field force are chronically undermanned due to courses, extraneous tasking and attrition.

**Deduction:** Effective collective training requires a stable manning situation.

- b. **Equipment.** Effective collective training requires the full range of vehicles, weapons, equipment and stores that a unit expects to use in actual operations. Collective training is in fact the practice or rehearsal of these operations. While some shortages of equipment exist, levels are generally adequate. Shared use, dictated by shortages, leads to abuse or loss however.

**Deduction:** Efforts must continue to redress shortages and the integrity of unit holdings should be maintained.

- c. **Ranges and training areas** of a large size are generally adequate and suitable. Some range development is planned and is necessary to extract maximum training value. These areas will continue to be suitable for the future if protected from encroachment. There is a paucity of minor ranges and training areas in unit locations. These are important for both regular and reserve units for training on an economical basis. Needs are being identified.

**Deductions:** (1) Major training areas require to be developed and to be protected.

- (2) A requirement to acquire some new minor training areas is apparent and recommendations for acquisition may be anticipated.

- d. **Airlift** is a finite resource upon which the army has come to depend heavily to accomplish collective training. There is considerable competition between users for available air hours. Some logistic requirements have priority over operational training requirements.

**Deduction:** The priorities for the allocation of airlift should be re-examined.

- e. **Combat supplies**, essentially ammunition and fuel, are most necessary to realistic and successful collective training. These items have generally been available in adequate quantities in the past. Rapidly escalating costs can be expected to constrain availability.

**Deductions:** (1) Priorities for the allocation of these resources must consider the requirements for collective training.

- (2) Reduction of ammunition expenditures through the use of simulation must accelerate and the expenditure of funds to accomplish this economy should be anticipated.

- f. **Time** to conduct collective training adequately is constrained by individual training, extraneous tasking and competing activity. Regular, protracted periods of time are needed for concentrated field deployments for collective training if professional standards are to be achieved at unit and formation level.

**Deduction:** Army field concentrations must take place on a regular basis and must be protected from interference to the greatest extent practical.

- g. **Funding** for collective training has generally been adequate only for a relatively low level of collective training activity. Multi-formation concentrations have not been possible recently. Funds for collective training represent a sizeable proportion of Commanders' discretionary funds. These are early targets in periods of fiscal restraint. The current budgeting process rests upon historical precedent based upon resource expenditure. New training activity can be contemplated only at the expense of the old in this climate. Comparison of competing activities in terms of cost and effectiveness is made extremely difficult.

**Deductions:** (1) Necessary funds to carry out regular field force concentrations for collective training must receive a high priority.

- (2) Reductions in funds for collective training to meet the need for financial cuts must only be made with due regard for the severe effects that will result. A high priority needs to be accorded to the maintenance of funding levels for collective training.



- (3) Consideration should be given to the development of a budgeting formula based upon activity cost rather than resource cost.

## 7. Priorities

- a. **Individual Training** is the fundamental basis of all further training. The question of priority between individual and collective training simply cannot arise. The conduct of individual training by field force units, however, imposes a severe constraint upon their collective training.

**Deductions:** (1) Where the two are seen to be in direct conflict, individual training must take priority over collective training.

- (2) Individual training must be conducted outside of the field units to the greatest extent practicable to assure their ability to carry out sufficient collective training.

- b. **Tasking** of all types has a direct, deleterious effect upon collective training. Operational tasking bears upon the *raison d'être* of the army and is accepted as a first priority. Operational tasks do provide some degree of training benefit in their execution. Non-operational tasks are generally non-military in nature, provide little or no training value and seriously constrain collective training.

**Deductions:** (1) Operational tasks of a non-military nature should only be undertaken when all other avenues have been exhausted.

- (2) Non-operational tasks should be avoided where possible; where acceptance is mandatory the effect upon collective training must be noted.

- (3) It must be accepted that reductions of collective training through tasking in turn reduces the army's capability to perform adequately on future tasks.

- c. **Resources** have been dealt with as a separate factor. The application of appropriate priorities to resource allocation is, however, a major consideration in terms of attaining and sustaining an effective level of capability through collective training. Founded upon adequate individual training, collective training produces the capability to meet effectively the many demands implicit in the roles assigned to the army. Ability to respond is predicated upon collective training.

**Deduction:** Careful consideration of the priorities accorded to the allocation of resources is necessary to ensure suitable collective training to produce operationally effective land forces.



## SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEDUCTIONS

8.
  - a. The navy and the air force have no significant problems with collective training however, the army does.
  - b. Effective collective training requires a stable manning situation.
  - c. Efforts must continue to redress shortages and the integrity of unit holdings should be maintained.
  - d. Major training areas require to be developed and to be protected.
  - e. A requirement to acquire some new minor training areas is apparent and recommendations for acquisition may be anticipated.
  - f. The priorities for the allocation of airlift should be re-examined.
  - g. Priorities for the allocation of combat supplies must consider the requirements for collective training.
  - h. Army field concentrations must take place on a regular basis and must be protected from interference to the greatest extent practical.
  - j. Necessary funds to carry out regular field force concentrations for collective training must receive a high priority.
  - k. Reductions in funds for collective training to meet the need for financial cuts must only be made with due regard for the severe effects that will result. A higher priority needs to be accorded to the maintenance of funding levels for collective training.
  - m. Consideration should be given to the development of a budgeting formula based upon activity cost rather than resources cost.
  - n. Where the two are seen to be in direct conflict, individual training must take priority over collective training.
  - p. Individual training must be conducted outside of field units to the greatest extent practicable to ensure their ability to carry out sufficient collective training.
  - q. Operational tasks of a non-military nature should only be undertaken when all other avenues have been exhausted.
  - r. Non-operational tasks should be avoided where possible; where acceptance is mandatory the effect upon collective training must be noted.
  - s. It must be accepted that the reduction of collective training through tasking in turn reduces the army's capability to perform adequately on future tasks.

- t. Careful consideration of the priorities accorded to the allocation of resources is necessary to ensure suitable collective training to produce operationally effective land forces.

## CONCLUSION

9. The Review Group concludes that inappropriate priorities accorded to resource allocation and to competing activities, have resulted in resources less than adequate to ensure essential collective training by land forces to attain and sustain a suitable professional standard.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

10. The Review Group accordingly recommends that the Minister of National Defence accept the subject Task Force recommendation, and further that:

- a. the Minister note the requirement that the army concentrate its field units annually to conduct extensive field training over a period of four to five weeks. These concentrations would be held at formation level in one year and at multi-formation level during the next year. Since the first multi-formation concentration to be held in 15 years is planned for the summer of 1981, it is further recommended that the Minister approve this activity, direct advance publicity and lend his support to its implementation; and,
- b. NDHQ examine the current allocation of resources within the Canadian Forces with a view to ensuring that appropriate collective training by the land forces can be supported.



## REVIEW GROUP STAFF PAPER ON

### IDENTITY

#### PART I - GENERAL

##### BACKGROUND

1. Ever since unification, the question of dress and the closely related subject of environmental identity has attracted great attention both within and without the Armed Forces. The subject of uniform design and colour is one which the public-at-large can easily understand. It is not surprising that the Task Force recommendations on uniforms were virtually the only ones which attracted press attention and comments when its Report was made public. It is thus prudent to assume that, although the most important recommendations that the Review Group will make upon the work of the Task Force will be in fields other than that of uniform, this question will probably receive the major share of publicity and discussion.

2. For this and other reasons, all aspects of the subject will be presented and discussed in as objective and full a fashion as possible. While this approach will entail some repetition of information which is contained elsewhere in this Report, such repetition is both desirable and necessary.

3. The basic problem discussed by the Task Force was one of a lack of identity. This shortcoming was expressed generally as a lack of environmental identity and a desire to return to the single Services of pre-unification times. Other aspects included a need for more unit and trade identity and a desire for support services personnel to be identified with the operators they support. It was noted that the present CF uniform did not meet these stated needs.

4. It is thus clear from the Task Force Report and the Review Group investigation that there is a lack of a clear and well founded policy on identity in the Canadian Forces. The Review Group has therefore undertaken as part of its job to consider the formulation of such a policy.

5. The Task Force recommendations on identity were:

a. **Recommendation 22**

"further identification be provided in the Canadian Forces for environment, ship, squadron or unit"



b. **Recommendation 23**

"trade badges be authorized"

c. **Recommendation 24**

"rank nomenclature for naval personnel be recognized throughout the Canadian Forces"

d. **Recommendation 25**

"the army retain the green uniform"

e. **Recommendation 26**

"naval personnel be allowed to select and wear a dark blue walking out uniform as soon as possible"

f. **Recommendation 27**

"air force personnel be allowed to select and wear a light blue uniform"

g. **Recommendation 28**

"any uniform modification take into account the overriding principle that uniforms be distinctively Canadian"

h. **Recommendation 29**

"the need for further support services identity be the subject of further study"

j. **Recommendation 30**

"any retention of the green uniform, in the context of recommendations above, include a complete, rationalized system of identification by environment, unit, rank and trade to be developed and applied by the Department of National Defence in a controlled manner"

## **REVIEW GROUP APPROACH**

6. Eight of the above recommendations deal with four separate forms of identity (environment, unit, rank, and trade), while the ninth is concerned with the overriding consideration of Canadian identity. The Review Group decided to combine certain of the recommendations because of their related nature and to facilitate thorough consideration without undue repetition. This combination process has led to the establishment of five identity groups as follows:

- a. Environmental Identity,
- b. Naval Rank Identity,
- c. Unit Identity,
- d. Trade Identity and,
- e. Canadian Identity.

7. As was the case with other recommendations, the Review Group has found it necessary to proceed from the general to the specific in dealing with identity. This paper will therefore first consider to what extent there is an unfulfilled need in the Canadian Forces for identity. The hierarchy of identity needs will then be discussed prior to treating each of the groups separately. Following a consideration of each of the groups of recommendations, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations formulated.

8. The body of the paper will make extensive use of the complete Task Force Report. Other source material includes submissions by NDHQ Branch Advisors and Commanders of Commands in response to a request from the Review Group. Utilized also will be a paper written by Captain (N) R.D. Yanow entitled "Canadian Forces Identity" while he was a student at the National Defence College in 1976-77 (referred to herein as "The Yanow Paper").

## **AIM**

9. The aim of this paper is to determine the need and practicability of implementing the Task Force recommendations on identity.

## **PART II - BASIC CONSIDERATIONS**

### **THE NEED FOR IDENTITY IN THE CANADIAN FORCES**

10. An all volunteer military force in a democratic society must maintain a value system which differs significantly from the norms of other professions. Society entrusts the military with the ultimate means of expressing the national will - the ability to wage war. For this reason democratic governments endeavour to maintain

the principle of civilian control over the military. This principle is workable only so long as the military agrees to it and strives for its preservation. In part what distinguishes the armed forces of a democracy from those of a country which has a different form of government is the acceptance of this principle within the value system of the military. If the military is to be disciplined at all, it must be self-disciplined first and foremost. Thus a military person must feel an overriding commitment to service on behalf of the society of which he is a member. Such a commitment is not predicated on selfish reasons such as a desire for monetary reward. A person does not go into battle for his country and risk the laying down of his life for money. However, military personnel do wish to be recognized for the service they render and are prepared to render on behalf of their country. Such a particular desire for recognition is fulfilled in part by the identification which comes with the wearing of a uniform. The Yanow Paper indicates the high degree of importance placed upon the matter of a Canadian Forces distinct societal identity. In a 1976-77 survey of 10,575 serving service personnel of all ranks conducted by means of a mail questionnaire, 97% "...considered that a Canadian Forces identity was important." Further, 69% did not think that the CF green uniform was distinctive to the degree necessary for public recognition. These statistics confirm that Canadian service personnel wish to have their own distinctive place in the Canadian fabric.

11. Along with the desire for public recognition is the need for recognition of the essential environmental differences which exist within the context of the Armed Forces. The Yanow Paper showed that 84% of service personnel are proud to be members of the Canadian Forces. Yet a unified force of some 80,000 people is too large for an individual to gain the proper sense of group identification which will foster esprit-de-corps and professional performance. Because only 22% of the personnel surveyed indicated that they identified most with the Canadian Forces whereas slightly more than double that number noted that they identified most with their element (navy, army, air force), Yanow concluded "...that the unification concept of a 'total family loyalty' may not have been realistic." In the face of such impressive numbers, it would seem reasonable to conclude that measures which would satisfy the desire to relate to an organization smaller than the Canadian Forces should be devised and implemented.

12. With regard to identity, the environmental Commanders have confirmed the need:

- a. for sailors, soldiers and airmen to be identified as such, although the Commander of Mobile Command was satisfied that by and large the needs of soldiers had been met with the present modifications to the CF uniform;
- b. for support services personnel to be able to identify with the element they support; and,
- c. for greater environmental identification, possibly through distinctive element uniforms as long as such a move could be made to apply to support services personnel as well.



## HIERARCHY OF IDENTITY NEEDS

13. **General.** The desire to belong to an organization is normally developed within an individual as a result of his personal association with the organization. The search for identity is a process which emerges from the bottom. For example, a recruit will first associate with his branch/trade as he progresses through trades training. He will then shift some of his allegiance to the first unit within which he serves and to the formation to which his unit belongs. At the same time, if the unit and trade are of a certain environment, then the environmental bonds will begin to dominate. One can therefore see that the environmental identity tie is strong because it is continually reinforced, especially with regard to the operational classifications and trades. In the case of the navy and air force, the loyalty of sailors and airmen eventually tends to focus on the element rather than on one particular unit. The unit whether it be a ship or an air squadron/base, is transitory in that allegiance is paid while serving in the unit but a sailor or an airman does not spend his entire career as a member of that particular unit. To soldiers, the focus is mainly on the regiment for it is as a member of that regiment that the soldier will progress through his career pattern. Notwithstanding the process of unification, the identity needs and allegiance pattern which have been described have not changed. Both the Task Force and the Yanow Paper have shown that, while all types of identity are important, most important of all to CF members remains the need for environmental identity.

14. **Canadian Forces Identity versus Environmental Identity for Operational Personnel.** It would seem reasonable to assume that, with a single title (the Canadian Forces), a common uniform, a common rank structure and rank nomenclature, and common administrative policies, the CF would have no trouble focusing the identity of its members on the Forces as a whole. This has not happened. It would appear that the reason is because the CF is an amalgam of different organizations which, except in the broadest sense, have no common mission and goals, and do not often perform together in combined operations. Notwithstanding that the navy and air force now operate together in some functional areas, as do the air force and army, there are major areas of CF responsibility where individual major environmental units do not interface with units of the other elements. The result is that identification with the Canadian Forces in its entirety has not happened since there is no common mission that would yield in its achievement a sense of close comradeship and understanding. In the absence of an early motive for strong identification with the CF, the desire and opportunities to develop and enhance identification with operationally functional groups has been carried over by those with former single-Service experience and by the new recruits for reasons discussed above. This manifestation should not be viewed as a rejection of CF identity. It is rather the natural human tendency to identify with a group whose roles, mores and *raison d'être* are understood by and appeal to the individual involved.

### 15. **Environmental Identity for Support Personnel**

- a. Much of what has been said concerning operational personnel also applies to those of the support services. There, a desire for environmental identity is also present and strong. Many, if not all, officers and tradesmen generally see themselves as sailors, soldiers and airmen first



and are proud of it. Many resent the fact that although their efforts are directly and indirectly applied to keeping the ships at sea, to providing vital support to soldiers in the field and to keeping aircraft flying, they are now classified as the support trades and are not seen to be associated, nor on a par, with the operators. The support services officers and other ranks who must transfer from one environment to another feel rootless and often unwanted in a force where others are clearly identified throughout their careers as proud members of the operations branches. In fact, it would be wrong to believe that the forward operations zone is made up exclusively of operators. On the contrary, the participation of combat support and service support personnel in operational groups such as a ship's company, a battalion group, or a tactical helicopter squadron, is essential and critical to the full operational capability of those units. Any action which would tend to separate the CF neatly into two components (the operators and the non-operators) would be wrong.

- b. Further, the branch advisors of support services personnel, and particularly those representing the Logistics, Land Ordnance Engineering, and Communications and Electronics Engineering stated that there had been no pressure from their members for new uniforms or for identity separate from that of the people they support. These comments support the Task Force statement that the majority of support services personnel did not wish to be recognized as members of a fourth service with separate identity. These views confirm that environmental identity is more of a concern than that of a separate uniform to support services personnel.

## **MORALE**

16. As has been noted, the army is satisfied with the green uniform as a result of the further recognition it has given to unit and individual identifiers. The navy and the air force have not followed the lead of the army although their members have indicated a strong desire for environmental identity. Personnel of individual environments it seems, would like to be able to improve the uniform as they see fit to meet their needs subject to NDHQ approval. Morale is closely linked to symbolism and internal and external recognition. It may reasonably be stated that if environmental uniform identifiers are permitted that morale would be improved. Ignoring for the moment whether the CF structure can tolerate separate uniforms, there has been a strong indication that ship's companies should be allowed a dark blue uniform for service at sea and visits to foreign ports. Service at sea requires a rugged uniform such as the existing work dress. Visits to foreign ports have two aspects: ceremonial and personal. Individuals on leave seldom wear uniforms in foreign ports. Ceremonial needs warrant consideration but not necessarily to the degree of providing a separate uniform. Again more obvious environmental identifiers could meet the desire. Morale is also tied to those other outward symbols of military life such as military bands, security guards at entrances to bases and installations, and regular parades. Owing to the drive to cut costs, these and most other aspects of military custom and ceremony have been jostled from their rightful places and the military atmosphere of our bases and units is being eroded. In addition to the reinstatement of military identifiers, the ceremonial aspects of military life must be revitalized.

## CONCLUSION

17. As individuals progress through the various levels of identity and serve in organizations with varying tasks and of varying sizes, an allegiance to the Canadian Forces as a whole is eventually developed. Both the Task Force Report and the Yanow Paper have shown that all types of identity are important to the individual but that the most important and lasting nevertheless, is the need for environmental identity. The hierarchy of identity needs is beneficial and necessary to both the individual and the Forces. It fosters esprit-de-corps based on common goals and interests and instills a sense of dedication which is of value to the CF notwithstanding that the immediate dedication is often to a group of less scope than the whole of the Forces. Finally, it has been determined that support services personnel do not wish to be recognized as members of a fourth service but rather as full fledged members of the element they support.

18. Having addressed some key considerations, this paper will now apply these and other considerations to a discussion of the five basic types of identity which need to be addressed before conclusions can be reached regarding the nine Task Force recommendations.

## PART III - ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITY

### GENERAL

19. Task Force Recommendations 1 and 2 were of sufficient magnitude as to subsequently influence and affect other recommendations, particularly those related to recruiting and identity. Recommendation 1, "The common central support system be retained", was taken by the Review Group to confirm Task Force support of unification. On the other hand, Recommendation 2, "support services personnel rotate between the central systems and their particular environment", indicated to the Review Group that the Task Force had a desire to see a return to a form of former environmental service support. In effect such a return would require the splitting of the personnel of the support services into navy, army and air force support elements. Personnel of these elements would serve alternately within their distinctive environment and the common central support systems only. Having come to these two conclusions the Task Force therefore could go on to recommend a distinctive recruiting pattern, three distinctive uniforms, and a complete rationalization of the different identities, secure in the view that three distinct environments, which included a proportional slice of support personnel, could be created and identified with the CF.

20. As a result of its consideration of Task Force Recommendations 1, 2 and 4, the Review Group agreed as indicated earlier in this report that the common central support systems be retained but could not support the proposal that support personnel rotate exclusively between the central systems and one environment. Non-support for Recommendation 2 was predicated upon the needs of the CF as expressed through the retention of a unified Force and a unified command and control structure

including the common central support systems. It also took into account the necessity to continue the practice of posting support personnel across environmental lines. Finally it took into account the effects on the CF of considerations such as efficiency, flexibility, cost effectiveness, personnel distribution, promotion opportunities, and morale.

## **INFLUENCE OF FORCE STRUCTURE**

21. Just as the structure of one unified force gave rise to the need for one uniform, so would the restructuring of three distinct services give rise to a return to three separate uniforms. To put it simply, the structure must dictate the choice of uniform, not the other way around. For reasons of operational, personnel and cost effectiveness the Review Group supports the implied Task Force conclusion that unification should be retained and further notes that Government policy on this matter has not changed. Having confirmed that the unified structure of the CF is to remain, the retention of a single uniform follows naturally. To support a return to three distinctive uniforms under the circumstances would be illogical and would be to invite criticism on the grounds of having "backed into" the fundamental issue of unification through the uniform question.

## **THE REALITY OF UNIFICATION**

22. As the Task Force Report implied the conclusion that unification should be retained and as the Review Group endorses this conclusion, a return to three uniforms at this time would do nothing to change the substance of unification and would merely create an illusion of separateness. Thus it would unnecessarily emphasize and distort the physical differences between people of different environments. It would also exacerbate the problems of support services personnel who would still have to be posted across environmental lines regardless of the colour of the uniform they would have chosen to wear.

## **COST**

23. The Task Force noted that "the cost implications of providing greater identity through distinctive uniforms cannot be established with certainty, but seem to be small compared to the advantage which would accrue to the Canadian Forces." Of the witnesses who noted that identity was a high priority, most expressed the view that equipment should come first with identity as a secondary consideration. The financial cost of introducing over a five year period uniforms of current styles but in three colours is estimated to be \$26,400,000 in 1980 dollars. In view of the criterion that the needs of the CF must come first and taking into consideration the view of witnesses before the Task Force that equipment purchases should be made before steps to enhance identity are undertaken, the question must be posed of whether it is desirable to spend \$26,400,000 on new uniforms. Perhaps other less expensive measures could be adopted to meet the need for identity.



## **SUPPORT SERVICES IDENTITY CONSIDERATIONS**

24. The support services personnel have given their opinion that they do not wish to be regarded as a fourth element with a separate identity. They prefer to be identified with the environment which they support. The choice of three uniforms would split the support services into three elements. The Review Group analysis of Task Force Recommendation 2 has shown such a split to be impractical for reasons of trade structure and employment patterns. Further, as has been noted in the same appreciation, the promotion potential of these personnel would be reduced sharply.

## **CONCLUSION**

25. Bearing in mind that the needs of the Forces should dominate, the Review Group made a most earnest analysis of each of the factors listed above. This analysis has led the Review Group to the conclusion that it cannot support the Task Force recommendations for a return to three uniforms. Other methods of providing environmental identity are possible however, and will be discussed below.

## **PART IV - NAVAL RANK IDENTITY**

### **GENERAL**

26. Naval personnel would like to have naval rank nomenclature fully recognized throughout the Canadian Forces, whereas the army and air force are quite content with the present titles and further, did not express any objection to the desire of the navy. There is an allied aspect to this subject which is that naval personnel cannot be recognized as such unless they wear a uniform jacket, headdress or naval skill badge. Both of these, rank nomenclature and insignia, must be considered together and, if approved would give reinforcement to environmental recognition as well as increasing the distinctiveness of the uniform. Present policy (CFAO 3-2) states that officers and men of the naval operations branch "shall use and be referred to by the appropriate naval rank." This policy recognizes the essential environmental difference of the navy but it is not being followed in all instances. For example, the NDHQ telephone book partially features naval ranks, but the officers' list and pay guide afford no recognition at all. It is exactly this lack of a clear application of the policy which is decried by the Commander of Maritime Command. He is emphatic in his request to have naval ranks officially recognized and implemented throughout the whole of the Canadian Forces. It would appear that the regulations contained in CFAO 3-2 need to be emphasized and given more definite implementation.



## **TRADITION**

27. Navies of the world have long used rank nomenclature similar to that which is now in use by members of the naval operations branch. Most of these navies also have rank insignia which instantly identify the wearer as being a naval person. The absence of full recognition and uniform use of naval rank nomenclature and rank insignia has caused embarrassment to Canadian sailors in their dealings with navies of other countries and this embarrassment has led to a lowering of morale within the ranks and may lead to a degradation of operational effectiveness. It is worthy of note that CF ranks suit the army and air force personnel because they are almost identical to those used by other armies and air forces.

## **COST**

28. Only administrative changes are necessary to ensure the universal recognition of naval rank nomenclature. These changes can be introduced and accomplished progressively over a period of time. Costs for these activities are considered to be moderate. There will be one-time, start up expenses associated with the production of naval rank insignia. The continuing costs will be small as the adopted naval rank insignia will be replacing the ones now worn.

## **CONCLUSION**

29. Due and proper consideration must be given to naval tradition within the unified Canadian Forces. The Review Group is convinced that naval rank nomenclature should be recognized throughout the CF. The same opinion applies to naval rank insignia. The detailed choice of such insignia should be left to those who have the knowledge necessary to make the decision. However, as guidance, the consensus within the Review Group is that for officers, the naval curl should be restored as it allows instant recognition and is internationally identifiable. A return to the old single-Service navy rank insignia for the other ranks is not deemed to be suitable as this would impede CF-wide rank recognition. A distinctively naval insignia could perhaps be added to the present CF rank badge to solve the problem.

## **PART V - UNIT IDENTITY**

### **GENERAL**

30. Comments forwarded by NDHQ staff in response to a Review Group request have acknowledged that a drastic change to existing policy is not necessary in order to foster greater unit identity. At present, combat arms regiments have attained authority to wear cloth shoulder titles on service dress and work dress. Such shoulder

titles are to be worn by all members of the regiment whether regimentally or extra-regimentally employed. Ships, squadrons and other units (other than those of the combat arms) are authorized to wear cloth unit badges on work dress, at the individual's option. In addition, unit cloth titles for combat clothing wear have been authorized for army units.

## **COST**

31. In all of the cases noted above, the present policy is that shoulder titles and unit badges are to be procured and issued at no expense to the public. As such items are part of the uniform and contribute to morale through recognition of identity, it is the Review Group's view that they should be provided at public expense. Unit identifiers provided in accordance with the present policy would cost approximately \$300,000.

## **RESULTS OF PRESENT POLICY**

32. The army has found that regimental/unit identity together with permanency of association has fostered a high level of morale. Unit identity in the army sense establishes a focal point of loyalty based on tradition and common goals and interests, recognizes the desire of individuals to relate to a common goal and group, fosters esprit-de-corps and forms the basis for healthy combat-related competition between units. The navy and the air force practice and experience have been somewhat different with the unit not being as significant a focal point as it is with the army. As the regimental system practised by the army is not part of naval or air force life, the impermanency of the association with a ship or squadron does not engender the same type of unit loyalty within these two environments as that which exists within the army. As a result, the loyalty of seamen and airmen tends to focus ultimately on the element rather than on one particular unit.

## **CONCLUSION**

33. In view of the greater importance of defining and highlighting environmental identity, the present policy with regard to unit identity seems to satisfy the needs of the CF and its personnel, except that unit identifiers should be provided at public expense at a cost of \$300,000.

## **PART VI - TRADE IDENTITY**

### **GENERAL**

34. The Task Force's recording of the views expressed in regard to this matter was simply that "many support personnel expressed a desire to re-introduce trade badges." This desire resulted in a Task Force conclusion that "there is a requirement across the Canadian Forces for increased trade identification", which in turn led to the formulation of the recommendation.

## **SUPPORTING EVIDENCE**

35. In previous discussions of the need for identity in the Canadian Forces, the hierarchy of needs and the case for environmental identity, it was stated that the individual at the outset of his career identified with his trade and then progressed on to identify with the unit and environment. To date the personnel of the support trades have had no ready, identifiable means for satisfying the need for an identity higher than that of trade, and hence have tended to associate strongly with their particular trade. Thus, it is not surprising that the only voices strongly in favour of trade identity come from the support trades. Logistics and Land Ordnance Engineering are in favour but the Communications and Electronics personnel are against the idea. The Commanders of Maritime Command and Air Command have expressed mild support while the Commander of Mobile Command would be in favour only if there was a significant groundswell of desire. The Command Chief Warrant Officers were polled twice and noted that they were against trade badges and had received virtually no indication from their personnel that trade badges were wanted. It is probable that a closer identification of the support trades personnel with the environment of which they are a part would serve to negate the demand for trade identification.

## **COST**

36. It is estimated that the cost of providing trade badges for other ranks of the Regular and Reserve Forces for wear on service dress and work dress would be \$800,000 in 1980 dollars. This sum is based on only one distinctive badge for each trade and excludes a more elaborate version of the badge at each level of trade progression, and does not include trade speciality badges and badges for specialities which are common to more than one trade. Use of trade badges by the former Navy and Army was universal while in the Air Force only medical assistants and bandsmen wore trade badges. These previous practices reasonably lead to the assumption that it would be necessary to provide trade badges for all trades and thus incur the total expense of \$800,000.

## **CONCLUSION**

37. In view of the fact that trade is perceived to be a less important level of identity, while environmental identity seems to be the most important, it would be wise to satisfy the need for environmental recognition before that of trade identity. It is probable that the desire for trade badges will be negated by a system of identifiers which will clearly indicate the environment which the individual is supporting.

## **PART VII - CANADIAN IDENTITY**

### **GENERAL**

38. Most witnesses appearing before the Task Force expressed the opinion that uniforms should have a strong Canadian identity to ensure that our military personnel



are not mistaken for those of other nations. Review Group investigation revealed overwhelming support for this recommendation.

## **CONCLUSION**

39. The Review Group endorses without qualification the overriding principle that uniforms be distinctively Canadian.

## **PART VIII - RATIONALIZATION OF CANADIAN FORCES UNIFORM**

### **GENERAL**

40. There was no specific testimony offered to the Task Force nor were there any remarks in the concluding section of the Task Force Report which could provide direct background information to Recommendation 30 that: "Any retention of the green uniform, in the context of recommendations above, include a complete, rationalized system of environment, unit, rank and trade to be developed and applied by the Department of National Defence in a controlled manner." However, it is the opinion of the Commanders of the environmental Commands and of the NDHQ Branch Advisors that the CF is gradually solving its identity problems and that Recommendation 30 contains the solution to the whole identity problem.

41. The points emphasized during the consideration of environmental identity indicate that a move back to three Services under the present circumstances is not in the best interests of either the CF or the individual and thus is not warranted. Environmental identity is certainly vital but should be attained in ways that are compatible with the CF green uniform.

### **POSSIBLE RATIONALIZATION METHODS**

42. The army has demonstrated that modifications to the CF green uniform are possible and go a long way toward satisfying the need for greater environmental identity. It is clear that the other two environments could achieve the same positive results as those attained by the army. Of course, any system of environmental identifiers must be applied to support services personnel, and to the Reserve Force and the Cadets.

43. Environmental, unit and individual identity are very closely linked. Those identifiers which enable instant environmental recognition also give to the individual an identity of his own. It is felt by the Review Group that the matter of each of the three types of identity is an interwoven one which is capable of reciprocal solution. Without limiting either initiative or its application, some examples of identifiers which pertain to environment, unit and individual could be:



- a. distinctive rank insignia in the form of an addition to the common CF badges of rank which would denote environment;
- b. shirts and/or berets of a different colour;
- c. uniform buttons and shoulder titles;
- d. the adoption of a type of headdress for exclusive use by the personnel of one environment;
- e. the wearing of an environmental cap badge by all who are serving with the navy or air force; and,
- f. the garbing of environmental bands and ceremonial guards in traditional uniforms as a manifestation of our military heritage.

## CONCLUSION

44. The Review Group believes that there is no impediment to the establishment of a rationalized system of identity which would apply equally to the operational and support branches of the CF. However, the Review Group is of the opinion that the details of dress and identity regulations should be decided upon by a committee specifically formed with that task in mind.

## PART IX - CONCLUDING MATERIAL

### CONCLUSIONS

45. The overwhelming majority of Canadian service personnel are proud to be members of the Canadian Forces and feel that a Canadian Forces identity is important. Notwithstanding, only 20% place identification with the Canadian Forces as their top identity priority, while almost half identify most with a particular environment.

46. Identification with a group is a collective, as well as an individual, term. In the case of the navy and air force, the loyalty of sailors and airmen tends to focus primarily on the element rather than on one particular unit. To soldiers, the focus is mainly on the regiment/unit for it is as a member of that group that the soldier will progress through his career. Both the Task Force Report and the Yanow Paper have shown that all types of identity are important but that the most important is the need for element or environmental identity.

47. With the realization by both the Task Force and the Review Group that the central support systems, the command and control apparatus and the attendant single-force structure are here to stay, the Review Group conclusion that a single uniform should be retained follows logically and reasonably. To decide on the number and colour of uniforms using any other criterion than that of operational and organizational effectiveness would be to "back into" the fundamental issue of unification.

48. The majority of support services personnel wish to be recognized as members of the element they support.
49. Environmental identity must be resolved first before going on to deal with unit and individual identity. It may well be that resolution of the overriding environmental issue will obviate the need for further consideration of the other two.
50. As identity symbols are part of the uniform, they should be provided at no cost to the individual.
51. There is no reason why naval rank nomenclature and appropriate naval rank identifiers cannot be instituted immediately. This corrective action would provide a means of instant rank and environment recognition, pay due regard to our naval customs and traditions, and would be responsive to the wishes of the individual.
52. The desire for trade badges expressed by certain support services branches will probably be satisfied by a system of identifiers which will more closely link the supporters to an environment. Therefore, no decision on this matter should be made at this time.
53. The green CF uniform is distinctly Canadian, cannot be mistaken for that of the Armed Forces of other countries and, with the addition of appropriate identifiers, will be more readily acceptable to the Canadian military and the general public. However, any modification must take into account the overriding principle that uniforms continue to be distinctly Canadian.
54. A rationalized system of identity for the CF should be established with details to be decided upon by a committee specifically set up for the task.

## **PART X - RECOMMENDATIONS**

53. It is recommended that the Minister of National Defence:
- a. re-affirm that the Canadian Forces will retain the green uniform for wear by all personnel; and,
  - b. concur in the establishment by the Chief of the Defence Staff of a "CF Committee on Identity" to formulate detailed regulations concerning environment, unit and individual identity in keeping with the spirit of the thoughts expressed in this paper.

56. It is further recommended that the Minister of National Defence note the position of the Review Group with regard to each of the Task Force recommendations:

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Review Group Position</b>
22	Supported
23	Supported with qualifications
24	Supported
25	Not supported
26	Not supported
27	Not supported
28	Supported
29	Not supported
30	Supported

## RECOMMENDED DISPOSAL OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

### SUMMARY

FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY/RECOMMENDATION	Support <sup>(1)</sup>	Support (Qualified)	Do Not Support
<b>COMMAND AND CONTROL</b>			
20 Commanders as Members of DC and DMC	o		
21 Heads of Service in NDHQ		x	
<b>MOBILIZATION</b>			
18 Mobilization Planning Priority	o		
19 Scope of Mobilization Study	o		
<b>SUPPORT SERVICES</b>			
1 Common Central Support Systems	x		
2 Posting Policy, Support Personnel			x
3 Inadequacies in the Supply System	o		
14 Environmental Preference in Recruiting		x	
<b>BASE CONCEPT</b>			
15 Flexibility in Base Concept	x		
16 "Double-Hatting" in Service Battalions	x		
17 Evaluation of CF Base System	x		
<b>PERSONNEL</b>			
4 Cross-Environmental Postings			x
5 Promotion Inducement			x
6 NCO Rank Structure	x		
7 Rank/Trade Structure	o		
8 Sea/Shore, Field/Static Ratios	o		
9 Authority of CO	x		
<b>TRAINING</b>			
10 Environmental Training and Socialization	o		
11 Environmental Training Facilities	o		
12 Environmental Training, Support Personnel	o		
13 Collective Training Priority	o		
<b>IDENTITY</b>			
22 Further Environmental/Unit Identity	x		
23 Trade Badges		x	
24 Naval Rank Nomenclature	x		
25 Green Uniform for Army			x
26 Dark Blue Uniform for Navy			x
27 Light Blue Uniform for Air Force			x
28 Distinctively Canadian Uniforms	x		
29 Support Services Identity			x
30 Rationalization of Identification System	x		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>

Note (1)

"o" Denotes those recommendations on which action has been initiated.























